Forrester v. Seven Seventeen HB St. Louis

• Decision Date: 16 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4-02-0278.,4-02-0278.
• Citation: 271 Ill.Dec. 280,784 N.E.2d 834,336 Ill. App.3d 572
• Parties: Gary FORRESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEVEN SEVENTEEN HB ST. LOUIS, REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a "Adam's Mark, the Hotel of St. Louis," Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

784 N.E.2d 834

336 Ill. App.3d 572

271 Ill.Dec. 280

Gary FORRESTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEVEN SEVENTEEN HB ST. LOUIS, REDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a "Adam's Mark, the Hotel of St. Louis," Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-02-0278.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Argued September 17, 2002.

Decided December 16, 2002.

Gary D. Forrester (argued), Phebus & Winkelmann, Urbana, for Gary Forrester.

Stephen M. O'Byrne (argued), Rawles, O'Byrne, Stanko & Kepley, P.C., Champaign, for Seven Seventeen HB St. Louis.

Justice COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Gary Forrester, appeals pro se the January 22, 2002, order of the Champaign County circuit court quashing service on defendant and dismissing plaintiff's small-claims complaint. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff's small-claims complaint, plaintiff spent the night of October 6, 2001, at defendant hotel in downtown St. Louis. Plaintiff made the reservation for his stay over the phone by calling defendant from plaintiff's home in Illinois. Plaintiff guaranteed his reservation by giving defendant a credit card number.

On the night of October 6, 2001, plaintiff's car was damaged while it was parked in defendant's parking facility in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant refused to accept liability or pay for any of the damage. Plaintiff filed suit to recover for the damages to his car in small-claims court in the Champaign County, Illinois, circuit court. On November 16, 2001, defendant responded by filing an objection to jurisdiction and motion to quash service. Attached was an affidavit of Timothy Tata, the general manager of the hotel. This affidavit stated that defendant was a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business located at Fourth and Chestnut Streets, in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant owns no property or real estate in Illinois, does not transact business in Illinois, has no registered agent in Illinois, has no Illinois telephone number, and has never sold insurance in Illinois.

On November 19, 2001, plaintiff filed an affidavit in response to defendant's objection to jurisdiction and motion to quash service. This affidavit generally restated the allegations in plaintiff's small-claims complaint: plaintiff called defendant to make a reservation from his home in Champaign, Illinois, and plaintiff provided defendant with his credit card number. Plaintiff's affidavit further concluded that he and defendant had entered into an Illinois contract.

On November 29, 2001, defendant filed a supplemental affidavit. This affidavit stated that defendant has a cancellation policy and that it informs all persons making reservations of this policy. A person who gives a credit card number when making a reservation can cancel the reservation without consequence at any time prior to 4 p.m. on the date of arrival. Charges are made on the guest's credit card pursuant to the telephone authorization only if the guest fails to appear on the arrival date and has not cancelled his or her reservation prior to 4 p.m. on the arrival date.

On December 3, 2001, plaintiff filed a supplemental affidavit. This affidavit concluded that, to plaintiff's knowledge and belief, defendant has transacted business in Illinois within the meaning of section 2-209 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (long-arm statute) (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2000)). Defendant also made a contract that was substantially connected with Illinois and was wholly performed on plaintiff's side in Illinois and performed in substantial part on defendant's side in Illinois within the meaning of the Illinois long-arm statute. The affidavit further stated plaintiff got defendant's toll-free telephone number from a website on the Internet; that reservations at defendant hotel can be made on the Internet; there is an "Adam's Mark Hotel" in Chicago, Illinois; and defendant advertises in Illinois.

On December 17, 2001, defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's supplemental affidavit in part. The trial court denied the motion to strike.

On January 22, 2002, the trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion to quash service. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. In March 2002, plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the order denying the motion to reconsider; and in April 2002, the court denied it. Plaintiff appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

This case presents the question of whether the Illinois courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant hotel, a Missouri corporation. The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, but decided the issue on the pleadings; therefore, our review is de novo. Stein v. Rio Parismina Lodge, 296 Ill.App.3d 520, 523, 231 Ill.Dec. 1, 695 N.E.2d 518, 520-21 (1998).

