Ford v. Dorcus, s. 7368, 7369.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SWEENEY, Justice.
• Citation: Ford v. Dorcus, 168 A. 814, 54 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1933)
• Decision Date: 27 October 1933
• Docket Number: Nos. 7368, 7369.,s. 7368, 7369.
• Parties: FORD v. DORCUS (two cases).

168 A. 814

FORD

v. DORCUS (two cases).^*

Nos. 7368, 7369.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 27, 1933.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Antonio A. Capotosto, Judge.

Actions by Ernest Ford and by Emily Ford against Millard G. Dorcus. A verdict was directed for defendant, and plaintiffs bring exceptions.

Exceptions overruled and case remitted with directions.

James E. Brothers, Peter L. Cannon, and Sidney L. Rabinowitz, all of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Ralph T. Barnefleld, of Providence, for defendant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

These cases are brought to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligent operation of defendant's automobile. At the close of the testimony the trial justice directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant in each case. The cases are before this court on plaintiffs' exceptions to this ruling.

At a former trial of the cases the jury returned a verdict for each plaintiff. This court sustained the decision of the trial justice granting defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. 162 A. 898.

September 28, 1930, defendant's automobile was so negligently oparated as to collide with an automobile in which plaintiffs were riding. Plaintiffs allege that defendant's automobile was being operated by his servant and agent. No proof was offered to support this allegation. Defendant testified that his automobile was operated without his knowledge and consent by a Miss Thompson. His testimony was corroborated by that of Miss Thompson. This testimony was contradicted by testimony produced by plaintiffs to the effect that immediately after the accident defendant said he had given Miss Thompson permission to use his automobile.

Plaintiffs claim Miss Thompson was defendant's bailee. They contend he is made liable for the negligence of his bailee by section 10, chapter 1429, P. L. 1929, which provides that: "Whenever any motor vehicle shall be * * * operated * * * upon any public highway of this state with the consent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof, expressed or implied, the operator thereof, if other than such owner, or lessee, or bailee, shall in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner or lessee, or bailee, of such motor vehicle."

At the former trial plaintiffs relied upon the provisions of section 3, chapter 1040, P. L. 1927, to establish defendant's liability. This court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to any advantage from this section as it had been repealed before plaintiffs were injured. When construing this section in Guerin v. Mongeon, 49 R. I. 414, 143 A. 674, 675 (1928) the court said: "The evident purpose of this new statute is to safeguard the public from the negligent operation of any motor vehicle, and to make the owner liable for injury caused thereby, if the operation is with his consent. The effect of the act is to extend the common-law liability of one who consents to the use by another of a motor vehicle which he owns or legally possesses."

The statute as thus construed by the court evidently imposed a greater...