Fore v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Civ. A. No. 2325.
| Decision Date | 14 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2325. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Faye FORE, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Defendant. |
John T. Allred, Moore & Van Allen, Charlotte, N. C., for defendant.
Faye Fore alleges in her complaint, as amended, that in October and November of 1965 and in May of 1966 she was denied advancement in employment because she was a woman instead of a man, and she seeks injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
On August 8, 1966, plaintiff filed a sworn charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On June 29, 1967 the Commission found reasonable cause to believe that a violation had occurred. On January 22, 1968 the Commission advised plaintiff that voluntary compliance had not been obtainable. She filed suit February 21, 1968.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as to the alleged events of October and November, 1965, upon the basis that the written charge required by the statute was not filed within ninety days after the alleged offenses. This position is correct and the motion is allowed.
Defendant also moved to dismiss as to the alleged violations of May 1966, contending that this action is barred because it was not filed until more than 180 days after the alleged unfair employment practice occurred. Defendant says that all the time periods described in § 2000e-5, subsections (a), (d) and (e)* are conditions precedent to the right to maintain the action and should be added together to constitute a 180-day statute of limitation. The plaintiff, on this theory, is barred unless: (1) Under subsection (d) a charge is filed with the Commission in 90 days; (2) Under subsection (e) the Commission, within 60 additional days has been unable to procure voluntary compliance and so notifies plaintiff; and (3) Under subsection (e), suit is filed within 30 days "thereafter."
Defendant says that instead of taking not over 60 days for conciliation as directed by subsection (d), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission took seventeen months before notifying plaintiff of failure of efforts to obtain voluntary compliance; that this ran the total time past the assumed 180-day limit; and that the action is now too late.
The Court does not agree.
It is true that the statute requires the person aggrieved to file a written charge within 90 days; it says so clearly, and the courts so hold; the Commission must be given at least a chance to conciliate before plaintiff is free to sue. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir., 1967); Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir., 1967). It also appears that the person aggrieved is required to file suit within 30 days after notice that the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance. This 30-day requirement is an integral part of the very clause of § 2000e-5(e) which confers the right to sue.
However, the defendant's remaining proposition cannot be sustained. In skeleton but verbatim form, subsection 2000e-5(e) says:
"If within sixty days after a charge is filed the Commission * * * has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance * * * the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may within thirty days thereafter be brought * * *." (Emphasis added.)
The word "thereafter" in subsection (e) does not refer to all preceding procedures, but only to the notice from the Commission. The 30 days to sue most reasonably begin to run only from the time when the Commission does "so notify the person aggrieved." The plain English interpretation of the statute is that a civil action may be brought within thirty days after the notice from the Commission.
Moreover, the construction the defendant requests does violence to the purpose of this...
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Cunningham v. Litton Industries
...days is not a condition precedent to an aggrieved person's right to sue in a federal district court. Fore v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 293 F.Supp. 587, 589 (W.D. N.C.1968); Harris v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 293 F.Supp. 104, 105 (N.D.Ga. 1968); Kendrick v. American Bakery C......
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP. COM'N v. Cleveland Mills Co., Civ. A. No. SH-73-36.
...408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Fore v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 293 F.Supp. 587 (W.D.N.C.1968). The statute clearly provides that "* * * the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent *......
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Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
...suit letter was ever issued with reference to this charge. 2 See, also, to the same general effect: Fore v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (D.C.N.C.1968) 293 F.Supp. 587, 588; King v. Georgia Power Company (D.C.Ga.1968) 295 F.Supp. 943, 946; Colbert v. H-K Corporation (D.C. G......
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Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
...the motion upon that ground is denied for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this same day in Fore v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, D. C., 293 F.Supp. 587. 1 "Whenever it is charged in writing under oath * * * that an employer * * * has engaged in an unlawful employ......