Fort Wayne, Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Co. v. Gildersleeve

• Decision Date: 05 January 1876
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The Fort Wayne, Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Company v. Juliza A. Gildersleeve

33 Mich. 133

The Fort Wayne, Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Company v. Juliza A. Gildersleeve

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 5, 1876

Heard October 29, 1875

Error to Jackson Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

John D Conely, for plaintiff in error.

F & R. Livermore and G. T. Gridley, for defendant in error cited: Davis v. D. & M. R. R. Co., 20 Mich. 126; Laning v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y., 521; Flike v. B. & A R. R. Co., 53 N. Y., 549; Gilman v. Eastern R. R. Co., 10 Allen. 233; 13 Allen 433; Huddleston v. Lowell Machine Shop, 106 Mass. 282.

OPINION

Cooley, Ch. J.

The plaintiff, as administratrix, has recovered against the defendant a judgment for damages occasioned by the killing of the intestate, who was a servant in defendant's employ. The accident occurred while the intestate was engaged in coupling two cars, one of which was lower than the other, rendering the act of coupling peculiarly difficult and dangerous. The gravamen of the complaint is, the negligence of defendant in making use of this low car, and subjecting its servants to the consequent risks. It is not claimed that the difficulty and danger were unknown to the intestate; on the contrary, much evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff to show that the danger was well understood by the intestate and that the car had a bad reputation among the employes of defendant. What the bad reputation was for does not very distinctly appear, though the evidence tends to show that it was rather because its construction,--it being an old mail car,--made it inconvenient for use, than for any other reason. This, however, is not very material. No question is made but that any difficulty that existed in coupling the car was understood by the intestate.

The question in the record is, whether there was any evidence tending to establish a claim against the defendant. On the argument it has been assumed on both sides that the rule of law which leaves the servant to bear the consequences of all the ordinary risks incident to his employment ought to remain undisturbed. Both parties rely upon the case of Davis v. Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105, in which that rule was examined and approved, as a rule reasonable in itself as it affected the particular relation of employer and employed, and as being also an important rule of public policy in its tendency to ensure caution and vigilance on the part of persons employed.

The plaintiff relies upon exceptions to that rule and claims to recover on the ground, either that the defendant was guilty of a breach of duty to its employes in making use of a dangerous vehicle, or that it was culpable in not discontinuing its use in accordance with what were equivalent to assurances to the persons employed that the car should be replaced by another. If the evidence tends to show a breach of duty in either of these particulars, it is insisted there was a case for the jury based upon the negligence of the employer, the risks of which the employed is never understood to assume.

Undoubtedly a servant has a right to repose confidence in the prudence and caution of his employer, and to rely upon his not putting him in charge of implements which, from improper construction or other cause, are so dangerous that a prudent man would not make use of them. If the servant is injured in consequence of this confidence being abused, he ought to be remunerated. But where the difficulties in the case are fully known...