Ford v. State

• Citation: 73 Miss. 734,19 So. 665
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 30 March 1896
• Parties: J. S. FORD v. THE STATE

19 So. 665

73 Miss. 734

J. S. FORD v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 30, 1896

March 1896

FROM the circuit court of Noxubee county HON. S. H. TERRAL, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife. The defense relied on in the court below was his insanity at the time of the homicide, and, to support the same, evidence was introduced tending to show partial and intermittent insanity. The state introduced much testimony in rebuttal.

The seventh instruction for defendant, as asked, was in the following words:

"7. It is the duty of the state to show that, at the time the offense was committed, the defendant was sane, and if, from the whole testimony in the case, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of his sanity, they must find him not guilty."

This instruction was granted after being so modified as to read as follows:

"7. Every person is presumed to be sane until (shown to be) otherwise, and it is incumbent on defendant to establish his insanity or to raise a reasonable doubt thereof, and if, from the testimony in the case, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of his sanity, they must find him not guilty."

The sixth and tenth instructions, as asked by defendant, were in the following words:

"6. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant at the time he shot his deceased wife, was suffering from mental disease, and that condition of mind was sufficient to break down in the mind of the defendant, at the time of the shooting, the distinction between right and wrong, it is immaterial whether he was totally or only partially insane on other subjects, and the verdict should be not guilty."

"10. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that defendant, at the time of the killing, was a sufferer from some mental disease, which broke down in him the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the act he did then it is immaterial whether he was totally or only partially insane on other subjects. There can be no such thing as motive without mental accountability, and this cannot co-exist with an incapacity from mental disease to distinguish between right and wrong."

These instructions were granted after being so modified as to read as follows:

"6. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant at the time he shot his deceased wife, was suffering from mental disease, and that diseased condition of mind was sufficient to break down in the mind of the defendant, at the time of the shooting, the distinction between right and wrong, they should acquit him."

"10. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that defendant, at the time of the killing, was a sufferer from some mental disease which broke down in him the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, with reference to the act he did then they should acquit."

The thirteenth instruction for defendant, as asked, was in the following words:

"13. If, from all the evidence in the case, the jury have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's sanity at the time of the shooting, that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and the jury should acquit."

This instruction was given after being modified so as to read as follows:

"13. If, from all the evidence in the case, the jury have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's sanity at the time of the shooting, the jury should acquit."

The following instruction was granted for the state:

"7. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant was at times so insane as to be unable to distinguish right from wrong, but that at other times he was sane and of sound mind, then it is incumbent on the defendant to show that at the time of the killing he was so insane as to be unable to distinguish between right and wrong, or to raise a reasonable doubt as to his capacity to distinguish between right and wrong."

The defendant asked the following instructions with reference to insane delusions, which were refused by the court, viz.:

"Any species of insane delusion exempts from punishment the perpetrator of an act committed under its influence. The belief that the taking of the life of another is the appropriate remedy for a minor or imaginary evil, is such a delusion that homicide committed under such belief is not liable to punishment."

"One who, under an insane delusion, shoots another, is irresponsible when the act is the product of the delusion."

Exceptions to the action of the court below, on all of the foregoing instructions, having been duly reserved, the same was made the basis of a motion for a new trial, and assigned for error on appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Thomas J. O' Neill, for the appellant.

1. The evidence shows quite conclusively that the appellant was mentally irresponsible for the terrible act he committed, but the burden of proving his sanity was not upon him, but the state. The prosecution had to show that the "conscious mind" acted, and that malice existed beyond a reasonable doubt. The action of the trial court in so modifying the seventh instruction asked by the defendant as to render it contrary to this view of the law, constitutes reversible error. Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269. This is also true of its modification of the thirteenth instruction asked by defendant.

2. It was also error to strike out of the sixth instruction asked by defendant the words "it is immaterial whether he was totally or partially insane on other subjects, and the verdict should be not guilty." This modification of the court destroyed the possibility of acquittal, except on the proof of total, general or complete insanity on all subjects. The court's modification of defendant's tenth instruction is subject to the same objection.

3. The charges asked by the defendant in reference to insane delusions were wholly unobjectionable, and should not have been refused. Nor should the charge that each juror was at liberty to withhold from his fellows the reason for any doubt he might have of the defendant's sanity have been refused. It announced a correct principle, and was designed to meet the argument of the district attorney.

4. The seventh instruction granted for the state is subject to the same objection urged against the court's modification of defendant's seventh and thirteenth instructions. It puts the burden of proving insanity upon the defendant, which is not the law in this state.

Wiley N. Nash, attorney-general, for the state.

The facts shown by the record disclose a case of wife murder by a worthless and vicious husband, who resorts in his peril to the plea of insanity. That...