Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Aldrich, 02A03-8609-CV-255

• Citation: 527 N.E.2d 201
• Decision Date: 24 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 02A03-8609-CV-255,02A03-8609-CV-255
• Parties: 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2376, 48 Ed. Law Rep. 917 FORT WAYNE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Mary E. ALDRICH, et al., Appellees (Defendants Below).
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 201

527 N.E.2d 201

129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2376, 48 Ed. Law Rep. 917

FORT WAYNE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Mary E. ALDRICH, et al., Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 02A03-8609-CV-255.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

Aug. 24, 1988.

Richard D. Darko, Janet C. Knapp, Lowe, Gray, Steele & Hoffman, Indianapolis, Frederick R. Tourkow, Tourkow, Crell, Rosenblatt & Johnson, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

William T. Hopkins, Jr., Gallucci, Hopkins & Theisen, Fort Wayne, David T. Bryant, Nat. Right to Work, Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, Va., for appellees.

STATON, Judge.

The Fort Wayne Education Association, the exclusive bargaining representative for Fort Wayne School employees, brings this interlocutory appeal before us, contesting an injunction and judgment entered against it in favor of nonmember teachers, who contested contractual fair share fees by claiming, among other things, that such fees were used for political purposes, thus infringing on their first amendment rights.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Fort Wayne Education Association (FWEA) exclusively represents the school employees of the Fort Wayne Community Schools (FWCS). A collective bargaining agreement between these two groups is embodied in a "Master Contract," which "contains certain terms and conditions of employment for teachers." (Master Contract, p. 4, Record p. 1152). This contract contains a "fair share clause," which requires that all school employees of the FWCS who are not members of FWEA pay a "representation fee" to FWEA and its affiliated organizations. This "fair share In August of 1983, FWEA filed two complaints in an attempt to collect unpaid representation fees from certain non-member teachers for the 1981-82 and 1982-83 school years; the teachers answered the complaints by denying that they owed any representation fees, although they admitted that they were school employees of FWCS. The teachers filed counterclaims which alleged that FWEA was violating their constitutional rights by collecting and spending the non-members' representation fees for purposes unrelated to the duties of collective bargaining. The teachers also sought an injunction to prohibit FWEA from collecting such fees.

fee" covers the costs incurred in collective bargaining activities on behalf of all school employees, union and non-union members. However, in accordance with Indiana law, FWEA cannot deduct the fee from teachers' paychecks unless the teachers voluntarily sign a release form.

At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding FWEA approximately 90% of the amount of the fees it sought to collect from the teachers. ¹ Among the various motions and memorandum orders filed in connection with this case, the one in question is the "Memorandum Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," entered on August 5, 1986, by the trial court. In this order, while the court again entered final judgment on the jury verdicts in favor of FWEA, it also entered an injunction and judgment against FWEA on the teachers' Counterclaims. Consequently, the following issues are now before us on interlocutory appeal:

ISSUES

I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling on the adequacy of the rebate procedure?

II. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the rebate procedure exacts association?

III. Whether the trial court entered an injunction prohibiting FWEA from collecting its representation fee?

IV. Whether the trial court erred by entering an injunction prohibiting FWEA from collecting a representation fee which included money for purposes other than collective bargaining?

V. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the teachers have no means or opportunity to resolve disputes over the activities included in the fair share fee?

VI. Whether sufficient evidence supports the court's finding that the present year's fair share fee computations are based on the past year's fees?

VII. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that the jury's verdict signifies that the teachers prevailed on their counterclaims?

VIII. Whether the trial court properly ruled that the application of Article XXIII(G) impacts upon wages and working conditions, improperly delegating discretionary authority of the school board to FWEA, contrary to the Goetz decision?

IX. Whether the trial court properly ordered the IEERB to resolve disputes over the representation fees?

X. Whether the trial court erred by stating that the defendants admitted their list of chargeable expenses did not conform with those acceptable under court decrees?

