Fort Belknap Indian Community of Fort Belknap Indian Reservation v. Mazurek

• Decision Date: 16 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-36086,93-36086
• Citation: 43 F.3d 428
• Parties: The FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF the FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph P. MAZUREK, as Attorney General for the State of Montana; Donald A. Ranstrom, as County Attorney for Blaine County, Montana, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 428

43 F.3d 428

The FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF the FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph P. MAZUREK, as Attorney General for the State of Montana; Donald A. Ranstrom, as County Attorney for Blaine County, Montana, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 93-36086.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 3, 1994.

Decided Dec. 16, 1994.

Deanne L. Sandholm and Harley R. Harris, Asst. Attys. Gen., Helena, MT, for defendants-appellants.

James L. Vogel, Vogel Law Office, Hardin, MT, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.

Before: BEEZER and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, ^* Senior District Judge.

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:

The State of Montana seeks enforcement of its liquor laws on Indian reservations. Joseph Mazurek, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Montana ("Montana"), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation ("Community") in a declaratory judgment action. Montana argues that the district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Montana further argues that the district court erred in holding that it could not enforce its state liquor laws through criminal penalties against tribal members who reside on Indian reservations. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Although the declaratory judgment action brought by the Community was filed in December of 1989, the underlying dispute began almost two years earlier. Caroline and Harley Brown operated a grocery store in Hays, Montana, within the confines of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. Caroline Brown was a Community member. Although Harley Brown was an Indian, the record does not indicate whether he also was a Community member. The Browns sold, among other sundries, beer and wine. In January of 1988, the Blaine County Attorney filed charges against the Browns for possessing and selling liquor without a license. ¹ Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 16-6-301(1) (1989).

The Browns moved to dismiss the prosecution, arguing that Montana lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians for offenses committed on Indian reservations. The Blaine County District Court disagreed. The Browns sought immediate review in the Montana Supreme Court, which accepted supervisory control jurisdiction. That court decided that Montana could bring a criminal proceeding in state court against an Indian for violations of the state's liquor laws. Brown v. District Ct., 238 Mont. 248, 777 P.2d 877 (1989).

The Community then filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Montana in federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201. It accused the state of frustrating "th[e] exercise of tribal sovereignty," the tribe's ability to "exercise reasonable forms of self government," and the ability of the Community "to govern itself." The Community sought a declaration that Montana could not criminally prosecute Indians for liquor law violations on Indian reservations. It also sought permanent injunctive relief to prevent any attempt at enforcing Montana's criminal laws on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. Montana moved for summary judgment, arguing that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that, in any case, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1161 permitted it to prosecute Indians for criminal violations of state liquor laws.

The district court granted Montana's motion on Eleventh Amendment grounds, see Fort Belknap Indian Community v. State of Montana, 793 F.Supp. 949 (D.Mont.1992), but stated that it would have ruled in favor of the Community on grounds that the state had no jurisdiction to maintain such prosecutions. The district court provided the Community with time to amend its complaint in order to avoid the preclusive effect of the Eleventh Amendment. The Community did so, and the district court reversed itself, granting the Community's motion for summary judgment "to the limited extent the Community seeks declaratory relief concerning the State of Montana's authority to enforce, through criminal prosecutions, its liquor laws on Indian Reservations." No injunctive relief was ordered.

Montana then moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment on grounds that the district court should have refrained from exercising jurisdiction over the controversy under the Younger abstention doctrine. The district court denied the motion. Montana appealed.

II

Montana argues that the district court should have dismissed the declaratory judgment action pursuant to Younger abstention principles. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (applying Younger principles to declaratory judgment actions). It contends that a state criminal proceeding was ongoing against the Browns, and that principles of comity and federalism should have guided the district court toward noninterference during the pendency of that prosecution. We disagree.

We review de novo whether abstention was required under the Younger doctrine. Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir.1994). In Younger, the Supreme Court held that a combination of federal-state comity, federalism, and the limited role for courts of equity "ordinarily require federal courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings." Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 35 F.3d 1355, 1365 (9th Cir.1994). Younger abstention is appropriate if three criteria are met: (1) state judicial proceedings must be ongoing; (2) the state proceedings must implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings must offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues. Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 133 (1993). If these three criteria are met, the district court must dismiss the action. ² Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir.1994); Wiener, 23 F.3d at 266.

In applying the Younger test, we adhere to the basic principle that abstention is an "extraordinary and narrow exception" to a district court's role as adjudicator of a ripe controversy. Barbosa, 35 F.3d at 1365 (citations omitted). Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). In a potential abstention case, the Supreme Court says we are "not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction" but rather to determine if "exceptional" circumstances exist to justify surrender of jurisdiction. Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 831 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)).

The district court offered two grounds for its decision to exercise its jurisdiction and refuse to abstain under Younger. First, the court held that the state did not have a vital state interest in asserting criminal jurisdiction over Indians for crimes committed on Indian reservations. Second, the district court determined that abstention was not appropriate because there were different parties in the federal and state action--the Browns in state court and the Community in federal court. Thus, the Community had no opportunity to raise its federal claim in state court. On appeal, Montana contests both of these grounds. We need address only the first.

The Community correctly argues that Montana cannot demonstrate an important state interest. Although there is no question that Montana has a legitimate interest in the enforcement of its liquor laws through criminal prosecution, the primary issue here is whether the state has jurisdiction to prosecute Indians who violate Montana liquor law on an Indian reservation. That question is one of federal jurisdiction.

In Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 38 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir.1994), we addressed a similar situation. The Sheriff of San Diego County initiated prosecutions against four Indians for alleged violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. Secs. 2701-2721, which applied state gaming laws to Indian reservations. The Tribe brought an action in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief, which was granted. The Sheriff argued on appeal that Younger abstention was appropriate. We disagreed, finding that the State failed to demonstrate an important state interest. We stated that "the threshold issue of the State's jurisdiction to prosecute is a matter of federal, not state, law." Roache, 38 F.3d at 409. ³

Our analysis is similar here. The threshold question in this case is whether Montana has jurisdiction to prosecute Indians in state court for violations of state liquor laws. Although the Supreme Court has already determined that states may regulate liquor transactions on Indian reservations, see Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983), the question of a state's jurisdiction to prosecute is one of first impression. It is an issue of federal law. The state undoubtedly has an interest in enforcing its liquor laws, but only if federal law gives it jurisdiction to do so for violations that occur on an Indian reservation. Because the jurisdictional question is paramount and federal, Younger abstention would not be appropriate here. ⁴

III

Montana next argues that the district court erred in holding that the state had no jurisdiction to criminally prosecute Indians for violations of state liquor laws occurring on Indian reservations. Montana relies on Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 77 L.Ed.2d...