Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.
| Citation | 476 S.E.2d 565,267 Ga. 226 |
| Decision Date | 07 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | S95G1897,Nos. S95G1892,s. S95G1892 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,761 FORD v. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE CO., et al. FORD v. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE CO., et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Murphy, Murphy & Garner, Thomas B. Murphy, Bremen, Walker, Hulbert, Gray & Byrd, Lawrence C. Walker, Jr., Charles W. Byrd, Perry, Smolar, Roseman, Brantley & Seifter, Yehuda Smolar, Barry L. Roseman, G. Grant Brantley, James I. Seifter, Thomas A. Rice, Atlanta, William B. Herndon, Marietta, Calvin S. Graves, Gambrell & Stolz, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Seaton D. Purdom, Atlanta, for appellants.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Michael E. Hobbs, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alston & Byrd, G. Conley Ingram, Cynthia L. Counts, R. Wayne Thorpe, Love & Willingham, Daryll Love, Allen S. Willingham, Clark S. Gillespy, John A. Gilleland, Robert P. Monyak, Johnson, Kane & Penna, Stephen R. Kane, Atlanta, for appellees.
David W. Boone, Craig, T. Jones, Atlanta, James O. Wilson, Jr., Savannah, William R. Waldrop, Lawrence J. Pond, Atlanta, Raymond J. Doumar, Augusta, James D. Hollingsworth, Decatur, amici curiae.
Franklin Ford, III, and his parents filed separate products liability actions against Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company and NTW We granted the writ of certiorari to consider: (1) whether parties who do not agree to consolidation of related cases may be required to try the cases together before separate juries, and (2) whether the requirement in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 that 75 percent of punitive damages awards be paid to the state is a proper subject for a jury instruction. On the first issue, we hold that OCGA § 9-11-42(a) applies to simultaneous proceedings before separate juries in the same courtroom because a dual jury trial has many attributes of a consolidated action or joint trial. On the second issue, we hold that the jury instruction was improper because the distribution of a punitive damages award injects prejudicial issues that are irrelevant to the purpose of punitive damages. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in ordering a dual jury trial without the consent of the parties and in giving the prejudicial 75-percent charge on punitive damages.
for injuries received when a car hit their stalled van on an interstate highway. The trial court ordered the two actions to begin on the same day with separate juries empaneled for each case to hear all common evidence. Although both juries found Uniroyal liable and awarded compensatory damages, only the jury in Franklin Ford's case found Uniroyal liable for punitive damages. The trial court instructed that jury that 75 percent of any punitive damages award would be paid into the state treasury and the jury returned a substantial verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed in both actions and ordered a new trial on several grounds. 1
Prior to trial, Uniroyal moved to consolidate the two actions under OCGA § 9-11-42(a), but the plaintiffs opposed the motion. The trial court then ordered the empaneling of two juries to hear substantially the same evidence in the same courtroom at the same time, which Uniroyal opposed. After the dual jury trial, one jury awarded Claudia Ford $150,000 in compensatory damages and the second jury awarded Franklin Ford $17 million in compensatory damages, including $12.6 million for pain and suffering. Following testimony and arguments on punitive damages, the trial court gave the following charge to the Franklin Ford jury:
The statutory law of Georgia provides that in a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product liability, seventy-five percent of any amount awarded as punitive damages, less a proportionate part of the cost of litigation, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid into the treasury of the state.
The jury returned a verdict of $25 million in punitive damages. The parties appealed.
1. The Georgia Civil Practice Act provides for joint trials and consolidation of actions. OCGA § 9-11-42(a) states:
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, if the parties consent, the court may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "consolidation" as the act of "uniting several actions into one trial and judgment ... where all the actions are between the same parties, pending in the same court, and involving substantially the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses." 4 A "joint trial" is defined as a "trial of two or more persons ... conducted within the framework of one trial." 5
Although we conclude that the trial court in this case ordered neither a consolidated action nor a joint trial, it mandated a procedure that has attributes similar to both. Like a consolidated action, the Fords' actions were pending in the same court and involved substantially the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses. Like a joint trial, this case had two plaintiffs whose claims were tried within the framework of one trial. The primary disparity between the procedures specified in section 42(a) and the dual jury trial is that two juries, rather than one, rendered the verdicts.
This distinction is insufficient to preclude section 42(a) from governing the procedure employed here. First, the trial court ordered the dual jury trial as an alternative to consolidation after the plaintiffs refused to consent to a joint trial. Second, the trial court employed the same rationale--efficient judicial administration--that supports the consolidation of actions or issues. Third, both trial courts and litigants would be able to contravene legislative intent and the consent requirement of section 42(a) if we ruled that the section did not apply to the dual jury procedure. Instead, we hold that section 42(a) applies to the dual jury trial and other procedures that combine separate actions in joint court proceedings. 6
2. Although patterned after the federal rule, the state provision differs from the federal rule in one way: it requires the parties' consent to either consolidation or a joint trial. Relying on the plain language of the statute, this court has consistently held that the parties must consent before a trial court may consolidate or join related actions for trial. 7
The legislative history of House Bill 6, which became the Civil Practice Act of 1966, shows that the General Assembly adopted the consent requirement despite opposition from the Senate. As originally introduced and approved by the House of Representatives, section 42(a) required the consent of the parties, but the Senate amended the bill by deleting the requirement. 8 The Committee of Conference recommended that the Senate recede from its amendment, and both houses approved section In this case, Uniroyal opposed the dual jury trial. Since the trial court ordered the procedure without the consent of all the parties, it violated OCGA § 9-11-42(a). When the statutory rights of a party are violated, the law presumes injury. 11 Requiring a party to show harm from a consolidation would eviscerate the consent requirement of section 42(a) and contravene the legislature's intent that the parties control the issue. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in ordering a dual jury trial without the consent of the parties and reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. 12
42(a) with the language "if the parties consent." 9 A year later the General Assembly rejected a state bar proposal to amend the section to remove the consent requirement. 10 Thus, the legislature intended to limit the trial court's discretion to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried by giving the litigants control over the decision to join actions that have common questions of law and fact
3. In reversing, we note that the requirement of party consent in section 42(a) conflicts with the general intent of the consolidation rule. "That objective is to give the court broad discretion to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched with expedition and economy while providing justice to the parties." 13 One commentator concluded that the General Assembly emasculated the rule in Georgia by inserting the words "if the parties consent." 14 As this case shows, giving the litigants control over the issue constricts the ability of trial courts to properly control their docket and order the merger of related actions when needed to avoid unnecessary costs and delay. 15 Until the legislature amends section 42(a) to remove the consent requirement, however, it applies when the trial court orders the consolidation or joinder, in whole or in part, of separate actions.
4. As part of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a new code section...
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