Fortenbacher v. Guardsmark, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 81984,No. 1,1,81984
• Citation: Fortenbacher v. Guardsmark, Inc., 867 P.2d 487, 1993 OK CIV APP 194 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993)
• Parties: 1993 OK CIV APP 194 Dan L. FORTENBACHER, D.O., Petitioner, v. GUARDSMARK, INC., National Union Fire Insurance Co., and Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division
• Court: United States State Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 487

867 P.2d 487

1993 OK CIV APP 194

Dan L. FORTENBACHER, D.O., Petitioner, v.GUARDSMARK, INC., National Union Fire Insurance Co., and Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

No. 81984.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

Dec. 21, 1993.

Proceeding to Review an Order of the Workers' Compensation Court; Dick Lynn, Judge.

SUSTAINED.

Louis P. Falsetti, Brady, Schaulat & Falsetti, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.

K. David Roberts and Teresa Cauthorn, King, Roberts & Beeler, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ADAMS, Judge:

In 1983, Carol Ann Martin was injured in an on-the-job automobile accident.She received temporary total disability benefits through October, 1985, and an order was entered on February 12, 1988, awarding her permanent partial disability benefits for injury to her head and brain, neck, low back and bladder.The court also found that though she had injured her ribs, shoulders, abdomen, hearing, vision and hips, she had no permanent partial disability from those injuries.The order recited that Guardsmark or its insurance carrier "shall pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred" by her as a result of her employment-related injury.

Dan L. Fortenbacher, D.O., filed a Form 19 on May 15, 1991, seeking payment for services rendered to Martin prior to the 1988 order.According to this record, bills reflecting those services were submitted to Guardsmark and its insurance carrier in June, 1988, and payment was denied in October 1988.The Workers' Compensation Court denied the medical payment claims, finding them barred by the statute of limitations.Dr. Fortenbacher seeks review of that order.

Dr. Fortenbacher first argues that the February 12, 1988 order, since unappealed became a judgment and that a five-year dormancy provision, not a statute of limitations, is applicable.Dr. Fortenbacher argues he had five years to satisfy the judgment for medical expenses granted in the February 12, 1988 order through a Form 19 claim, which he characterizes as an enforcement procedure.We disagree.

An employer is not concluded or bound by a general order directing payment of necessary medical expenses in the absence of a specific agreement or stipulation as to the reasonableness of the expenses.Patterson Steel Company v. Smith, 353 P.2d 126(Okla.1960).The February 12, 1988 order was, essentially, interlocutory as to Martin's medical expenses because the reasonableness of and necessity for the expenses had not been determined by the trial court nor had the parties made any agreement or stipulation in that regard.Further, as in Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon, 129 Okl. 15, 263 P. 140(1928), the rule that an order which has not been timely appealed may not be later reviewed has no application because the actual medical charges were not before the court until Dr. Fortenbacher filed a claim.Because there was no prior final judgment of the court addressing these medical expenses, dormancy limits are irrelevant to our analysis.¹

Alternatively, Dr. Fortenbacher argues a five-year statute of limitations applies to a claim for medical services, citing Womack v. Boston Fisheries, 527 P.2d 1368(Okla.1974).Guardsmark argues a three-year limitation period applies, citing Standard Paving v. Lemmon.We must agree the three-year limitation period provided in 12 O.S.1991 § 95(2), which is applicable to actions upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty is the appropriate limitation.

As it may apply here, Womack involved review of an order directing payment of a hospital's medical bills which were rendered more than seven years prior to the filing of the Form 19 on which the order was based.In vacating the trial court's order, the Womack Court cited the holding to Standard Paving v. Lemmon that the general statute of limitations contained in 12 O.S. § 95 applied and noted that the hospital's Form 19 included services "rendered more than five (5) years prior to the date of the claim."Womack, 527 P.2d at 1372.Dr. Fortenbacher cites this latter statement as a holding that the five-year limitation in 12 O.S.1991 § 95(6), applicable to an "action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for," covers claims for medical expenses in workers' compensation cases.

Dr. Fortenbacher's analysis, while arguably correct, is inconsistent with the clear holding in Standard Paving v. Lemmon, 263 P. at 142, that the medical services provider "had three years within which bring his action."In construing Womack, we must recognize its approval of Standard Paving v. Lemmon and conclude the Court was merely using the longest period of limitation arguably available under § 95 rather than implicitly overruling a portion of the case which it had just cited with approval.

This interpretation is also consistent with the statutory language.Absent some special contract, the liability of an employer or insurance carrier for medical treatment as a result of on-the-job injuries results solely from the statutory provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1991 § 1 et seq., and there is no suggestion that such liability is a "forfeiture or penalty."By the explicit...