Forsman v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State of Wash.
| Decision Date | 27 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 12434-3-II,12434-3-II |
| Citation | 59 Wn.App. 76,795 P.2d 1184 |
| Parties | Patricia FORSMAN and Nina Morris, Appellants, v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF the STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Martha L. Schmidt, Vashon Island, for appellants.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., and M. Geoffrey G. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Employment Security Div., Olympia, for respondent.
*
Patricia Forsman and Nina Morris appeal the trial court's affirmance of the decision by the delegate of the Commissioner of the Employment Security Department.The commissioner's delegate denied benefits on the basis that the claimants had not established good cause for terminating employment.In reviewing that denial, we must answer four other questions: (1) Did the claimants have compelling reasons for terminating their employment?(2) Were they sufficiently certain of deterioration in working conditions before they terminated their employment?(3) Did they exhaust all reasonable alternatives before terminating their employment?(4) Was the deterioration in working conditions involuntary even though the union, of which the claimants were members, ratified the changes in working conditions?We answer these questions in the affirmative and find that the workers established good cause for terminating their employment.Thus, we reverse.
We review the record of the administrative tribunal, not the superior court.Macey v. Department of Empl. Sec., 110 Wash.2d 308, 311, 752 P.2d 372(1988).Neither party challenges the Commissioner's delegate's findings of fact, so those facts are verities on appeal.Fuller v. Department of Empl. Sec., 52 Wash.App. 603, 606, 762 P.2d 367(1988), review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1005(1989).The findings of fact were entered by the administrative law judge and adopted by the Commissioner's delegate.
The findings for Morris read as follows:
1.The claimant is presently unemployed.She was employed by [Hancock Fabrics] in Tacoma as a sales clerk from August 25, 1969 until September 26, 1986.She worked varied hours and was paid $5.94 per hour as a member of United Food and Commericial [sic ] Workers Union, Local 367 (Tacoma).
2.The claimant was hired by [Hancock Fabrics] to work on a full-time basis.Through the years hours fluctuated depending upon the business flow.The claimant worked 40 hours a week until 1980 when the hours were reduced.They were increased to 40 hours a week again in 1985.In April 1986the claimant's hours were reduced to 22-24 hours per week.Contract negotiations began in April 1986 and the claimant remained on the job to determine what the final outcome would be.The claimant submitted her notice of intent to resign on September 19, 1986 approximately one week before the final contract vote was taken.Before submitting her resignation the claimant received reasonable assurance from the interested employer that their (sic) pay would be reduced from $5.94 per hour to $4.50 per hour and medical benefits would be lost plus several holidays and one weeks vacation.In addition, hours could not be guaranteed.Hours could possibly be increased in the future depending upon the business flow of the particular store.Since hours could not be guaranteed and the claimant was convinced that her pay would, in fact, be reduced in addition to the loss of benefits, she terminated her position on September 26, 1986.
The findings of fact in Forsman's case were identical except that Forsman was employed from October 30, 1970 until September 26, 1986.
The contract negotiations mentioned are negotiations between the union and the employer.Both claimants voted against ratification, but the union members ratified the contract September 25, 1986.
The Department of Employment Security(Department) denied benefits to both claimants on the ground that each had left work voluntarily without good cause.The claimants appealed, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimants' work conditions had deteriorated so that job separation was justified.On further appeal, the Commissioner's delegate reversed that decision, finding that the prospect of less favorable working conditions does not establish good cause, that the "employer would have attempted to provide additional hours if requested," that dissatisfaction with one's wage level does not constitute good cause for job separation, and that the deteriorations were voluntary because the union had ratified the contract.Therefore, the delegate determined that the claimants had not established good cause.The ALJ's order was set aside and the claimants were disqualified pursuant to RCW 50.20.050(1).1The trial court affirmed the decision in both cases.
An employee is disqualified from receiving benefits if she terminated employment voluntarily without good cause.RCW 50.20.050(1).To establish good cause the employee must satisfy three factors: (1) that she left because of work-connected factors; (2) that the factors were sufficiently compelling to cause a reasonably prudent person to terminate employment; and (3) that she exhausted all reasonable alternatives (but she need not perform futile acts).WAC 192-16-009.
The Commissioner's delegate found that neither the wage reduction nor the prospect of less favorable working conditions was sufficient to establish good cause.He also found that "it would have been prudent" for the workers to wait until after the union ratification vote, and that the deterioration in working conditions was voluntary because the union ratified the new contract.We will consider each of these reasons in turn.
