Forte v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-5004

Decision Date21 March 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 14-5004
PartiesKATHLEEN FORTE, Plaintiff, v. BED BATH & BEYOND, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM

Tucker, C.J.

Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. 18), and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. 22). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and exhibits and for the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Kathleen Forte ("Plaintiff" or "Forte") alleges that Defendant Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Bed Bath & Beyond") was negligent in maintaining its retail store located at 1261 Knapp Road, North Wales, Pennsylvania. The undisputed material facts follow.

On July 22, 2013, at approximately 4:30 PM, Plaintiff entered Bed Bath & Beyond. Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3, Doc. 16; Pl. Resp., Exh. B at 23, Doc. 18. Upon entering the store, Plaintiff went to the back of the store to look at dishtowels. During Plaintiff's walk from the entrance of the store to the back of the store where the dishtowels are located, she did not observe any water on the floor. After Plaintiff selected dishtowels to purchase, she exited the aisle and her right foot slid in water.

Prior to slipping, Plaintiff did not observe any water on the floor. After she slipped, however, Plaintiff noticed "'a good bit' of water on the floor" that measured about ten feet. Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3 (quoting Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Exh. B, at 11, Doc. 16). Plaintiff testified that the water was clear. Plaintiff further testified that she did not see footprints in the water and that she believed there was one cart mark in the water but she was uncertain of when that cart mark was formed.

Though Plaintiff was not present when the water got on the floor, she estimated that the water had been on the floor "for 'a long time'" because approximately half of the ten feet of the water had evaporated. Id. at 4 (quoting Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Exh. B, at 13). Plaintiff believed half of the water evaporated because the water on the floor was "'streaky'" and "'looked dry in certain areas.'" Id. (quoting Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Exh. B, at 12). Plaintiff did not observe where the water originated and testified that she did not notice anything in the store that used water or that was for sale that contained water.

Shortly after Plaintiff fell, the manager on duty, Thomas Bowes ("Bowes") came over to Plaintiff. As part of his managerial duties, Bowes was in charge of conducting walkthroughs of the sales floor "to maintain customer service and safety, ensure the employees are working in a safe fashion, make sure the aisles are uncluttered, assess whether there is anything dangerous overhead, and determine if there are any hazardous conditions on the floor." Id. at 5. Bowes conducted a walkthrough of the sales floor approximately thirty minutes prior to Plaintiff's fall.Bowes inspected the area where Plaintiff fell and only "observed two (2) water drops on the floor." Id.1 Like Plaintiff, Bowes could not determine the source of the water.

In addition to the above-mentioned undisputed facts, Plaintiff also alleges that "Defendant, a retail store, houses many liquid products." Pl. Resp. at 10, Doc. 18. Plaintiff also maintains that on the date of the incident, Bowes and seven other employees were on duty. Id. at 11. During Bowes' shift, he was required to walk the floor which "takes approximately ten minutes and . . . is supposed to be 'continual.'" Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pl. Resp., Exh. D at 110, Doc. 18). However, "[t]here are no records or logs kept that track the 'walks' or confirm the walks actually took place. . . . [and no] record of when [Defendant's employees] encounter [hazards] on the floor." Id. (quoting Pl. Resp., Exh. D at 105-13).

Plaintiff avers that as Plaintiff slipped and fell on the wood in the main aisle, she "grabbed on an adjacent display, her right leg went forward and her left leg twisted back into a splitting position." Id. After Plaintiff fell, "a young male employee returned . . . to wipe the area." Id. at 12-13. At some point, an employee alerted Bowes that Plaintiff had slipped and fallen. Id. at 13. Bowes was uncertain as to "how much time elapsed between the fall and when he was alerted." Id. Bowes was also uncertain as to whether "anyone had cleaned the spill prior to his arrival." Id. Bowes did not investigate how the floor became wet. Id. Additionally, Bowes "did not have a 'specific recollection' that he 'had been [in] the area within a half hour prior to the fall.'" Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pl. Resp., Exh. D at 117-18).2

As a result of the slip and fall, Plaintiff suffered "immediate pain in her groin, back, and shoulder." Id. Plaintiff was then "transported to Lansdale Hospital." Id. After undergoing additional testing, Plaintiff was diagnosed with "tearing of her gluteus minimus/medius, degenerative disease, trochanteric bursitis, and degenerative arthritis of the right hip." Id. In August 2015 Plaintiff underwent hip replacement surgery because previous conservative treatment methods failed. Id.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Doc. 1, Exh. A. On August 27, 2014, Defendant removed the matter from the Court of Common Pleas to this Court. Doc. 1. Plaintiff subsequently amended her Complaint on September 4, 2014 (the "Amended Complaint"). Doc. 3. On January 8, 2016, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 16. The matter is currently scheduled for an arbitration hearing on March 28, 2016. Doc. 20.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, courts shall grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A fact is "material" if it is "one that might 'affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'" Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if it "is one that 'may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

The movant has the initial "burden of identifying specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015). If the movant can sustain its initial burden, "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and 'come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. '" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). When assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court "must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. Nonetheless, the court must be mindful that, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

IV. DISCUSSION

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges her injuries were the result of Defendant's negligence. Doc. 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case because Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania, Defendant is a citizen of New Jersey, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Doc. 3 at 2. Since "[a] federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state . . . to determine the controlling law[,]" this Court will apply Pennsylvania law. Maniscalco v. Brother Int'l (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2013). In Pennsylvania, a negligence action "requires a showing of four elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) such breach caused the injury in question; and (4) the plaintiff incurred actual loss or damage." Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011).

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was a business invitee. See Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 15; Pl. Resp. at 16. Accordingly, "'[t]he duty owed to a business invitee is the highest dutyowed to any entrant upon land' and Defendant was 'under an affirmative duty to protect [Plaintiff] not only against known dangers but also against those which might be discovered with reasonable care.'" Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (quoting Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exch., 100 A.3d 244, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)). The Court will determine "the particular duty owed to a business invitee . . . on a case-by-case basis." Campisi v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). However, "[i]n determining the scope of duty property owners owe to business invitees, [courts in Pennsylvania] have relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343." Id. According to § 343,

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343.

While "'[i]t is unquestionable that a store owner owes a duty of care to the patrons of the store'" it is also true that "'the owner of the store is not an insurer of the safety...

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