Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2020
• Docket Number: 1:20-CV-470
• Citation: 507 F.Supp.3d 406
• Parties: Morgan FORD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Ethan Deecher, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Grady Habicht, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

507 F.Supp.3d 406

Morgan FORD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Ethan Deecher, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Grady Habicht, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, Defendant.

1:20-CV-470

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed December 16, 2020

OF COUNSEL: ERIC POULIN, ESQ., ROY T. WILLEY, IV, ESQ., ANASTOPOULO LAW FIRM, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 32 Ann Street, Charleston, South Carolina 29403.

OF COUNSEL: KELSEY W. SHANNON, ESQ., LYNN LAW FIRM, LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff Ford, M&T Bank Building, 101 South Salina Street, Suite 750, Syracuse, New York 13202.

OF COUNSEL: EDWARD TOPTANI, ESQ., TOPTANI LAW PLLC, Attorneys for Plaintiff Ford, 375 Pearl Street Suite 1410, New York, New York 10038.

OF COUNSEL: JOHN McLEOD BRADHAM, ESQ., PETER BRYAN KATZMAN, ESQ., MOREA SCHWARTZ BRADHAM FRIEDMAN & BROWN LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff Ford, 444 Madison Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, New York 10022.

OF COUNSEL: DONALD W. BOYAJIAN, ESQ., JAMES R. PELUSO, JR., ESQ., JOSHUA R. FRIEDMAN, ESQ., DREYER BOYAJIAN LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Deecher and Habicht, 75 Columbia Street, Albany, New York 12210.

OF COUNSEL: JONATHAN B. FELLOWS, ESQ., SUZANNE M. MESSER, ESQ., BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, Attorneys for Defendant, One Lincoln Center, Syracuse, New York 13202.

OF COUNSEL: MICHAEL E. GINSBERG, ESQ., PATTISON, SAMPSON LAW FIRM, Attorneys for Defendant, P.O. Box 208, 22 First Street, Troy, New York 12181.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

It barely needs mentioning that the daily life of a vast majority of Americans—and indeed, human beings—before the COVID-19 pandemic seems foreign to the way we now must live in the middle of it. Higher education has not been spared. Countless students were sent home from colleges and universities mid-semester, including the students attending defendant Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute ("RPI" or "defendant"). Although their education continued remotely, to at least some of those students online learning was apparently less than they bargained for.

Now three of RPI's students, Morgan Ford ("Ford"), Ethan Deecher ("Deecher"), and Grady Habicht ("Habicht", together "plaintiffs") have sued defendant for breach of contract and other New York torts in the hopes of recovering in some measure the difference between the on-campus education they expected and the online schooling they received. Defendant disputes plaintiffs’ claims and to that end has moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c). That motion, having been fully briefed, will now be decided on the parties’ submissions and oral arguments.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Ford, a New Jersey resident, Deecher, a Massachusetts resident, and Habicht, a Connecticut resident, are all undergraduate students currently enrolled at RPI. Dkt. 28 ("Compl."), ¶¶ 10-15.¹ Plaintiffs allege that they were drawn to defendant in part because of "The Rensselaer Plan 2024" (the "Plan"), a framework of programs, some enacted, some yet hypothetical, designed to afford its students a unique educational experience. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 31. The language of the Plan has a flavor of commitment, and most of its substantive clauses begin with the phrase "we will." See Dkt. 28-1, passim.

Of particular relevance, RPI claims in the Plan that it "will ... [o]ffer a complete student experience, highlighted by[ ] Clustered Learning, Advocacy, and Support for Students" ("CLASS"). Dkt. 28-1, p. 6.² Defendant's CLASS program, which it has actively incorporated into student life, is designed to improve counseling, academic skill development, community building, and other purported benefits that "originate within the residential setting." Id. at 12, see Compl. ¶ 41 (describing CLASS as an operational and ongoing program). Defendant's catalog defines the CLASS program as "built around a time-based clustering and residential commons program." Dkt. 29-1. To help facilitate CLASS, defendant mandates that all first- and second-year students, as well as transfer students, live on campus. Compl. ¶ 131.

