Ford v. Strange
| Decision Date | 03 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-10326,14-10326 |
| Parties | JOHNNY FORD, LOUIS MAXWELL, THEODORE SAMUEL,DYANN ROBINSON, BARBARA HOWARD,in their individual and representative capacities, WILLIE PATTERSON, in his individual capacity, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LUTHER J. STRANGE, III, individually and in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Alabama, ROBERT BENTLEY, Governor, individually and in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Alabama, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-00214-WKW-WC
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of AlabamaBefore MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their Complaint, the denial of their Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, and the grant of Defendant Strange's Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In the State of Alabama, it is a crime to possess, "with knowledge of the character thereof," a "slot machine" or "other gambling device, with the intention that it be used in the advancement of unlawful gambling activity." Ala. Code § 13A-12-27. The Alabama Constitution, however, provides for the adoption of "amendment[s] which affect[] or appl[y] to only one county" if approved by, inter alia, a majority vote of the qualified electors in that county. See Ala. Const. amend. 555(a). The voters of Macon County approved local Amendment 744 in 2003. Amendment 744 legalized "[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes" in Macon County. See Ala. Const. amend. 744. It also provides that "[t]he sheriff shall promulgate rules and regulations for the licensing and operationof bingo games within the county" and "shall insure compliance pursuant to any rule or regulation" and certain other specified requirements. Id.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Ford was the state legislator who sponsored the bill proposing Amendment 744 in 2003. He is also currently the mayor of the City of Tuskegee in Macon County. According to the Complaint, Ford and four of the five other individual plaintiffs—Maxwell, Samuel, Robinson, and Howard—all voted for Amendment 744 when it was put to a popular referendum in Macon County.1 Each of these individuals is also the officer of an organization that received a license to operate bingo games pursuant to Amendment 744.2 Although the caption of the Complaint names each of these individuals only in his or her "individual and representative capacit[y],"3 the body of the Complaint indicates that they also brought suit in their official capacities as representatives of these organizations. Each of the licensed organizations contracted with a third party, VictoryLand, to operate games in Macon County onthe license-holder's behalf.4 Plaintiff Patterson is a former VictoryLand employee. VictoryLand is not a party to this case.
Defendant Bentley is the Governor of the State of Alabama. He is a white member of the Republican Party. Defendant Strange is the elected Attorney General of the State of Alabama. Both defendants were sworn into office in January 2011. Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants subsequently used their powers as state officers to have VictoryLand shut down as part of a scheme to disempower black and Democratic voters in Macon County. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants caused certain equipment at VictoryLand to be seized, removed, or destroyed, including electronic gaming machines that the Macon County sheriff had had certified as "legal bingo games," in compliance with Amendment 744 and regulations issued thereunder. It is clear that Defendants acted under at least the pretext of a valid law-enforcement action. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 340, 355 (Ala. 2013) (per curiam) (). Plaintiffs insinuated in the Complaint, however, that Defendants actually shut down VictoryLand because its existence tended tobenefit the Democratic Party. Plaintiffs also insinuated that Defendants showed favoritism toward Indian gaming interests (to VictoryLand's detriment) in exchange for financial and political support. Plaintiffs further alleged that VictoryLand's demise caused its employees—presumably including Plaintiff Patterson—to lose their jobs and that it will cause local citizens to lose public services that had previously been funded from VictoryLand's revenues.
Plaintiffs brought suit in their individual and official capacities and also sought to be certified as representatives of the class of "all residents and qualified voters of Macon County who are injured by the statutory and constitutional violations alleged in this complaint." In their Complaint, Plaintiffs brought four counts. In Count One, Plaintiffs claimed a violation of their rights under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, on the ground that Defendants had implemented "unprecleared policies and practices affecting voting." 5 The district court dismissed this claim sua sponte following the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), and Plaintiffs have since abandoned it.
In Count Two, Plaintiffs claimed a violation of their right to vote under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.6 Plaintiffs' theory was apparently that Defendants had infringed their voting rights, and the voting rights of African-Americans in the putative class, by taking actions that undermined Amendment 744 years after those voters had supported it.
In Count Three, Plaintiffs claimed "purposeful discrimination" in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.7 Plaintiffs' theory was that Defendants had acted with the racially-discriminatory purpose and effect of denying them, and African-American voters in Macon County more broadly, "the ability to choose by constitutional amendment the laws and means of their enforcement in their own counties" and "the ability to exercise home rule in their respective counties."8 Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had"abridged and negated the 2003 vote enacting Amendment 744 and [had] devastated and continue to devastate Tuskegee, Macon County, and its citizens." Plaintiffs explained that, "[b]y the closing of Victory[L]and, a historically poverty stricken area of black citizens will remain so and public services that Victory[L]and's operating revenue would have funded will be curtailed or eliminated altogether."
In Count Four, Plaintiffs claimed "fundamental unfairness" in violation of their "due process rights." Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had unlawfully caused the invalidation of their rights in their licenses to operate bingo games in Macon County pursuant to Amendment 744.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for both lack of standing and also failure to state a claim. After full briefing, the district court granted Defendants' motions on both grounds. Plaintiffs appeal that decision.
In the court below, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. We summarize a subset of the most substantial proposed amendments. First, Plaintiffs proposed to add as plaintiffs the sheriff of Macon County, theMacon County Racing Commission, and the Macon County Water Authority.9 Second, Plaintiff Patterson proposed to prosecute the lawsuit both on his own behalf and also as a representative of all others who had lost their jobs as a result of VictoryLand's demise. Third, Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Defendant Strange had "not operated in an even-handed manner" because, in another lawsuit, he had asserted that the Alabama Poarch Band of Creek Indian Casino Operators ("Poarch Creeks") were operating gaming machines in violation of state law, but he had not raided, seized equipment from, or otherwise adversely affected the Poarch Creeks' operations. Fourth, Plaintiffs alleged in greater detail the economic injury that the closing of VictoryLand had caused Macon County, its citizens, and the organizational plaintiffs.10 Fifth, Plaintiffs proposed to add three additional counts, which we describe below.
In the first proposed additional count, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants conspired to deny them their "constitutional right to vote without due process of law and as a denial of the equal protection [sic] as guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United StatesConstitution in violation of [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983]" by "intentionally nullify[ing]" their votes in favor of Amendment 744, its sponsor (then-Representative Ford), and the elected sheriff of Macon County. In the second proposed additional count, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants participated in a racially- or class-motivated conspiracy to deny them their "property right to contract, or to own, operate, and maintain a bingo business in Macon County, Alabama[,] without due process of law as guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985]" by usurping the authority vested in the sheriff of Macon County and shutting down VictoryLand, while permitting the Poarch Creeks and another facility in Greene County to use the same or similar machines. In the third...
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