Fort Hill Builders v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 29 February 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-0046 P. |
Citation | 682 F. Supp. 145 |
Parties | FORT HILL BUILDERS, INC. v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Girard R. Visconti, Mark Hagopian, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.
Raymond A. LaFazia, Providence, R.I., Steven J. Comen, Boston, Mass., William R. Landry, Providence, R.I., for defendants.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) this matter was referred to a Magistrate for recommended disposition of the motions filed by the plaintiff for summary judgment, and issuance of a writ for pre-judgment attachment, and motion by the defendant to vacate an arbitrator's award in favor of the plaintiff. The Magistrate's findings were appealed to this Court. After hearing and arguments the arbitrator's award was confirmed. The defendants now contests the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest.
A dispute between the defendants, who are owners and developers of a construction project from which the original controversy stems and was heard by a panel of arbitrators, and the plaintiff, as a general contractor, was referred to arbitration on February 23, 1987; they awarded the plaintiff $1,124,105.00. On March 27, 1987 the plaintiff filed a complaint for confirmation of the arbitrator's award. G.L.R.I. § 10-3-16.1
The query before the Court is whether or not Rhode Island permits this Court to assess judgment interest on an arbitrator's award. I hold that it does.
There are cases from other jurisdictions on the issue of pre-judgment interest which the plaintiff has cited in support of its position2 and which the defendants contest as not being apposit "because the issue depends heavily on the types of arbitration and interest statutes in force in particular jurisdictions." I do not agree. At any rate, both parties concede, and I concur, that this controversy can be resolved by the application of Rhode Island law which I find affirms the plaintiff's case. I will also, infra, refer to federal law which the plaintiff contends is equally applicable.
To use a colloquialism, the defendants put all their "eggs in one basket"; this they must do since it is their only hope of surviving. They categorically state that this case deals with pre-judgment interest and that "the issue of pre-judgment interest is governed by State law, see Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co., 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.1977), and the law of Rhode Island on the issue of adding pre-judgment interest is set forth in the Paola case...." Paola v. Commercial Union Assurance Companies, 461 A.2d 935 (R.I. 1983). More specifically, the defendants claim that G.L.R.I. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§ 9-21-10 and 10-3-163 as interpreted by the Paola court controls.
In Paola, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries and property damages when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident; the claim was submitted to arbitration and he was awarded $2,934.80. He subsequently filed a petition for confirmation of the award in the trial court; at the same time, he asked that interest be added. The trial justice confirmed the award but denied the interest; an appeal ensued.
As the state appellate court stated:
The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether a Superior Court justice can add prejudgment interest to an arbitration award pursuant to § 9-21-10 at the time of confirmation; and (2) whether an arbitrator can award prejudgment interest to an arbitration award pursuant to § 9-21-10.
As to the first issue the plaintiff asked the court to modify the arbitrator's award by adding interest to the amount of damages from the date of the cause of action to the date of the confirmation. He contended that this added element fell within the rationale of G.L.R.I. § 9-21-10, supra.
The State Supreme Court rejected this reasoning; it held that the judiciary has a limited role in the arbitration process. And that a trial justice could vacate an arbitration award only if it fell within one of the statutory grounds set forth in G.L.R.I. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-3-124 or if the trial justice determined that the specific award was irrational under the circumstances.
In concluding this first issue the Court specifically stated:
From the foregoing it seems quite clear that a trial court must accept the arbitrator's award and that he cannot add to the damages interest for that period from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the date of his confirmation.
It may appear that this entire recitation is unnecessary prolixity since this plaintiff is not seeking interest from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. It is asking this Court to award interest from the date of the award or "at the very least" from "the date of the filing of its complaint."
This now brings us to the second issue. Though the second issue centers around the authority of the arbitrator to award interest from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to the date of his award it reveals the answer at issue here. This pertinent portion of the opinion is succinct and so I quote the same in its entirety:
It follows: "The nature and effect of an arbitration judgment i.e. the award is equivalent to a judgment in an action at law;" such a judgment "may be enforced as if it has been rendered in an action at law in the court in which it is entered"; the arbitrator should apply G.L.R.I. § 9-21-10, to such a judgment since the statute "provides that interest shall be added to the amount of damages in any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or decision made for pecuniary damages ...".
In answering the second question the Court created no apparent contradiction in applying § 9-21-10; it established the award as being a judgment and reserved uniquely to the arbitrator the prerogative of adding interest from the date of the accrual of the action to the date of the award and reaffirmed the limited role of the judiciary in the arbitration process— that its interjection is circumscribed by the dictates of specific statutes. The logical progression of this reasoning is that the confirmation of the award by the court is a judgment retroactive to the date of the...
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