In addition to the CLASS program, RPI has another program that it refers to as "The Arch." Compl. ¶ 44. The Arch requires all second-year students to live on-campus during the summer between their second and third years. Id. During that summer, the students take focused classes that are intended to afford more meaningful interaction with defendant's professors.

Id. ¶ 47. After completing the Arch, third-year students typically spend their fall semester away from campus in internships or other experiential learning environments to facilitate post-graduate employment opportunities. Id. ¶ 49.

As is the case with so many areas of life, however, the COVID-19 pandemic drastically changed the way RPI's 2020 programs would proceed. On March 10, 2020, due to concerns about the spread of the virus, defendant cancelled all university-sponsored events. Compl. ¶ 73. On March 11, 2020, defendant required students to move out of on-campus housing. Id. ¶ 75. Although defendant eventually issued refunds for Spring 2020 room and board fees after having required its students to move out early, defendant reduced these reimbursements by the net of a reimbursed student's financial aid. Id. ¶ 85. Effective March 16, 2020, defendant moved all classes exclusively online. Id. ¶ 74. Nevertheless, rising third-year students were still required to complete the Arch online, even though it would no longer provide the in-person experience it originally intended. Id. ¶ 80.

Plaintiffs allege that because RPI cancelled all activities and in-person instruction, they were deprived of the benefit of the on-campus education, activity fees, housing fees, and meal allowances for which they had paid in full before the semester began. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 81-84.

On April 25, 2020, Ford filed the present class action complaint in this District. Dkt. 1. Deecher and Habicht filed their own complaints on May 4, 2020. On September 10, 2020, all three plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint, the current operative pleading. Dkt. 28. The amended complaint states eleven causes of action, eight of which state putative class allegations: (I & II) breach of contract or in the alternative unjust enrichment on behalf of a class of those who paid tuition for students for the Spring 2020 or Arch 2020 semesters; (III & IV) breach of contract or in the alternative unjust enrichment for a class of those who paid fees for students for the Spring 2020 or Arch 2020 semesters; (V & VI) breach of contract or in the alternative unjust enrichment for a class of those who paid for on-campus housing for students during the Spring 2020 semester; (VII & VIII) breach of contract or in the alternative unjust enrichment for a class of those who paid for students’ meal plans for the Spring 2020 semester; (IX) conversion; (X) violation of N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349 (" § 349") and 350 ("§ 350"); and (XI) promissory estoppel. Compl. pp. 22-54.

On October 9, 2020, RPI answered the amended complaint. Dkt. 29. Four days later, on October 13, 2020, defendant filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c). Dkt. 30. On December 3, 2020, the parties presented oral argument. Text Minute Entry dated 12/3/2020.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings, so long as it does so early enough not to delay trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). In most material respects, the Rule 12(c) standard is the same as the familiar failure to state a claim standard under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g. , Sheppard v. Beerman , 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994).

"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca , 839 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Instead, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that it presents a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

In assessing the plausibility of the plaintiff's complaint, "the complaint is to be construed liberally, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor." Ginsburg , 839 F. Supp. 2d at 540. The complaint may be supported by "any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint." L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC , 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Sira v. Morton , 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) ).

IV. DISCUSSION

RPI has moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Defendant argues five major points: (1) plaintiffs have failed to allege a specific contractual promise defendant breached to sustain their breach of contract claims; (2) plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims are duplicative of their breach of contract claims and fail to prove that justice requires plaintiffs to be repaid; (3) plaintiffs’ conversion claims are also duplicative and fail to identify a property interest of which plaintiffs were deprived; (4) plaintiffs’ General Business Law claims fail to allege a deceptive practice; and (5) plaintiffs have not alleged that defendants breached a clear and unambiguous promise.

A. Breach of Contract (Counts I, III, V, and VII).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a breach of contract claim need only allege: (1) the existence of an agreement; (2) adequate performance of that agreement by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the agreement by the defendant; and (4) resulting damages. Harsco Corp. v. Segui , 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 1996). Specific to...