Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROBERTSON; COVINGTON; PRICE; PRICE
• Citation: Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. 1995)
• Decision Date: 25 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 76861,76861
• Parties: 100 Ed. Law Rep. 373 FORT ZUMWALT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents.

Page 918

896 S.W.2d 918

100 Ed. Law Rep. 373

FORT ZUMWALT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents.

No. 76861.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

April 25, 1995.

Richard J. Pautler, Thomas E. Tueth, Celynda L. Brasher, St. Louis, for appellants.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Article X, Section 21 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits the state

from reducing the state financed proportion of the cost of any existing activity or service required of ... political subdivisions. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state agency of ... political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made to pay the ... political subdivision for any increased costs.

In Rolla 31 School District v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992), we affirmed a trial court's injunction prohibiting the state from requiring a school district to provide new special education services "until the legislature provides a specific appropriation" to fund the state portion of the program. We reserved for another day the question whether a violation of Section 21 may result in a money judgment against the state in favor of a political subdivision or its taxpayers. Id. at 7-8.

In this case, school districts and taxpayers present that issue, claiming that the state has reduced its proportion of funding of special education services below its 1980-81 level. The trial court sustained the state's motion for summary judgment. The school districts and taxpayers appeal. Our jurisdiction is founded on Article V, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.

I.

Appellants Fort Zumwalt School District, Francis Howell School District, St. Charles School District, and Wentzville School District are school districts in Missouri. Appellants Robert Fisher, Jayne Voss, Carl Hack, Barbara Hack, Teri Fricke, Keith Schulte, Richard Place and Diane Hansen are residents and taxpayers of these school districts. Respondents are the State of Missouri, the Governor, the Missouri State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner of Administration, and the State Treasurer.

Federal law offers aid to states that adopt policies and programs to assure "all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485, § 1412(1) (Supp.1991). Mindful of the federal carrot, Section 162.670, RSMo 1994, announces the policy of the state "to provide or to require public schools to provide to all handicapped and severely handicapped children within the ages prescribed herein, ... special educational services sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped and severely handicapped children." Section 162.700, RSMo 1994, requires the board of education of each school district to provide special educational services for handicapped children residing in the district who are three years old or older. ¹

Section 162.975, RSMo 1994, establishes the amount of state aid to school districts for special education programs. In 1980, this section authorized $6,000.00 per class with the exception that the amount was $4,500.00 per class of educable mentally retarded (EMR) students and $3,500.00 per class for remedial reading. § 162.975.1, RSMo 1978. The section also authorized $4,000.00 for each professional staff member other than classroom teachers employed to work full time with handicapped or severely handicapped children and $2,000.00 for each full-time teacher aide. § 162.975.4-.5, RSMo 1978.

In 1986, the legislature increased the respective amounts to $11,646.00 per class, $10,500.00 per EMR class, $6,794.00 per remedial reading class, $8,000.00 for full-time professionals other than teachers, and $4,000.00 for each full-time teacher aide. § 162.975.1, .4-.5, RSMo 1986.

Section 162.975.1 prescribes annual adjustments so that these rates increase by the same percentage by which the appropriation of state funds for the school foundation program is changed from the previous year or the percentage change in per pupil operating costs, whichever is less. The plaintiffs do not claim that the state violated Section 162.975.1.

The total amount of state aid for special education increased from $60,569,207 in 1980-81 to $144,946,670 in 1992-93. Appellants admit that each of the four school districts in this case received a higher dollar amount of special education aid in 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 than they received in 1980-81. However, the school districts allege the state has unconstitutionally reduced the proportion that its reimbursement of costs bears to costs of the school districts in providing special education services.

The school districts' and taxpayers' petition sought a declaration that "the state is obligated to maintain the same proportion of categorical aid to Missouri school districts for providing special education services to school-aged residents as it did in 1980-81," and also a declaration that the state violated the provisions of Section 21 by failing to maintain that proportion in 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92. The petition also sought a permanent injunction requiring the state to maintain the "same proportion of categorical aid to local school districts for special education services as it did in 1980-81." Finally, the petition sought a money judgment against the state for the amount by which the state allegedly fell short of its funding obligation under Section 21.

The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' motion sought partial summary judgment, asking the court to hold that Section 21 requires the state to pay and maintain the same percentage of funding for a specific school district as it provided in 1980, and for a declaration that Section 21 permits a money judgment against the state for the state's failure to maintain the required proportion of special education funding.

The state defendants' summary judgment motion asserted that compliance with Section 21 "cannot be determined in the context of individual school districts"; that compliance with Section 21 cannot be determined "on a percentage basis"; and that the state had met its Section 21 obligation because it had increased the dollar amount of state aid for funding special education.

The trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment sustaining the state defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded, among other things, that the state had "not reduced the level of state financing for special education" and rejected any claim that Section 21 required the state to reimburse a district's special education expenditures at a set percentage established with the passage of Section 21 in 1980.

II.

A.

The state defendants' contention that the school district defendants have no standing to enforce Article X, Section 21 claims our attention first. Article X, Section 23, provides:

Notwithstanding other provisions of this constitution or other law, any taxpayer of the state, county, or other political subdivision shall have standing to bring suit in a circuit court of proper venue and additionally, when the state is involved, in the Missouri supreme court, ² to enforce the provisions of sections 16 through 22, inclusive, of this article and, if the suit is sustained, shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in maintaining such suit.

[Emphasis added.]

The Hancock Amendment makes no pretense of protecting one level of government from another. By its clear language, Section 23 limits the class of persons who can bring suit to enforce the Hancock Amendment to "any taxpayer." In so doing Section 23 recognizes that any apparent injury to the school district is merely derivative of the taxpayers' injury. Cf. Bartlett v. Ross, 891 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. banc 1995) (school districts not considered real parties in interest in tax protests before State Tax Commission).

The school district plaintiffs do not, because they cannot, claim status as taxpayers. We hold, therefore, as did the trial court, that the school district plaintiffs in this case are without standing to bring an action to enforce Article X, Section 21.

The taxpayer plaintiffs do have standing, however; the remaining portions of this opinion discuss the taxpayers' claims exclusively.

B.

Read as a whole, the Hancock Amendment, Mo. Const. art. X, §§ 16-24, aspires to erect a comprehensive, constitutionally-rooted shield erected to protect taxpayers from government's ability to increase the tax burden above that borne by the taxpayers on November 4, 1980. First, Section 18(a) establishes a revenue limit for state government the precise dimensions of which are not germane here. Second, Section 21 prohibits unfunded mandates. To the extent that the state required local governments to perform activities and provided some funding of those activities on November 4, 1980, the first sentence of Section 21 prohibits the state "from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs" of the mandated activity. The second sentence of Section 21 prohibits the state from requiring local government to begin a new mandated activity or to increase the level of a previously mandated activity beyond its 1980-81 level unless the General Assembly appropriates sufficient funds to finance the cost of the new or increased activity. Finally, local government may increase any "tax, license, or fees [sic]" only with voter approval. § 22(a).

As this case comes to this Court on summary judgment, only two issues concern us: First, whether Section 21 requires the state to maintain the 1980-81 proportion of state funding of...