Ford v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12832.,12832.
• Citation: 396 A.2d 191
• Parties: Charles H. FORD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

396 A.2d 191

Charles H. FORD, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 12832.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 7, 1978.

Decided December 11, 1978.

Karen D. Hurvitz, with whom William W. Greenhalgh, Washington, D. C., was on the brief (both appointed by the court), for appellant.

John Voorhees, Dept. of Justice, with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry and Mary Ellen Abrecht, Asst. U. S. Attys., and William C. Brown, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KELLY, NEBEKER and HARRIS, Associate Judges.

HARRIS, Associate Judge:

Appellant was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of heroin. D.C.Code 1973, § 33-402(a). He urges reversal on the grounds that (1) the trial court erred in not replacing the jury panel after the clerk improperly called appellant's case, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the arresting officer to testify that he was executing an arrest warrant for appellant when appellant was found with the narcotics, and (3) the government failed to demonstrate a proper chain of custody for the narcotics evidence introduced against him.¹ We affirm.

At the commencement of appellant's trial, while the jury panel was in the court-room but prior to the voir dire, the clerk called "the case of the United States versus Charles H. Ford, Criminal Case No. 91850-76 and 92012-76." Immediately upon hearing the announcement of two case numbers, the trial judge called counsel to the bench to discuss the situation. The prosecutor indicated that although there were two cases pending against appellant, only one, the narcotics offense, was to be tried that day. Appellant's counsel rejoined that the announcement of two case numbers indicated to the jurors that appellant was faced with another charge and that this knowledge would adversely influence their decision. Accordingly, defense counsel requested a new jury panel.

The trial judge declined the request, noting that the clerk's announcement was merely a mistake and that he would so instruct the jury. He then stated:

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury panel, by way of preface, I want to say the reason I called counsel up was by inadvertence or accident two cases were read. There is only one case here involving this defendant, so don't be under the impression that there are two cases involving this defendant. There is only one case that is here for trial and that involves the charge by the grand jury that on or about April 26th, 1976, within the District of Columbia, Charles H. Ford, the defendant here, did possess and have under his control a quantity of heroin.

Appellant contends that this instruction was insufficient to dispel the alleged prejudice. We disagree. Initially, we doubt that the clerk's announcement of the defendant's "case" followed by a recitation of two numbers would convey anything to a jury panel other than the fact that trial was about to commence. Such a pro forma action is hardly equivalent to telling the jury that a defendant has an arrest record, as appellant contends. We conclude that even if any modest uncertainty was created by the announcement, it was promptly remedied by the trial judge's instruction.

II

Appellant argues that the arresting officer's testimony impermissibly prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the jury. The officer was called to explain how it happened that appellant was apprehended with narcotics on his person. In so doing, the officer stated that he had been informed that appellant, "who had an outstanding arrest warrant" against him, was at a certain location and that he and two other officers had proceeded there to execute the warrant. Appellant asserts that the officer's reference to the arrest warrant was both unnecessary and prejudicial because it improperly brought to light his arrest record. We are unpersuaded by this contention.

The officer never mentioned the origin of the arrest warrant. He merely referred to its existence in the context of explaining the circumstances surrounding appellant's apprehension. On numerous occasions we have stated that evidence of other crimes may be admitted to explain the circumstances of the offense charged. See, e. g., Chambers v. United States, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 343, 345 (1978); Lewis v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 1168, 1171 (1977); Day v. United States, D.C.App., 360 A.2d 483, 485 (1976); Wooten v. United States, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 308, 309 (1971). Here, the testimony never even rose to the level of "other crimes" evidence. Rather, it was simply part of a permissible explication of the events which led up to appellant's arrest, and the court did not err in admitting it.

III

The final contention of appellant focuses upon the physical evidence which was introduced against him. When the arresting officers confronted appellant on a stairway landing, appellant removed a change purse from his pocket and threw it out a window. The purse was recovered; in it were several tinfoil packets which contained white powder. A field test of the powder indicated that it contained narcotics.

After the field test, the purse and its contents were put into a lock-seal envelope by one of the arresting officers and sent to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on April 26, 1976 (the day of appellant's arrest), for analysis. There it was received by a chemist, identified in this record only by the initials "M.S.", on April 27, 1976. M.S. opened the envelope, analyzed the contents, found heroin, and placed the material in a second lock-seal envelope. On February 3, 1977, this second envelope was opened by another chemist, E. L. Farmer, who also analyzed the contents and then put them in a third lock-seal envelope which was kept in a vault until the time of trial.

At trial, Mr. Farmer testified to that sequence of events. He stated that he had found the powder to contain 4.1 percent heroin, and that his qualitative finding differed from that previously made by M.S.² Farmer also testified about the customary security procedures for drug samples at the DEA.

The government also called Detective H. R. Norris as an expert on narcotics and on the procedures followed in handling narcotics evidence. Norris testified that judging from the notations on the first lock-seal envelope, it appeared to have been handled in accordance with standard procedures. On the basis of the testimony of both witnesses, the evidence was admitted over appellant's objection.

There are several settled...