Plaintiff argues that Illinois courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to the long-arm statute, specifically sections 2-209(a), (b), and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a), (b), (c) (West 2000). Courts apply a two-step analysis when a plaintiff argues for jurisdiction under the long-arm statute: (1) determine whether jurisdiction is proper under the statute; and if so, (2) determine if jurisdiction is permissible under the federal constitution's due process clause. Stein, 296 Ill.App.3d at 524,231 Ill.Dec. 1,695 N.E.2d at 521. The analysis may begin with either step: if jurisdiction is not found under the long-arm statute, then there is no need to determine whether jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible; and if exercising jurisdiction would offend due process, then there is no need to address the application of the long-arm statute. Stein, 296 Ill.App.3d at 524,231 Ill.Dec. 1,695 N.E.2d at 521.

The long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this [s]tate, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and[,] if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this [s]tate as to any cause of action arising from the doing of such acts:

(1) [t]he transaction of any business within this [s]tate;

* * *

(7) [t]he making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this State.

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(b) A court may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without this State against any person who:

* * *

(4) [i]s a natural person or corporation doing business within this State.

(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States." 735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2000).

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider. We address each argument in turn.

A. Specific Jurisdiction under Section 2-209(a)

Section 2-209(a) of the long-arm statute gives Illinois courts personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when that defendant commits one of the acts enumerated in the statute. This jurisdiction is specific and limited to a cause of action that arises directly from the commission of one of these enumerated acts. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a) (West 2000). Plaintiff claims that defendant has committed the following acts enumerated in section 2-209(a): "[t]he transaction of any business within this [s]tate" (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(1) (West 2000)), and "[t]he making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this [s]tate" (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(7) (West 2000)). Specifically, plaintiff argues that when he called defendant to make a reservation for a hotel room, defendant was transacting business in Illinois (section 2-209(a)(1)), and defendant was making or performing a contract substantially connected to Illinois (section 2-209(a)(7)). Plaintiff further argues that his cause of action arises directly out of the alleged Illinois contract between him and defendant under the doctrine of infra hospitium. Infra hospitium is a common-law doctrine that imposes strict liability on innkeepers. See Plant v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodge, 500 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind.App.1986). Therefore, plaintiff argues, because defendant committed these enumerated acts in Illinois, and plaintiff's cause of action arises directly from defendant's actions in Illinois, the Champaign County circuit court can exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant in this case.

We first address plaintiff's argument that defendant transacted business within this state when plaintiff called to make a reservation (section 2-209(a)(1)). According to plaintiff, this created an Illinois contract. Assuming there was a contract, and it was executed in Illinois, "the mere execution of a contract in Illinois is not by itself a sufficient transaction of business to trigger the application of the long-arm statute." Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill.App.3d 49, 58, 258 Ill.Dec. 628, 756 N.E.2d 902, 911 (2001). Instead, the courts consider who initiated the transaction, where the parties entered the contract, and where defendant would have performed the contract. Campbell v. Mills, 262 Ill.App.3d 624, 628, 199 Ill.Dec. 441, 634 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1994). "The relevant inquiry is not whether the plaintiff partially performed the contract in Illinois, but whether the defendant performed any part of the contract in Illinois." (Emphases in original.) Khan, 325 Ill.App.3d at 58, 258 Ill.Dec. 628, 756 N.E.2d at 911. In this case, plaintiff initiated the transaction by calling defendant hotel to make a reservation, and defendant's performance of the contract, which was to provide plaintiff with lodging, was to occur exclusively in Missouri. As defendant was not required to do anything in Illinois, there is no jurisdiction on this basis.

We next address plaintiff's argument that defendant made a contract substantially connected with Illinois when plaintiff called defendant hotel to make a reservation (section 2-209(a)(7)). Assuming a...