Forest v. Parmalee
| Decision Date | 27 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 7,8 and 9,s. 7 |
| Parties | Gary L. FOREST and James C. Mills, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gerald L. PARMALEE, d/b/a G & L Construction Company, and Roy C. Davis, Defendants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD COMMISSIONERS FOR the COUNTY OF GRATIOT, Defendant-Appellee. Allison McGREGOR and Alzyque Thomas, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MACOMB COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Lillian T. BURTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, Michigan State HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee. 402 Mich. 348, 262 N.W.2d 653 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Robert L. Douglas, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortino, Plaxton & Moskal by John J. Moskal, Alma, for defendant-appellee.
Bain & Shapero, P.C., by Gerald D. Wahl, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Daner, Freeman, McKenzie & Matthews, P. C., Mount Clemens, by Robert S. McKenzie, Mount Clemens, for defendant-appellee.
Peter Dozorc, Troy, for appellant; Ronald M. Barron, Troy, of counsel.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Francis J. Carrier, Myron A. McMillan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for defendant-appellee.
The single question engendered by these consolidated cases is whether the two-year statute of limitations provided for in 1964 P.A. 170 violates equal protection mandates and is therefore unconstitutional. See M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111).
Plaintiffs Forest and Mills were injured when Forest drove his car into an excavation for a drainage construction project on August 10, 1970. The plaintiffs filed separate complaints against defendants Parmalee and Davis, private excavators and contractors, who were performing the drainage construction work pursuant to a contract with the county drain commission. An amended complaint adding the Gratiot County Board of Road Commissioners as parties defendant was filed on October 27, 1972. The trial judge granted defendant County Road Board's motion for accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1(5), based on the two-year statute of limitations in M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111).
Plaintiffs McGregor and Thomas were driver and passenger in a car which fell into a depression on the edge of Eleven Mile Road in Warren on October 2, 1970. On October 22, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a notice of intent to file a claim with the Court of Claims. Settlement efforts were unsuccessful. On September 27, 1973, the plaintiffs sued defendant Macomb County Road Commission for injuries allegedly caused by negligent repair and maintenance of Eleven Mile Road. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for accelerated judgment. GCR 1963, 116.1(5), based on the two-year statute of limitations in M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111).
On July 3, 1972, plaintiff Burton tripped and fell on an exposed manhole cover while crossing the street at the corner of Grand River Avenue and Woodward Avenue in downtown Detroit. Suit was filed against defendant State Highway Department on July 17, 1974. The judge granted the defendant's motion for accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1(5), on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111).
The plaintiffs in these cases appealed the dismissals. The Court of Appeals affirmed each dismissal. This Court granted leave to appeal in these cases on October 29, 1976, and November 1, 1976. 397 Mich. 885, 887 and 889. The cases were subsequently consolidated and heard together.
The plaintiffs contend that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to suits brought against governmental tortfeasors for injuries resulting from negligently maintained highways is violative of equal protection 1 because the comparable statute of limitations applicable to the same suits brought against private tortfeasors is three years.
The plaintiffs do not dispute that these cases arose under § 2 of the governmental liability act, M.C.L.A. § 691.1401 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.996(101) et seq. Section 2, in its pertinent part, allows for recovery against a governmental unit for injuries resulting from a negligently maintained highway:
The statute of limitations under which the accelerated judgments in the instant cases were granted is M.C.L.A. § 691.1411; M.S.A. § 3.996(111):
The thrust of plaintiffs' attack on the two-year statute of limitations is that the Legislature has created an arbitrary and unreasonable classification scheme by permitting plaintiffs injured by private tortfeasors three years in which to assert their claims, M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7), while granting those plaintiffs injured by governmental tortfeasors a year less. 2 Fox v. Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich. 579, 588, 153 N.W.2d 644 (1967).
Before examining the precise question before us, we should set forth the general principles for reviewing alleged equal protection violations.
A party attacking a statutory classification on equal protection grounds has the heavy burden of demonstrating that the classification lacks a reasonable basis. 3 If a reasonable relationship exists between the governmental classification and a legitimate state interest, no denial of equal protection results.
(Footnotes omitted.) Manistee Bank v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 668, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975).
State legislatures, therefore, have a broad range of discretion in establishing classifications in the exercise of their police powers. Fox v. Employment Security Commission, supra.
In the instant cases, the statute in question does effectively separate the victims of highway tortfeasors into two classes. 4 Those plaintiffs injured as a result of the negligent maintenance of a highway by a public tortfeasor have their rights of action cut off after two years. Their counterparts, who are injured under the same circumstances but through the negligence of private tortfeasors, have three years within which to press their causes of action.
Significantly, plaintiffs here presented us with no cogent showing that the statute of limitations has operated arbitrarily or capriciously in barring their causes of action. Instead, they rely almost entirely on Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972), for their legal analysis and conclusion.
Reich recognized that two classes of victims were established by requiring notice of suit be given to public tortfeasors within 60 days while only requiring that suits against similarly situated private tortfeasors be filed within the three-year statute of limitations. Reich held that a 60-day notice requirement found in M.C.L.A. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104) arbitrarily barred actions by the victims of governmental highway negligence and thus violated equal protection strictures.
The Reich majority believed that the 60-day special notice limitation was unduly restrictive, as opposed to the three-year statute of limitations, in light of the "legislature's intention to place victims of negligent conduct on equal footing". Reich, supra, 623, 194 N.W.2d 702. The dissent in Reich theorized that the instant two-year statute of limitations could conceivably fall under the majority's "equal footing" rationale. Reich, supra, 626, 194 N.W.2d 700.
While we accept the majority's analysis in Reich that the 60-day notice requirement in that case was arbitrary and thus violative of equal protection, we do not agree that the two-year statute must fall under the same rationale.
The Reich Court was correct in reasoning that the Legislature, inter alia, intended to place victims of negligent highway maintenance on "equal footing" as to the substantive right to proceed against a governmental tortfeasor. However, we do not believe the Court intended that the same analysis should apply to all procedural requirements involved in bringing such suits. Justice T. M. Kavanagh recognized this same substantive-procedural distinction in Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 173-174, 180 N.W.2d 778, 783 (1970):
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...divest plaintiffs of the access to the courts intended by the grant of the substantive right.' "), quoting Forest v Parmalee, 402 Mich 348, 359; 262 NW2d 653 (1978). The Court of Appeals held that MCL 600.6431 places a "reasonable, albeit minimal, burden on a plaintiff to advise the state o......
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...that does not afford a reasonable time to file suit cannot be constitutionally upheld, because it prevents access to the courts. Forest v. Parmalee12 held that "statutes of limitations are to be upheld by courts unless it can be demonstrated that they are so harsh and in their consequences ......
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...as procedural and not substantive in nature. Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160, 166, 324 N.W.2d 9 (1982); Forest v. Parmalee, 402 Mich. 348, 359, 262 N.W.2d 653 (1978). 14 This concept also has been applied to changes in criminal procedure. People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 255, 246 N.W. 60 ......
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...The equal protection challenge to the validity of that limitation was decided adversely to Williams' contentions in Forest v. Parmalee, 402 Mich. 348, 262 N.W.2d 653 (1978).2 Grossman also relied on the three month limitation on rehearing a probate court order. M.C.L. § 701.19; M.S.A. § 27.......