Fort Wayne Patrolman's Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne

• Citation: 411 N.E.2d 630
• Decision Date: 15 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 3-877,3-877
• Parties: The FORT WAYNE PATROLMAN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF FORT WAYNE, Defendant-Appellee. A 214.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 630

411 N.E.2d 630

The FORT WAYNE PATROLMAN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF FORT WAYNE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-877 A 214.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District.

Oct. 15, 1980.

Stephen L. Williams, Snouffer, Haller & Colvin, Fort Wayne, for plaintiff-appellant.

Carol A. Angel, Associate City Atty., Fort Wayne, argued for defendant-appellee; William N. Salin, Larry J. Burke, Fort Wayne, on brief.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

CHIPMAN, Judge.

In its petition for rehearing, Fort Wayne Patrolman's Benevolent Association (PBA) contends this court failed to give a statement in writing addressing all the arguments and issues raised by appellant, referring specifically to our failure to address: (1) whether policemen have a right to (a) select a collective bargaining representative, (b) enter into collective bargaining with municipalities, and (c) enter into collective bargaining agreements; (2) whether the trial court was correct when it interpreted the Indiana Public Employee Labor Relations Act, Ind.Code § 22-6-4-1 et seq. as prohibiting policemen from engaging in collective bargaining, and (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it entered summary judgment in favor of the City of Fort Wayne based upon its interpretation of the Public Employee Labor Relations Act.

We remain firm in our resolve that it would be nothing more than an exercise in futility for us to address these allegations since determination of these issues would have no effect upon this litigation. Indeed, the PBA itself has not asserted resolution of these questions would have any effect upon the outcome of this appeal. Its assertion seems to be that once issues have been presented, we must address them. The law does not, however, require us to engage in such an empty ritual. As a broad, fundamental rule, questions which are not essential to a proper determination of an appeal will not be considered or decided. 2 I.L.E. Appeals § 467.

Our Supreme Court in State ex rel. Meade v. Marion Superior Court, Room No. 1, (1961) 242 Ind. 22, 175 N.E.2d 423, quoting from Willets v. Ridgway, (1857) 9 Ind. 367, 370, noted:

" '... it has been the frequent practice of the Court, in cases where a single point would put an end to a case, to decide that point and no other.' "

The Court went on to add:

" 'Many questions are presented by the record in almost every appeal taken to the Supreme or Appellate Courts that are not considered or decided by the court, for the reason that their consideration and decision are unnecessary to the determination of the appeal.' Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Taylor, 1906, 39 Ind.App. 592, 596, 80 N.E. 436, 438."

175 N.E.2d at 424.

Deciding whether policemen have the right to enter into collective bargaining or whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted a statute which has since been declared unconstitutional, would not alter our determination that this contract was invalid because the Mayor of Fort Wayne did not have the authority to enter into such an agreement. We, therefore, will not address these issues.

We also reject the PBA's assertion that it was erroneous to uphold the trial court's entry of summary judgment based upon a different theory than was expressed by the trial court. Our review of this appeal disclosed that as a matter of law, the Mayor was not empowered to bind the City of Fort Wayne to this agreement. We therefore, believe it was proper to affirm...