Ford v. City of Shreveport

• Decision Date: 08 November 1943
• Docket Number: 37023.
• Citation: 204 La. 618,16 So.2d 127
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: FORD et al. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT.

16 So.2d 127

204 La. 618

FORD et al. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT.

No. 37023.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

November 8, 1943

Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1943.

Chandler & Chandler, of Shreveport, for plaintiffs, appellants.

J H. Jackson, of Shreveport, for defendant, appellee.

PONDER Justice.

The plaintiffs, Frank H. Ford and others, are seeking in this suit to cancel Ordinance No. 8 of 1942 of the City of Shreveport insofar as it affects and levies a paving assessment against their property. They are now appealing from a judgment of the lower court rejecting their demands.

In March 1941, the City of Shreveport inaugurated proceedings to pave Southern Avenue from St. Vincent's Ave. to 59th St. On May 27, 1941, Ordinance No. 23 of 1941 was adopted by the City, authorizing the paving under the provisions of Act No 10 of 1896. The plaintiffs filed written protests against the adoption of the ordinance. The paving was completed and accepted. The City then adopted Ordinance No. 8 of 1942 levying assessments against the abutting property owners. The plaintiffs also entered a written protest to this ordinance.

The paving covers a distance of approximately 1.66 miles. However plaintiffs' property which abuts the street is only a distance of 500 feet.

The part of the street adjacent to the plaintiffs' property was formerly owned by Mrs. Laura Sempe. Originally Mrs. Sempe owned 35 acres of land in the vicinity, including the part of the street in controversy and the adjacent property owned by the plaintiffs. On May 27, 1912, while Mrs. Sempe was the record owner of the entire 35 acres of land, she granted a right-of-way 60 feet in width and 582.12 feet in length, which now forms that part of the street adjoining the plaintiffs' property, to the Shreveport Traction Company. This right-of-way deed is the subject of considerable dispute in this case. The dispute resolves itself to whether the deed conveys the fee to the right-of-way or a mere servitude.

Subsequent to the granting of the right-of-way to the Shreveport Traction Company, W. T. Willis secured a judgment against Mrs. Laura J. Sempe decreeing him the owner of a certain undivided interest in the 35-acre tract of land. On July 22, 1916, a partition was entered into between Mrs. Sempe and Willis whereby Willis received a portion of the land. There is some dispute as to whether he received the naked fee to the right-of-way previously granted the Shreveport Traction Company.

Willis later transferred all the property he received in the partition east of the right-of-way to Albert C. Steere, ancestor of the plaintiffs' title. The remainder of the property he received in the partition he sold to Cecil L. Bland. Miss Octavia Hunter acquired the property sold to Bland in a foreclosure proceeding. On June 12, 1941, Miss Hunter executed a deed dedicating to the City of Shreveport that part of the street involved in this suit.

The plaintiffs contend that Mrs. Sempe has never parted with the fee of the part of the street lying adjacent to their property and that the fee still remains in her subject to the right-of-way previously granted to the Shreveport Traction Company, now the Shreveport Railways Company. In the alternative, the plaintiffs take the position that the Shreveport Traction Company owns the fee to this part of the street. In the further alternative, plaintiffs contend that the land forming this part of the street has never been legally dedicated.

The City of Shreveport relies on the deed of Miss Hunter dedicating to it the land covered by this part of the street. The City contends in the alternative that if the fee to the land, covered by this part of the street, was the property of the Shreveport Railways Company at the time the paving was commenced, then, in that event, the City should now be decreed the owner of the land on the ground that there was an implied dedication.

As we take it, the basis of the contentions advanced by the plaintiffs is to the effect that the City is attempting to tax...