The Commissioner's delegate found that a wage reduction alone was not sufficiently compelling to cause the claimants to terminate their employment, and cited Cowles Publishing Co. v. Department of Empl. Sec., 15 Wash.App. 590, 550 P.2d 712(1976).We review the Commissioner's delegate's construction of the term "good cause" under the error of law standard.Grier v. Department of Empl. Sec., 43 Wash.App. 92, 95, 715 P.2d 534, review denied, 106 Wash.2d 1003(1986).
The reliance upon Cowles is misplaced, because that case did not involve a wage reduction.Instead, the employee quit because she was dissatisfied with her wages, which were significantly below the level of wages paid to other persons with similar seniority and skill.The Cowles court noted that wage reduction could constitute good cause, though that was not the case there.Cowles, 15 Wash.App. at 594, 550 P.2d 712.A substantial wage reduction has long been recognized as a compelling reason for terminating one's employment.Grier, 43 Wash.App. at 96, 715 P.2d 534.A reduction in benefits may also rise to the level of a compelling reason.Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash.2d 836, 839, 539 P.2d 852(1975).The wage reduction of 24 percent, coupled with the reduction in hours per week of 45 percent, loss of medical benefits, holidays and one week's vacation, were sufficiently compelling to cause the claimants to terminate their employment.
We review whether the claimant must wait until the change actually takes effect under the error of law standard.2Grier, 43 Wash.App. at 95, 715 P.2d 534.See alsoSafeco Ins. Co. v. Meyering, 102 Wash.2d 385, 390, 687 P.2d 195(1984).
The Department argues that by terminating employment before the actual deterioration, and before the contract ratification, the claimants failed to exhaust all reasonable alternatives.Of the cases cited by the Department, however, none presents a factual situation similar to the case before us.
In Johns v. Department of Empl. Sec., 38 Wash.App. 566, 686 P.2d 517(1984), the claimant was offered time to resolve conflicts with employers, but simply terminated his employment without pursuing a less drastic resolution.Similarly, the claimant in Maltese v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 190 Pa.Super. 123, 152 A.2d 773(1959), walked away from her job for personal reasons without first discussing possible resolution of her problems with her employer.Finally, in Korte v. Department of Empl. Sec., 47 Wash.App. 296, 304, 734 P.2d 939(1987), the claimant refused to sign a contract that was substantially similar to--if not better than--her agreement without the contract.The court reasoned that she should have signed the contract and waited to see if her working conditions actually worsened.
Here, the employer had already reduced the claimants' hours and the claimants were given no guarantee that the hours would be reinstated.The claimants were also given reasonable assurances that the wages and benefits would be cut.Thus, though the Commissioner's delegate labeled the wage and benefit losses as prospective, some of the losses had already occurred.The other losses were prospective only in the sense that they would occur in the future, but not in the sense that they were a mere possibility.
When the reduction in benefits is imminent, the employee need not wait until the actual reduction.In Grierthe claimant resigned ten days before the actual reduction in benefits.The court reasoned that denying benefits because the employee resigned too early would be unreasonable where the benefit reductions were imminent.The court then found good cause, Grier, 43 Wash.App. at 98, 715 P.2d 534, and held that the claimant was entitled to benefits commencing the day that the reduction in hours would have taken effect.Grier, 43 Wash.App. at 99, 715 P.2d 534.Thus, providing notice of intent to terminate before the actual deterioration in conditions is not fatal to claimants' cases.3
Whether the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Shoreline Community College Dist. No. 7 v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State of Wash.
-
Terry v. Employment Sec. Dept.
...hardship on the individual were he or she required to continue in the employment.10 WAC 192-16-009; Forsman v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 59 Wash.App. 76, 80-81, 795 P.2d 1184 (1990), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1005, 803 P.2d 1309 (1991).11 See Davis v. Department of Empl. Sec., 108 Wash.2d 272......
-
Cascade Nursing Services, Ltd. v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State
...on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Forsman v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 59 Wash.App. 76, 83, 795 P.2d 1184 (1990), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1005, 803 P.2d 1309 In reviewing an agency's conclusions of law, the court applies ......
-
Pederson v. Emp't Sec. Dep't
...wage reduction has long been recognized as a compelling reason for terminating one's employment.” Forsman v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 59 Wash.App. 76, 81, 795 P.2d 1184 (1990). But to qualify as good cause for quitting work, “some employer action must have caused the reduction in the employee......