Forfeiture of $5,264, In re

• Citation: 432 Mich. 242,439 N.W.2d 246
• Decision Date: 01 December 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 82253
• Parties: In re FORFEITURE OF $5,264; One 1985 BMW, Bearing Motor Vehicle Number WBAAB6408F1210308; Real Property, Building, Business, Business Inventory Fixtures and Safe Located at 24726 Gratiot, East Detroit, Michigan, Known as "Mother Lode." ,
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 246

439 N.W.2d 246

In re FORFEITURE OF $5,264; One 1985 BMW, Bearing Motor

Vehicle Number WBAAB6408F1210308; Real Property, Building,

Business, Business Inventory Fixtures and Safe Located at

24726 Gratiot, East Detroit, Michigan, Known as "Mother

Lode."

Docket No. 82253, Dec. Term, 1988.

432 Mich. 242, 439 N.W.2d 246, 86 A.L.R.4th 969

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 8, 1988.

Decided April 19, 1989.

Carl J. Marlinga, Pros. Atty., Macomb County, Robert John Berlin, Chief Appellate Lawyer, by Edward L. Graham, Asst. Pros. Atty., Mount Clemens, for appellant.

P. Kelly O'Dea, O'Dea & Jamnik, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, for appellee.

RILEY, Chief Justice.

In this case, we are asked to decide whether a store building which was allegedly used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance may be forfeited pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 333.7521(1)(f); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7521)(1)(f). Drawing upon the plain language and legislative history of Sec. 7521(1)(f) as well as the public policy of the controlled substances act, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7101) et seq., we hold that the Legislature intended to allow the forfeiture of real property under that provision. We conclude that, in the instant case, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the claimant's store was used to facilitate the unlawful sale of narcotics. Because the claimant's store was, in our view, "substantially connected" to his cocaine business, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order of forfeiture.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Claimant Rex Lewandowski owned and operated the Mother Lode, a precious metal and jewelry exchange store. Undercover officer Thomas Trombley entered the Mother Lode on August 8, 1985, accompanied by an informant who knew the claimant. Trombley indicated that he wanted to buy a half ounce of cocaine. However, the claimant stated that he would not handle a transaction involving less than two ounces. The parties then agreed to a sale for that amount, and Trombley gave the claimant $2,500 as a down payment. Using the business phone, the claimant made several attempts to contact his supplier. When his efforts failed, the claimant returned the money to Trombley. The claimant instructed Trombley to contact him the next day to see if he had communicated with his source.

Trombley met the claimant at the Mother Lode the following morning. They went for a ride in claimant's new BMW automobile. During the drive, the claimant advised Trombley that he would not be able to reach his source until later that afternoon. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Trombley returned to the store and drove the claimant to a particular phone booth from which the supplier was contacted.

The claimant advised Trombley that he could obtain the cocaine for $4,000 and that immediate payment was necessary. The claimant offered Trombley a Mother Lode business receipt in return for the $4,000. However, Trombley refused to tender the cash up front. Instead, the two agreed to meet later that evening at a shopping mall.

At the mall, the claimant told Trombley that the cocaine was under the front seat of the BMW. As instructed, the detective placed $4,000 in the glove compartment and retrieved a package containing cocaine.

On August 14, 1985, Trombley called the claimant at the Mother Lode. The claimant returned his call and arranged to deliver additional cocaine. When Trombley met the claimant at the store later that day, the claimant retrieved eight ounces of cocaine from the BMW and gave it to Trombley in a back room. In exchange, Trombley gave the claimant $15,000. The claimant placed the money in a desk drawer behind the front counter in the display room.

Shortly after the exchange took place, the claimant was arrested and charged with delivering over 50 grams but less than 225 grams of cocaine. M.C.L. Sec. 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). The claimant's business was searched. On August 15, 1985, the prosecutor, pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 333.7522; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7522), filed the present civil forfeiture action in rem in Macomb Circuit Court, seeking the confiscation of $5,264 found in a drawer behind the store counter, the BMW automobile registered to the claimant, the building and business inventory of the Mother Lode, and the real property upon which the building stood. Only the building and the real property are at issue in this appeal. Deeds indicated that the claimant was the sole owner of the building and real estate.

