Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08–305.,08–305.
• Citation: 174 L.Ed.2d 168,129 S.Ct. 2484,77 USLW 4550,557 U.S. 230
• Parties: FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. T.A.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

557 U.S. 230

129 S.Ct. 2484

174 L.Ed.2d 168

77 USLW 4550

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner,

v.T.A.

No. 08–305.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 28, 2009.

Decided June 22, 2009.

Syllabus^*

After a private specialist diagnosed respondent with learning disabilities, his parents unilaterally removed him from petitioner public school district (School District), enrolled him in a private academy, and requested an administrative hearing on his eligibility for special-education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The School District found respondent ineligible for such services and declined to offer him an individualized education program (IEP). Concluding that the School District had failed to provide respondent a “free appropriate public education” as required by IDEA, § 1412(a)(1)(A), and that respondent's private-school placement was appropriate, the hearing officer ordered the School District to reimburse his parents for his private-school tuition. The District Court set aside the award, holding that the IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Amendments) categorically bar reimbursement unless a child has “previously received special education or related services under the [school's] authority.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Reversing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Amendments did not diminish the authority of courts to grant reimbursement as “appropriate” relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385.

Held: IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education services when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special-education services through the public school. Pp. 2490 – 2496.

(a) This Court held in Burlington and Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284, that § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) authorizes courts to reimburse parents for the cost of private-school tuition when a school district fails to provide a child a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate. That Burlington and Carter involved the deficiency of a proposed IEP does not distinguish this case, nor does the fact that the children in Burlington and Carter had previously received special-education services; the Court's decision in those cases depended on the Act's language and purpose rather than the particular facts involved. Thus, the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies unless the 1997 Amendments require a different result. Pp. 2490 – 2491.

(b) The 1997 Amendments do not impose a categorical bar to reimbursement. The Amendments made no change to the central purpose of IDEA or the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Because Congress is presumed to be aware of, and to adopt, a judicial interpretation of a statute when it reenacts that law without change, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40, this Court will continue to read § 1415(i)(2) (C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement absent a clear indication that Congress intended to repeal the provision or abrogate Burlington and Carter. The School District's argument that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) limits reimbursement to children who have previously received public special-education services is unpersuasive for several reasons: It is not supported by IDEA's text, as the 1997 Amendments do not expressly prohibit reimbursement in this case and the School District offers no evidence that Congress intended to supersede Burlington and Carter; it is at odds with IDEA's remedial purpose of “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special education ... designed to meet their unique needs,” § 1400(d)(1)(A); and it would produce a rule bordering on the irrational by providing a remedy when a school offers a child inadequate special-education services but leaving parents remediless when the school unreasonably denies access to such services altogether. Pp. 2491 – 2495.

(c) The School District's argument that any conditions on accepting IDEA funds must be stated unambiguously is clearly satisfied here, as States have been on notice at least since Burlington that IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement. The School District's claims that respondent's reading will impose a heavy financial burden on public schools and encourage parents to enroll their children in private school without first trying to cooperate with public-school authorities are also unpersuasive in light of the restrictions on reimbursement awards identified in Burlington and the fact that parents unilaterally change their child's placement at their own financial risk. See, e.g., Carter, 510 U.S., at 15, 114 S.Ct. 361 .Pp. 2495 – 2496.

523 F.3d 1078, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.

Gary S. Feinerman, for Petitioner.

David B. Salmons, for Respondent.

Eric D. Miller, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

Eamon P. Joyce, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, Gary Feinerman, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, Ryan C. Morris, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Richard Cohn-Lee, Andrea L. Hungerford, The Hungerford Law Firm, LLP, Oregon City, OR, for Petitioner.

Mary E. Broadhurst, Mary E. Broadhurst, P.C., Eugene, OR, David B. Salmons, Jason R. Scherr, Goutam Patnaik, Randall M. Levine, Masai McDougall Bingham McCutchen, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., requires States receiving federal funding to make a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) available to all children with disabilities residing in the State, § 1412 (a)(1)(A). We have previously held that when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and a child's parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the school district's consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). The question presented in this case is whether the IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Amendments), 111 Stat. 37, categorically prohibit reimbursement for private-education costs if a child has not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). We hold that the Amendments impose no such categorical bar.

I

Respondent T.A. attended public schools in the Forest Grove School District (School District or District) from the time he was in kindergarten through the winter of his junior year of high school. From kindergarten through eighth grade, respondent's teachers observed that he had trouble paying attention in class and completing his assignments. When respondent entered high school, his difficulties increased.

In December 2000, during respondent's freshman year, his mother contacted the school counselor to discuss respondent's problems with his schoolwork. At the end of the school year, respondent was evaluated by a school psychologist. After interviewing him, examining his school records, and administering cognitive ability tests, the psychologist concluded that respondent did not need further testing for any learning disabilities or other health impairments, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The psychologist and two other school officials discussed the evaluation results with respondent's mother in June 2001, and all agreed that respondent did not qualify for special-education services. Respondent's parents did not seek review of that decision, although the hearing examiner later found that the School District's evaluation was legally inadequate because it failed to address all areas of suspected disability, including ADHD.

With extensive help from his family, respondent completed his sophomore year at Forest Grove High School, but his problems worsened during his junior year. In February 2003, respondent's parents discussed with the School District the possibility of respondent completing high school through a partnership program with the local community college. They also sought private professional advice, and in March 2003 respondent was diagnosed with ADHD and a number of disabilities related to learning and memory. Advised by the private specialist that respondent would do best in a structured, residential learning environment, respondent's parents enrolled him at a private academy that focuses on educating children with special needs.

Four days after enrolling him in private school, respondent's parents hired a lawyer to ascertain their rights and to give the School District written notice of respondent's private placement. A few weeks later, in April 2003, respondent's parents requested an administrative due process hearing regarding respondent's eligibility for special-education services. In June 2003, the District engaged a school psychologist to assist in determining whether respondent had a disability that significantly interfered with his educational performance. Respondent's parents cooperated with the District during the evaluation process. In July 2003, a multidisciplinary team met to discuss whether respondent satisfied IDEA's disability criteria and concluded that he did not because his ADHD did not have a sufficiently significant adverse impact on his educational performance. Because the School District maintained that respondent was not eligible for special-education services and therefore declined to provide...