Foreman v. City of Phila.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1326 C.D. 2011,1326 C.D. 2011 |
| Parties | Gary Foreman, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
In this appeal, Gary Foreman seeks review of an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia (trial court) that denied his motion to reinstate his action against the City of Philadelphia (City) to the major jury trial pool from the compulsory arbitration program. Upon review, we quash this appeal as interlocutory.
Foreman filed suit against City alleging it negligently demolished the structures on two of his properties. Originally, this matter was placed on the trial court's major jury trial list.
In April 2010, the parties attended a court ordered settlement conference before a judge pro tempore. However, at that time, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. Specifically, Foreman demanded no less than $90,000, but City offered to settle for only $20,000. Despite their disagreement, the parties decided to submit their dispute to the compulsory arbitration program. The parties reduced this agreement to writing (the Stipulation), which was signed by both parties and by the judge pro tempore.
In pertinent part, the Stipulation stated:
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 41a.
At the arbitration, Foreman's attorney informed the panel he believed the $50,000 jurisdictional limitation on damages did not apply. City's counsel disagreed. The panel decided it would restrain itself to its jurisdictional limit. At that time, Foreman's attorney objected, and requested a continuance, which the panel granted. Thereafter, Foreman filed his motion with the trial court to remove the case from arbitration and reinstate it in the major jury trial pool. The trial court held oral argument on the motion.
Before the trial court, Foreman argued the parties agreed to waive the compulsory arbitration program's jurisdictional limit on damages despite not including that language in the Stipulation. City argued to the contrary that the Stipulation was the full and complete agreement of the parties. Thereafter, upon consideration of the case management conference report and the parties' submissions, including the Stipulation, the trial court determined the case would properly be resolved by submitting it to compulsory arbitration. Therefore, the trial court issued an order remanding the dispute accordingly:
Foreman then filed an appeal to the Superior Court, which later transferred it to this Court. Additionally, at the trial court's direction, Foreman filed a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. Specifically, he claimed: 1) the trial court did not give him an opportunity to present argument in support of his motion; and, 2) the Stipulation is based on mutual mistake, and therefore, void.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that both parties had ample opportunity to present argument, and that neither party objected whenthe trial court closed the proceeding. Additionally, the trial court held that any misunderstanding of the Stipulation terms was a unilateral mistake by Foreman, not a mutual mistake. Therefore, the trial court discerned no merit in Foreman's contentions. This matter is now before this Court for disposition.
Upon receiving this appeal, this Court issued a per curiam order requiring the parties address whether the Order is appealable as a threshold issue in their merits briefs.1
In his brief, Foreman does not address whether his appeal is subject to our review as directed.2 Rather, he limits his argument to the merits. Essentially, Foreman's argument is that the trial court improperly enforced the Stipulation by compelling arbitration. Foreman raises this argument not only to avoid the compulsory arbitration jurisdictional limit on damages, but also, to avoid theStipulation waiver clause, which if enforced after arbitration may contractually preclude him from seeking a trial de novo.
Specifically, Foreman claims the Stipulation is not enforceable because: the trial court did not approve it as required by Philadelphia County Local Rule 201(A)(5); his attorney lacked authority to sign the Stipulation; and, the Stipulation is based on mutual mistake. Additionally, Foreman claims the trial court erred in rendering its decision on his motion without sufficient record evidence or argument.
For its part, City contends the Order is not appealable. In the alternative, City argues Foreman did not preserve any issues for appeal, as he did not preserve any during argument before the trial court or in his statement of matters complained of on appeal. Further, addressing the merits, City claims the parties did not enter the Stipulation by mutual mistake.
As it is necessary to determine whether this appeal is subject to our review, we first address whether the Order is appealable as final, interlocutory by permission or as of right, or under the collateral order doctrine.
It is well settled that a party may only appeal from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule to file an interlocutory or collateral appeal. Pa. R.A.P. 311-341; Pennsylvania Ass'n of Rural & Small Sch. v. Casey, 531 Pa.439, 613 A.2d 1198 (1992); Northumberland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 2 A.3d 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Whether an order is final and appealable is determined after considering the ramifications of the order. Dep't of Transp. v. Morris, 615 A.2d 807 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
Here, Foreman appeals a trial court order denying his motion to reinstate his suit to the major jury trial pool from compulsory arbitration. The Order in effect compels the parties to attend compulsory arbitration. Therefore, the Order shall be construed as an order directing the parties to submit to arbitration. See id.
Upon review, the Order is not a final order. Myerowitz v. Pathology Lab. Diagnostics, 678 A.2d 404 (Pa. Super. 1996) (); Bartus v. Bartus, 540 A.2d 576 (Pa. Super. 1988) (). Furthermore, the Order does not fall within any category of interlocutory appeals as of right, and Foreman did not seek to appeal by permission. See Bartus; Pa. R.A.P. 311, 312. Accordingly, the Order is not appealable as a final order or as an interlocutory appeal by permission or as of right.
Next, we consider whether this Court may hear Foreman's appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Following Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975), the collateral order doctrine was codified as follows:
Pa. R.A.P. 313. Our Supreme Court requires the rule to be interpreted narrowly, so it does not swallow the general rule that only final orders are appealable. Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209 (1999). Each prong of the test must be clearly present for an order to be appealable. Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42 (2003); Brophy v. Phila. Gas Works & Phila. Facilities Mgmt., 921 A.2d 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Additionally, the test must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue raised on appeal. Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65, 977 A.2d 1121 (2009). Therefore, if one claim satisfies the collateral order doctrine, it will be reviewed; however, those claims, which do not satisfy the test, will not be bootstrapped into the appeal. Id.
Here, Foreman raises two distinct legal issues: 1) whether the Stipulation is void; and, 2) whether the trial court had a sufficient record to support its Order. Accordingly, we address each argument independently. See id.
Foreman's claims regarding the validity of the Stipulation are separable from his suit for damages against City. See Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547 (1999) ().
However, here the claim does not involve any right so important as to invoke concerns deeply rooted in public policy, and the parties have not asserted any exists. See Geniviva. Foreman's interest in not arbitrating his claim prior to challenging the validity of the Stipulation is not equivalent to those rights that are rooted in fundamental public policy. See Rae (privilege); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) ...
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