Ford v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 23 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 CV 0246(SJ).,96 CV 0246(SJ). |
| Citation | 326 F.Supp.2d 392 |
| Parties | Erica FORD, Miriam Plata, Quentin Walcott, Jose Rivas-Cinque, Viola Plummer, and William Clay, Plaintiffs, v. W. Ann REYNOLDS, Robert E. Diaz, Thomas Minter, Marcia Keizs, Ronald Brown, Charles McCabe, Jose Elrique, The City University of New York, and York College, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Ronald B. McGuire, Esq., Jersey City, NJ, for Plaintiffs.
Eliot Spitzer, Esq., Attorney General of the State of New York City by Michael Cohen, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Erica Ford ("Ford"), Miriam Plata ("Plata"), Quentin Walcott ("Walcott"), Jose Rivas-Cinque ("Rivas-Cinque"), Viola Plummer ("Plummer"), and William Clay ("Clay") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the violation of their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights by defendants Ann Reynolds ("Reynolds"), Robert E. Diaz ("Diaz"), Thomas Minter ("Minter"), Marcia Keizs ("Keizs"), Ronald Brown ("Brown"), Charles McCabe ("McCabe"), and Jose Elique ("Elique")1, in their official and individual capacities, and the City University of New York ("CUNY") and York College ("York College" or "the College") (collectively, "Defendants"). At the time the action was filed, all of the individual Defendants were officials of either CUNY or York College. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their constitutional rights by: (1) attempting to bar outside speakers from participating in the College's 1995 Black Solidarity Day ("BSD") program based on the content of the proposed speech; (2) initiating disciplinary action against student Plaintiffs Ford, Plata, and Walcott for participating in the 1995 BSD event; and (3) denying payment of speakers' honoraria to Plaintiffs Plummer and Clay. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
By Memorandum and Order dated September 28, 2001, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing all claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for consideration of four issues that this Court neglected to address in its September 28, 2001 decision. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to these four issues. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
The facts of this case arising from the 1995 BSD event were detailed in this Court's September 28, 2001 Memorandum and Order, and will not be repeated here. On October 26, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Second Circuit. On January 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants CUNY, York College, Keizs, Reynolds, Diaz, Minter, Brown, McCabe, and Elique — the latter six in their official capacities. The judgment was also affirmed as to all claims for injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to this Court for review of the claims for monetary and declaratory relief against the aforementioned six Defendants in their individual capacities. Specifically, the Court of Appeals directed this Court to consider the following issues:
(1) whether Reynolds, Diaz, Minter, Brown, McCabe or Elrique [sic] is entitled to qualified immunity; (2) whether the defendants' failure to submit affidavits or deposition testimony from Reynolds, Diaz, McCabe and Elrique [sic] precludes a grant of summary judgment in their favor on the grounds of qualified immunity; (3) whether the defendants met their burden at the summary judgment stage as to the plaintiffs' four claims for declaratory relief; and (4) whether the plaintiffs' complaint sets forth any claim for relief based on the defendants' actions in regard to the 1993 and 1994 BSD events, as opposed to merely mentioning those events as factual background for claims relating to the 1995 BSD event.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants unsuccessfully tried to ban speakers for the 1993 and 1994 BSD events at York College and to punish student organizers for their participation in the events. (Compl.¶¶ 49-67.) The Complaint alleges that in both years, the student Plaintiffs followed all appropriate college policies and procedures concerning event approval. (Compl.¶¶ 50, 61.)
This Court may not consider matters outside Plaintiffs' Complaint in its determination as to "whether the plaintiffs' complaint sets forth any claim for relief based on the defendants' actions in regard to the 1993 and 1994 BSD events...." Ford, 316 F.3d at 356. Thus, the Court will treat this portion of Defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and must make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir.1994). Moreover, a district court must limit its analysis to the complaint, and any attached exhibits or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir.1991). "For purposes of a motion to dismiss, [the Second Circuit has] deemed a complaint to include ... documents that the plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit." Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2000).
With respect to the 1993 event, the Complaint alleges that York College Director of Student Activities Kieron Sharpe ("Sharpe") and Associate Dean of Students Jacqueline Ray ("Ray") demonstrated aversion toward the proposed 1993 BSD program at York College and initiated but never pursued disciplinary charges against Plaintiffs Walcott and Rivas-Cinque after an incident involving advertising for the event. (Compl.¶¶ 61-67.) However, Plaintiffs' allegations concerning the 1993 event do not include specific claims related to any individual Defendant named in this action, and this Court has already dismissed all claims as to CUNY and York College. (See Mem. & Order, Sept. 28, 2001.) Therefore, the only way in which this Court could consider Plaintiffs' assertions with respect to the 1993 event is if Sharpe and Ray were added as defendants to this action.
Rule 21 provides, in relevant part, "[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. "Under Rule 21 courts have broad discretion to determine whether to bring in a party at any stage of the litigation." Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 99 CV 1401, 2000 WL 342689, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2000). Because Plaintiffs did not seek to add Sharpe and Ray as defendants at any time in the eight years this lawsuit has been pending, and because such an addition at this stage in the litigation would cause substantial delay, this Court will not allow the addition of Sharpe and Ray as defendants to this action. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim for relief based on Defendants' actions with respect to the 1993 BSD event.
With regard to the 1994 event, the Complaint alleges that Vice President Brown cancelled the scheduled BSD program with four days' notice, but that the event went on as planned after a student demonstration. (Compl.¶¶ 51-56.) Plaintiffs contend that Brown subsequently blocked the academic registration and records of Plaintiffs Ford and Walcott, in violation of the CUNY by-laws, but thereafter lifted the registration and record restrictions and did not pursue disciplinary charges. (Compl. ¶¶ 57-60; Ex. N, O.) Because Plaintiffs assert no injury with respect to the 1994 event, they fail to state a claim for relief against Defendant Brown or any other individual defendant.
Because the causes of action and relief sought are limited to the actions arising from the 1995 BSD event, and because the information contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint concerning the 1993 and 1994 BSD events served only as factual background for claims relating to the 1995 BSD event, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to set forth any claim for relief based on Defendants' actions with regard to the 1993 and 1994 BSD events.2
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court's function is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but only to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eastman Mach. Co. v. United States, 841 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir.1988).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995). Once the movant has made a showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact to...
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