Ford v. Baltimore City Sheriff's Office, 2514

• Decision Date: 27 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2514,2514
• Parties: Earnest FORD v. BALTIMORE CITY SHERIFF'S OFFICE.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

814 A.2d 127

149 Md. App. 107

Earnest FORD v. BALTIMORE CITY SHERIFF'S OFFICE.

No. 2514, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

December 27, 2002.

Joseph I. Tiwis, Jr. (Leonard C. Redmond, III, P.C. on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Frank W. Mann, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Kimberly Smith Ward, Asst. Atty. Gen. on the brief), Baltimore, for appellees.

Argued Before ADKINS, GREENE and CHARLES E. MOYLAN (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. GREENE, Judge.

On March 3, 1999, appellant, Earnest Ford, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming the Baltimore City Sheriff's Office and Baltimore City Deputy Sheriff's Arthur Phillips, Mary Krall, and Arthur Seabrook as defendants in a suit alleging counts of assault, battery, negligence, negligent trespass, intentional trespass, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. Thereafter, appellant amended his complaint to remove the Baltimore City Sheriff's Office as a defendant. Appellant instead added the State of Maryland as a defendant in the amended complaint. On November 30, 2001, at the conclusion of a hearing, the court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by appellees. Appellant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate, or in the Alternative, for Reconsideration and a Request for Hearing. The court denied that motion on January 8, 2002.

Appellant noted an appeal from the court's January 8, 2002, decision to present the following questions for review¹:

I. Did the court err in ruling that Deputy Phillips did not act with malicious intent? II. Did the court err in concluding that the State was not negligent?

III. Did the court err in concluding that appellees did not violate appellant's State constitutional rights?

Regarding appellant's first question presented, we hold that the facts viewed in a light most favorable to appellant do not support a finding of malice or negligence. We conclude, however, that the court erred in dismissing the State constitutional claims against the State.

FACTS

In 1995, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Queen, who was charged with non-support. The warrant identification letter noted that Queen was an African-American male, 5'9" tall, and weighed approximately 155 lbs. The warrant notification letter was dated July 28, 1995, and indicated that the warrant was "due" on October 28, 1995. Queen was sentenced to eighteen months in the Anne Arundel County Detention Center on January 22, 1998. The warrant was consequently dismissed on the day of Queen's sentencing.

On March 10, 1998, not realizing the arrest warrant had been dismissed, Baltimore City Deputy Sheriffs Phillips, Krall, and Seabrook attempted to execute the warrant at 2705 Norland Road, Baltimore, Maryland, where Ford allegedly had resided since 1993. The sheriffs were dressed in plain clothes with their badges around their necks. Following procedure, Deputies Phillips and Krall approached the front door while Deputy Seabrook guarded the back door to ensure that the suspect did not escape.

Upon knocking on the front door, the deputies were greeted by appellant, an African-American male, standing 5'9", but weighing approximately 210 lbs. Appellant was a Maryland State Trooper, although this fact was unknown to appellees. The parties dispute whether Deputy Phillips identified himself or stated the purpose of the visit.² Deputy Phillips asked permission to enter the residence to speak with appellant. Appellant stated that the deputies could not come in and attempted to close the front door. Deputy Phillips stuck his foot in the door to keep it from closing and he and Deputy Krall forced their way into appellant's home. Upon entering the residence, Deputy Phillips advised appellant that he had a warrant permitting him to enter appellant's home.³

Appellant, faced with the forcible entry, moved toward his telephone to attempt to call for assistance. Appellant contends that Deputy Phillips, seeing the furtive movement, jumped on his back and pinned him on the couch. Although these facts are in dispute, it is clear that appellant, at some point, was able to call 911 for assistance and informed the operator that unknown individuals were in his house. Appellant was also able to make a second call to his Maryland State Police barracks. It is undisputed that appellant refused to inform the deputies of his identity.

At this time, Deputy Seabrook entered the home to assist the other deputies and search for other people. Deputy Seabrook, while searching the residence, noticed a photograph of appellant wearing a State Trooper uniform. Deputy Seabrook informed the other deputies of his discovery. Thereafter, Deputy Phillips asked appellant if he was a Maryland State Trooper, but appellant would not reveal his identity.⁴

Shortly thereafter, Baltimore City police officers arrived in response to appellant's 911 call. Deputy Phillips explained to the responding officers that he possessed an arrest warrant for an individual living at the address and that the deputies were attempting to determine if appellant was the subject of the warrant. Officer Derek Phyall, one of the Baltimore City officers, recognized appellant and indicated that appellant was a Maryland State Trooper. A debate arose between Deputy Phillips and Officer Phyall when the officer refused to reveal appellant's identity and defended appellant's right to refuse to answer the deputies' questions. Appellant eventually went upstairs and retrieved his driver's license. The license revealed that appellant was not the subject of the arrest warrant. Consequently, Deputy Phillips recorded the information, apologized to appellant, and left the residence.

Appellant further contends that Deputy Phillips used obscenities and abusive language during the entire incident. He further alleges that he sustained injuries to his back when Deputy Phillips jumped on him to subdue him.

On March 3, 1999, appellant filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging assault, battery, negligence, negligent trespass, intentional trespass, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, and violations of the Maryland State Declaration of Rights. The complaint named the three Baltimore City deputy sheriffs and the Baltimore City Sheriff's Department as defendants. On March 31, 1999, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, appellant filed an amended complaint in which he eliminated the Baltimore City Sheriff's Department as a defendant and instead included the State of Maryland. Defendants filed another Motion to Dismiss that was subsequently denied on May 4, 1999. Consequently, appellant filed a second amended complaint against the State of Maryland and the Baltimore City deputy sheriffs as defendants. Specifically the second amended complaint alleged assault, battery, negligence, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the State of Maryland, Deputies Phillips, Krall and Seabrook. The second amended complaint also included counts of negligent trespass, intentional trespass, violations of the State Declaration of Rights against all four defendants, and counts of negligent training and supervision against the State of Maryland.

On or about April 7, 2000, at the conclusion of discovery, appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the second amended complaint in its entirety. On May 2, 2000, the court granted appellees' motion. On May 19, 2000, appellant filed a Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On this same date, appellant also filed a motion to vacate or, alternatively, for reconsideration of the court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. The court, on June 14, 2000, denied both appellant's motion to extend time and motion to vacate or reconsider the grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. On July 13, 2000, appellant noted an appeal to this Court, challenging the grant of appellees' summary judgment motion and the denial of appellant's subsequent motions. In an unreported opinion, filed on March 27, 2001, we reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings so that the circuit court could consider appellant's opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on November 30, 2001. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court again granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of all defendants. On December 10, 2001, appellant once again filed a Motion to Vacate or, In the Alternative, for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing. That motion was denied on January 8, 2002.

Appellant thereafter noted this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part:

The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. See Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676, 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Williams v. Mayor & Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114, 753 A.2d 41 (2000). The trial court on summary judgment must not try the case or decide factual disputes, but decide the case when no dispute of material facts exists. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. Inc., 366 Md. 29, 73, 782 A.2d 807 (2001); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564 (1981). The standard of appellate review is...