Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London

• Decision Date: 19 August 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16661).
• Citation: 265 Conn. 423,829 A.2d 801
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FORT TRUMBULL CONSERVANCY, LLC v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.

265 Conn. 423

829 A.2d 801

FORT TRUMBULL CONSERVANCY, LLC v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.

(SC 16661).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 13, 2002.

Officially released August 19, 2003.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Scott W. Sawyer, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Edward B. O'Connell, for the appellee (defendant New London Development Corporation).

William J. Prensky, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant department of economic and community development).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC, has alleged facts sufficient to establish standing to bring this action against the defendants, the city of New London (city), the New London redevelopment agency (redevelopment agency), the New London Development Corporation (corporation) and the state department of economic and community development (department), seeking to bar them from, inter alia, implementing a municipal development plan (development plan) in the Fort Trumbull area of New London. The trial court, Hon. D. Michael Hurley, judge trial referee, granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing and rendered judgment thereon after concluding that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate either statutory or classical aggrievement. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss because the allegations of the complaint are adequate to establish both statutory aggrievement under General Statutes § 22a-16¹ and classical aggrievement. We reject the plaintiff's claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts. In May, 1998, the New London city council designated the corporation, a private, nonprofit organization,² as the development agency for the city. Thereafter, the corporation applied to the department for financial support for a development plan for the Fort Trumbull area of New London. Among other things, the development plan called for the condemnation of property and demolition of buildings located in that area. After performing an environmental impact assessment, the department determined that the development plan could have a significant impact on the environment. The corporation therefore prepared an environmental impact evaluation in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 22a-1b (b).³ The department made the evaluation available for public inspection and comment⁴ in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 22a-1d.⁵

Following the public comment period, the department rendered a decision recommending that the proposed development plan be implemented. Thereafter, the state office of policy and management conditionally approved the environmental impact evaluation.⁶ In January, 2000, the city and the redevelopment agency adopted the development plan. The corporation, acting on behalf of the city, subsequently condemned and demolished certain properties located in the Fort Trumbull area. The plaintiff, a limited liability corporation formed, among other reasons, "to preserve, conserve, maintain and protect the continuity, historic importance, environment and legal status of [the Fort Trumbull] area," initiated this action in July, 2000, alleging numerous violations of federal, state and local law in connection with the creation, approval and implementation of the development plan.⁷ The plaintiff sought various legal and equitable remedies, including declaratory relief and an injunction prohibiting the defendants from implementing the plan.⁸

The defendants filed motions to dismiss,⁹ claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge their actions regarding the development plan. In particular, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff had failed to establish: (1) statutory aggrievement under § 22a-16 inasmuch as the complaint merely repeated the language of that statutory provision and did not set forth any facts indicating how the defendants' activities were likely to result in "unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction" of the state's natural resources; General Statutes § 22a-16; and (2) classical aggrievement, inasmuch as the complaint contained insufficient allegations of any direct and specific injury. The trial court agreed with the defendants' claims and, therefore, granted the motions to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.¹⁰

On appeal,¹¹ the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. We disagree.

"As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record....

"Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction .... The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time ... [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.... The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings.¹² ...

"Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.... These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy.... The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue....

"Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory.... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share.... Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest....

"Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative flat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485-87, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). With these principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiff's claims.

I

The plaintiff first claims that it has standing under § 22a-16 because its complaint sets forth sufficient facts from which to infer that the defendants' activities created a "`reasonable likelihood of unreasonable environmental harm.'" In support of this claim, the plaintiff refers to two allegations in its complaint: (1) that the defendants failed to follow certain procedural requirements in adopting the development plan; and (2) that the plan called for demolition without consideration of "feasible and prudent alternatives." The plaintiff maintains that these allegations are specific enough to support its claim of environmental harm, which otherwise is alleged only in conclusory terms. We are not persuaded.

General Statutes § 22a-16 provides broadly that "any person ... [or] corporation ... may maintain an action ... for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction ...." Inasmuch as § 22a-16 affords standing to any person or corporation, the plaintiff indisputably comes within the statute's purview. Indeed, "[t]his court ... has recognized no restriction on the class of persons with standing to seek relief under § 22a-16." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 495-96.

Our inquiry into whether the plaintiff has standing under § 22a-16 is not complete, however. It is settled that the existence of statutory standing depends on "whether the interest sought to be protected by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152, 160, 699 A.2d 142 (1997). Under § 22a-16, "standing ... is conferred only to protect the natural resources of the state...