XI. Whether sufficient evidence supports certain findings and conclusions of the trial court?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When we review the trial court's decision, we are to presume that the trial court properly applied the law; the appellant has the burden of showing reversible error. Abels v. Monroe County Educ. Ass'n (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 533, 540, reh. denied, (1986), Ind.App., 490 N.E.2d 775, trans. denied, cert. denied, (1987), 480 U.S. 905, 107 S.Ct. 1347, 94 L.Ed.2d 518. We will not set aside the specific findings and conclusions of the trial court unless the findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Finally, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we will consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision, along with the inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id.

When reviewing the grant or denial of an injunction, an action within the discretion of the trial judge, we will reverse only where there is a clear showing of abuse, i.e., where the decision is contrary to the "logic and effect of the circumstances." State v. Town of Wolcott (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 62, 65. We will not presume error but will entertain any reasonable presumption favoring the trial court's decision, and will affirm it on any valid legal theory. Id.

Article XXIII(G) & the Rebate Procedure

The pertinent sections of Article XXIII(G) and FWEA's rebate procedure are as follows:

Article XXIII(G) reads:

G. REPRESENTATION FEE

1. The Board recognizes as valid, fair and equitable the Association's claim that all members of the bargaining unit, even those that are not members of the Association, have an obligation to pay fair value for services rendered on their behalf by the Association, by the Indiana State Teachers Association, and by the National Education Association, and for their proportionate part of the costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, grievance adjustment, and other duties and services related to being exclusive representative.

2. The Board considers it proper for the Association to charge each non-member of the Association, who is also a member of the bargaining unit, and for each such non-member to pay to the Association a representation fee, to be determined solely by the Association but in a manner consistent with the services rendered and costs incurred on behalf of all bargaining unit members. Such representation fee may then be allocated between the Association, the Indiana State Teachers Association, and the National Education Association, as the Association shall deem appropriate.

3. On or before October 10, of each year, the Association shall provide the Board with a list of bargaining unit members who are not also Association members, and the Board shall ask each such person to voluntarily submit, within two (2) weeks, a payroll deduction authorization form, as set forth in the Appendix to this Contract. The Board shall then deduct the representation fee in ten (10) equal installments from the payroll of each person who submits an authorization. The Board shall inform the Association of all members of the bargaining unit who refuse to sign such an authorization form or who revoke an executed form.

4. The Association, on its own and not on behalf of the Board, may take such action as it may deem appropriate to collect its representation fee from those bargaining unit members who refuse to authorize payroll deductions for or who otherwise refuse to pay the representation fee.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, pp. 50-51, Record, p. 1152.

The pertinent sections of FWEA's rebate procedure ² are as follows:

FORT WAYNE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, INC. SERVICE

(REPRESENTATION) FEE REBATE POLICY

* * *

* * *

Procedure

Section 1.A. Any person required by Contract or statute to pay a service fee to the Fort Wayne Education Association, and who objects to the expenditure of any portion of his service fee for political activities may request a rebate of that portion of his service fee.

* * *

* * *

Section 4.A. Not later than ten (10) days after the close of each fiscal year the Executive Committee of the Fort Wayne Education Association shall determine the amount of the service fee rebate, which shall be equal to the proportion of service fees expended for political activities in that fiscal year.... (Emphasis added.)

* * *

* * *

Plaintiff's Exhibit 17; Record, p. 2452.

From these excerpts, two conclusions are evident, conclusions which are pertinent to our decision. First, pursuant to the contract, FWEA requests teachers to voluntarily allow FWEA to start deducting the representation fee in October of the year for which it is due, prior to the incurring of all costs and rendering of all services.

Second, the verbiage of the rebate policy indicates that its purpose is to refund that portion of the nonmember teachers' funds spent for political purposes. This, in turn, signifies that FWEA is aware of and anticipates that its method of collecting the fee necessarily entails that part of it is or may be spent for political purposes.

I. Rebate Procedure

As stated above, the standard of review requires that we look to the evidence favorable to the judgment and uphold the trial court's findings and conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. Abels, supra, at 540...