Ford v. Coleman
Decision Date | 26 May 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-1261-J-39JBT |
Parties | KENNETH FORD, Plaintiff, v. BENNIE COLEMAN, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Plaintiff Kenneth Ford, an inmate of the Florida penal system and former pretrial detainee of the Columbia County Detention Facility (CCDF), is proceeding on a Second Amended Complaint (Second Amended Complaint) (Doc. 36) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is represented by counsel. Plaintiff names Bennie Coleman, the Administrator of CCDF, as a Defendant. Plaintiff also names D'Andra Cole, Renee Lents, Troy Green, Donna Tyre, and Richard Collins, all officials at CCDF, as Defendants. Finally, although not a model of clarity, Plaintiff names "John Doe(s) 2" as Defendants.1
Plaintiff raises the following Counts in his Second Amended Complaint: Count I: Violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Right to Free Speech), a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Cole, Lents, Green, Tyre, and Collins; Count II: Violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Retaliation), a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Coleman; Count III: Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures) a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against John Doe(s) 2 Defendants; Count IV: Violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Right to Counsel), a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Coleman, Cole, Lents, Green, Tyre, and Collins; and Count V: Declaratory Relief, a claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 against Defendants for their violation of Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant Coleman's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 42) and Defendants Cole, Lents, Green, Tyre and Collins' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) were filed on June 30, 2014.
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Plaintiff's Motion) (Doc. 46), requesting the Court enter partial summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's First Amendment claim (Count I), his Sixth Amendment claim (CountIV), and his declaratory relief claim (Count V). Plaintiff also seeks a partial summary judgment regarding Defendants Tyre and Lents' first (qualified immunity), second (qualified immunity), fourth (negligence/failure to state a constitutional claim), and fifth (mootness of declaratory relief claim) affirmative defenses.2 In response, Defendants Tyre and Lents' Second Amended Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) was filed on January 6, 2015. This cause is also before the Court on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Final Judgment (Doc. 47) (Defendants' Amended Motion) and Amended Notice of Filing in Support of Motion for Summary Final Judgment of Defendants' (Doc. 48).3 Plaintiff responded. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Final Judgment (Plaintiff's Response) (Doc. 52). Plaintiff also filed a Rule 56(c)(1)(A) Stipulation of Facts for Summary Judgment Purposes (Plaintiff's Stipulation) (Doc. 51).
Of import, in Plaintiff's Response, Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses with prejudice his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Coleman (Count II of the Second Amended Complaint) and his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendant John Doe(s) 2 (Count III of the SecondAmended Complaint). Therefore, the Court will address the remaining Counts: Count I (Right to Free Speech); Count IV (Right to Counsel); and Count V (Declaratory Relief).
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 8, 2009, he was arrested and booked into CCDF as a pretrial detainee. Second Amended Complaint at 2. A public defender represented him in his criminal case. Id. Plaintiff, on June 29, 2010, requested access to the law library. Id. Staff denied his request because Plaintiff had a public defender. Id. In May, 2011, Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning denial of access to the law library. Id.
On or about May 23, 2011, Plaintiff wrote letters to the Florida Bar and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for legal assistance concerning the denial of access to the law library. Id. at 3. On or about July 8, 2011, Plaintiff received a letter from the Florida Bar that had been opened and taped back together and slipped under his door while he was sleeping. Id.
The corporal, on or about August 15, 2011, brought Plaintiff mail from the ACLU that had been opened and taped back together. Id. The corporal advised Plaintiff that the letter had been received by her in that condition. Id.
Plaintiff submitted an informal grievance. Id. Defendant Coleman approved the grievance and stated that he would remind staff that legal mail should only be opened in Plaintiff'spresence. Id. Thereafter, on August 24, 2011, Plaintiff received a letter from an attorney marked legal mail. Id. It had been opened and taped back together prior to its delivery to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff complained to the guard about the condition of the letter. Id. A sergeant returned the letter to Plaintiff after writing on the envelope that it had been opened by mistake and had not been read. Id.
Plaintiff filed another grievance. Id. Defendant Coleman told Plaintiff if he continued to complain, he would stop Plaintiff's legal mail and give it to Plaintiff at his convenience. Id. Plaintiff stopped complaining. Id.
On November 9, 2011, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Coleman a letter to determine if he could appeal Coleman's decisions. Id. Coleman responded that Plaintiff had exhausted all grievances. Id. at 4. Plaintiff's public defender stopped sending Plaintiff legal mail because he knew that it was being opened. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit set forth the summary judgment standard.
Howard v. Memnon, 572 F. App'x 692, 694-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). In an action involving the alleged violation of plaintiff's federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "assuming all facts in the light most favorable to [plaintiff, as the non-moving party]," summary judgment is properly entered in favor of the defendant where "no genuine issue of material fact exist[s] as to whether [plaintiff]'s constitutional rights were violated." McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App'x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) they are entitled to qualified immunity, and (2) Plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment fails on the ground of mootness. Amended Motion at 1. Although Defendants also seek summary judgment with respect to Count II, the retaliation claim against Defendant Coleman, Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses that claim with prejudice so it is no longer at issue.
Defendants assert that Count V, the claim for declaratory relief, is due to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff, on the date of the filing of his original Complaint (Doc. 1), was confined at CCDF. Plaintiff is no longerconfined in CCDF or subjected to the conditions of confinement at CCDF. Therefore, the claim for...
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