Forsythe v. Coats Co., Inc., 53604

• Decision Date: 15 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 53604,53604
• Citation: 230 Kan. 553,639 P.2d 43
• Parties: James A. FORSYTHE, Plaintiff, v. COATS COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 43

639 P.2d 43

230 Kan. 553

James A. FORSYTHE, Plaintiff, v. COATS COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

No. 53604.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 15, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The system of modified comparative negligence, codified in K.S.A. 60-258a, applies to cases tried under strict liability in tort.

2. In an action based on strict liability in tort (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A (1965)) for design or manufacturing defects in a product, where the jury's verdict attributes 65% of the causal fault to plaintiff, 20% to plaintiff's immune employer, and 15% to defendant, judgment should be entered for defendant.

Edward W. Mullen, of Deacy & Deacy, Kansas City, Mo., argued the cause, and Gerald L. Rushfelt, of Rushfelt, Mueller, Druten & Moran, Overland Park, was with him on the brief for the defendant.

Lynn R. Johnson, of Schnider, Shamberg & May, Chartered, Shawnee Mission, argued the cause, and Mark A. Johnson, was with him on the brief for the plaintiff.

Richard C. Hite and Arthur S. Chalmers, of Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg, Wichita, were on the amicus curiae brief for the Kansas Ass'n of Defense Counsel.

Donald W. Vasos and Michael E. Callen, Kansas City, were on the amicus curiae brief for the Kansas Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

FROMME, Justice:

This case comes to the court by way of certification from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under authority of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 60-3201 et seq.

The case is a products liability action in which plaintiff claimed the defendant manufacturer was liable to him for personal injuries under the theory of strict liability in tort for design or manufacturing defects in a product. The product was a tire changer manufactured by the defendant, Coats Company, Inc. Plaintiff was an employee of Amoco Oil Company which company purchased the tire changer for use by its employees. Amoco Oil Company was immune from suit by reason of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant Coats Company claimed that plaintiff unreasonably misused the product and assumed the risk of injury from the alleged defects in the product. Defendant Coats Company further claimed that Amoco was also at fault and contributed to the cause of plaintiff's injuries by improperly modifying the machine, failing to maintain the machine, and failing to provide plaintiff with warnings or instructions as to use of the machine.

The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict apportioning 65% of the causal fault to plaintiff, 20% to Amoco, and 15% to the Coats Company. The matter is pending before the federal trial court on defendant's motion for entry of judgment. The motion is based on a contention that since plaintiff was found to be 65% at fault recovery is barred by K.S.A. 60-258a(a), or alternatively barred by the common law of Kansas relating to assumption of risk or improper use of the product. Jurisdiction of the federal court is founded solely on diversity of citizenship. The substantive law of Kansas governs the action.

In certifying the question to this court, Judge O'Connor correctly points out that since the case of Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980), was decided by this court, there is no longer any doubt that the doctrine of comparative fault or comparative causation is applicable to strict liability claims. This result was predicted in Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., 457 F.Supp. 740 (D.Kan.1978). Judge O'Connor points out further that this court has held that a plaintiff can recover a percentage of his damage from a third-party tortfeasor, even though the latter's causal negligence was less than that of plaintiff. See Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 229 Kan. 465, 625 P.2d 472 (1981), and Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).

In support of its motion for judgment, defendant Coats Company relies on language found in Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788; Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Salem Township, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271 (1978); Wilson v. Probst, 224 Kan. 459, 581 P.2d 380 (1978); and Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842, 610 P.2d 1107 (1980). Defendant argues that Kansas law recognizes only one type of comparative fault-the modified comparative fault system set forth in K.S.A. 60-258a.

On the other hand, plaintiff points to the opinion in Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., 457 F.Supp. 740, in which Judge Rogers of the United States District Court observed that the application of comparative liability in its "pure form" would most effectively carry out the public policy on equitable loss allocation in product liability cases. However, Judge Rogers was careful to point out that his observation in Stueve did not decide the question of whether a "pure" or "modified" comparative liability system was to be employed in Kansas. That question of Kansas law was left to a decision of this court. We are now confronted with that question.

The question certified to this court is as follows:

"In an action based on strict liability in tort (Restatement of Torts, Second, § 402A) for alleged design or manufacturing defects in a product, what judgment should be entered where the jury's verdict attributes 65% of the causal fault to plaintiff, 20% to plaintiff's immune employer, and 15% to defendant? "

It may be helpful to review some of the history of comparative negligence in Kansas. In 1974, the Kansas legislature enacted what is now K.S.A. 60-258a. In pertinent part it provides:

"(a) The contributory negligence of any party in a civil action shall not bar such party or said party's legal representative from recovering damages for negligence resulting in death, personal injury or property damage, if such party's negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom claim for recovery is made, but the award of damages to any party in such action shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to such party."

Under subsequent Kansas cases the statute applies in any action where the comparative negligence of two or more parties must be determined. Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1978). The term negligence found in this statute has been liberally interpreted to apply in cases arising from road defects which actions had traditionally been considered as arising strictly from a liability created by statute. Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Salem Township, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271, and Wilson v. Probst, 224 Kan. 459, 581 P.2d 380. In Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc. 227 Kan. 842, 610 P.2d 1107, this court held that the comparative negligence statute was applicable to a claim based on the violation of K.S.A. 21-4209(a), which statute prohibits the sale of gun powder to a minor. In Arredondo a violation of the statute resulted in the imposition of strict liability on the seller. A violation of this statute amounts to negligence per se.

In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788, this court held the doctrine of comparative fault liability is applicable to both strict liability claims and claims based on implied warranty in products liability cases. Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, Syl. P 4, 618 P.2d 788. This court went further and judicially adopted a form of comparative implied indemnity between joint tortfeasors, so on a settlement of plaintiff's entire damages by one tortfeasor during the pendency of a comparative negligence action, an apportionment of responsibility for plaintiff's damages...