On February 14, 1986, the claimant was convicted of the charged offense. A forfeiture hearing was held on May 22, 1986. ¹ The trial court ordered the forfeiture of the claimant's building on May 23, 1985, stating that M.C.L. Sec. 333.7521(1)(f); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7521)(1)(f) clearly permits the forfeiture of "any thing of value [including real estate] which is used ... for the purpose of facilitating [the sale of a controlled substance]." In the opinion of the trial court, the prosecutor presented an overwhelming amount of evidence to support the forfeiture of the claimant's store. "We have testimony, uncontradicted, [that] the actual buy took place in a back room of the Mother Lode, that's in the store itself ... [and that] an offer was made to sell another ... large quantity of cocaine as Detective Trombley was preparing to leave the store."

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order of forfeiture. ² Relying upon In re Forfeiture of 2850 Ewing Road, 161 Mich.App. 266, 409 N.W.2d 800 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 884, 416 N.W.2d 115 (1987), the Court held that "[r]eal property which is merely the situs of a violation of the controlled substances act is not subject to forfeiture." ³ On June 22, 1988, we granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether the store building was subject to forfeiture under M.C.L. Sec. 333.7521; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7521). ⁴

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The issue before the Court is one of statutory construction. Our primary goal in interpreting M.C.L. Sec. 333.7521; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7521) is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the intent must be determined accordingly, and no judicial interpretation is warranted. City of Livonia v. Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich. 466, 487, 378 N.W.2d 402 (1985); Dussia v. Monroe Co. Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich. 244, 249, 191 N.W.2d 307 (1971); Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956). However, where statutory language is of doubtful meaning, a court must look to the object of the statute, the harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction which best accomplishes the statute's purpose. State Treasurer v. Wilson, 423 Mich. 138, 144, 377 N.W.2d 703 (1985); Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 340 Mich. 25, 35, 64 N.W.2d 903 (1954).

M.C.L. Sec. 333.7521; M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7521) provides:

"(1) The following property is subject to forfeiture:

* * * * * *

"(f) Any thing of value that is furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this article, or used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities. To the extent of the interest of an owner, a thing of value is not subject to forfeiture under this subdivision by reason of any act or omission that is established by the owner of the item to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent. Any money that is found in close proximity [sic] to any property that is subject to forfeiture under subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) shall be presumed to be subject to forfeiture under this subdivision. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.)

At issue is the proper construction of the phrase "any thing of value that is ... used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this article including but not limited to money, negotiable instruments, or securities." Section 7521(1)(f) does not expressly specify real property as "any thing of value" used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act. Thus, because the statute is ambiguous on its face, we must determine and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.

A

A thorough examination of the express language of Sec. 7521(1)(f) evidences the Legislature's intent to permit the forfeiture of real property. When drafting the forfeiture provision, the Legislature used the term "any" to describe "thing of value." Webster defines the adjective "any" to mean "every." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985), p 93. The term "thing" is defined as an "object[ ] ... of property as contradistinguished from 'person.' " Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 1326. In light of these common-sense definitions, real property would seem to qualify as "any thing of value."

In Gibson v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 282, 289, 276 N.W. 450 (1937), a case involving the interpretation of the word "any" in a contract of insurance, we affirmed the trial court's finding that "[t]he clause uses the word 'any,' which to the ordinary understanding implies 'of every kind.' The word negatives the idea of exclusion and would seem to mean just what it says. The plaintiff insists [incorrectly ] the word 'any' as used in this contract means less than all." Like the plaintiff in Gibson, the claimant in the instant case contends that "any" in Sec. 7521(1)(f) means less than "every" and that real property is somehow excluded from the phrase "any thing of value" used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act.

...