Ford v. City of Huntsville, 00-20293
| Decision Date | 22 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-20293,00-20293 |
| Citation | 242 F.3d 235 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) Deneen Ford, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. City of Hunstville; Hank Eckhardt, Defendants-Appellees, v. The Huntsville Item, Movant-Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before: KENNEDY,* JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
Appellant The Huntsville Item, a local newspaper, appeals from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene and motion to vacate an agreed order prohibiting disclosure of settlement documents in the underlying lawsuit between appellees, plaintiff Deneen Ford and defendant City of Huntsville. On appeal, appellant alleges that (1) it had standing to intervene in the original action, and (2) the district court erred in issuing the confidentiality order. For the reasons stated below, we grant appellant's motion to intervene and vacate the district court's confidentiality order.
Deneen Ford filed the underlying lawsuit against the city of Huntsville, Texas and police chief Hank Eckhardt claiming that her employer, the Huntsville Police Department, racially and sexually discriminated against her. The local newspaper, The Huntsville Item, reported on the progress of the suit from its filing. The parties to the suit ultimately reached a settlement, and on December 22, 1999, the parties filed an Agreed Motion to Dismiss in the district court. (R.55.) The district court entered an Agreed Order of Dismissal on December 27, 1999. At the initial request of plaintiff Ford, the parties also jointly submitted an Agreed Order of Confidentiality, prohibiting disclosure of the terms of the settlement. The district court issued the Agreed Order of Confidentiality on December 28, 1999.
On January 19, 2000, appellant The Huntsville Item moved to intervene in the original lawsuit and to vacate the Agreed Order of Confidentiality, alleging that the confidentiality order was impermissible under the Texas Public Information Act (Texas Act) which provides that a settlement agreement to which a governmental body is a party is public information.1 The district court summarily denied appellant's Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Agreed Order on February 16, 2000, without a hearing and without offering any findings or conclusions.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, appellant challenges the district court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene. Secondly, appellant claims that the district court erred in issuing the confidentiality order protecting the underlying settlement agreement.
Appellant alleges that the district court erred in denying its motion to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), and that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion under the standard for permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). The district court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its denial of appellant's motion to intervene.
A district court's denial of intervention as of right is reviewed de novo. Taylor Communications Group, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 172 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1999). Intervention as of right is governed by Rule 24(a) which provides that "[u]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). To intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), appellant must meet a four prong test. Each of the following four requirements must be satisfied:
(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair his ability to protect that interest; (4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.
Under the first requirement, the district court should have considered four factors to determine whether appellant's application for intervention was timely. The four factors are:
(1) The length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case before it petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as a result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely.
Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994). Although a district court's determination regarding the timeliness of intervention is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, it is reviewed de novo where the district court failed to make any findings regarding its timeliness conclusion. Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205 n.2. In the present case, the district court did not address the question of timeliness.
Appellant filed its motion to intervene on January 19, 2000, twenty-two days after the entry of the confidentiality order on December 28, 1999. Appellees, the original parties to the case, filed their motion for the confidentiality order on December 27, 1999. (R.14.) Appellant's interest in the case is limited to obtaining access to the settlement documents. Appellant had no reason to think that such access would be denied until the confidentiality agreement was proposed. Therefore, appellant's interest in the case did not arise until appellees filed their joint motion for the confidentiality agreement. As a result, there were only twenty-three days between the time when appellant could have learned of its interest in the case and the time at which it filed its motion to intervene. In Stallworth v Monsanto Co., 558, F.2d 257, 267 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit applied the four factors listed above and concluded generally that "[b]y filing their petition less than one month after learning of their interest in this case, the appellants discharged their duty to act quickly." In addition, this court has emphasized that the relevant prejudice is that created by the intervenor's delay in seeking to intervene after it learns of its interest, not prejudice to existing parties if intervention is allowed. Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992). No apparent prejudice to the original parties resulted from appellant filing its motion in January as opposed to December, and no such prejudice was alleged. In addition, because appellant seeks only to litigate the issue of the confidentiality order and not to reopen the merits of the dispute between the original parties, even a greater delay in the intervention would not have prejudiced the parties. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 780 (3d Cir. 1994). Under the third timeliness factor, appellant could suffer prejudice if its motion is denied, because if it brings a separate suit to gain access to the information under the Texas Act, any potential remedy will be restricted by the confidentiality order issued here. There are no unusual circumstances to be considered under the fourth factor above. Thus, we conclude that appellant's motion to intervene was timely.
The second condition to intervention as of right requires that appellant have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the underlying action. In the context of intervention, the Fifth Circuit has warned against defining "property or transaction" too narrowly. Ceres Gulf, 957 F.2d at 1203. This court has held that a news agency has a legal interest in challenging a confidentiality order, stating that "members of the news media, although not parties to litigation, can appeal court closure orders or confidentiality orders under the collateral order doctrine." Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School District, 78 F.3d 920, 926 (5th Cir. 1996). More specifically, appellant has a legal interest arising under the Texas Act, section 552.022(a)(18), which provides that "a settlement agreement to which a governmental body is a party," is "public information and [is] not excepted from required disclosure under this chapter unless [it is] expressly confidential under other law." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 552.022(a)(18) (Vernon 1999).
The Third Circuit has explained that Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777. In the present case, the confidentiality order issued by the district court presents an obstacle to appellant's attempt to obtain the settlement agreement. Standing to challenge the confidentiality order demonstrates the interest required to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). For these reasons, we conclude that appellant has an interest relating to the underlying action and satisfies the second condition for intervention as of right.
The third condition for intervention as of right requires that the disposition of the case may impair the applicant's ability to...
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