Foss v. Stanton
| Decision Date | 16 May 1904 |
| Citation | 57 A. 942,76 Vt. 365 |
| Parties | SADIE FOSS v. ISAAC STANTON |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
January Term, 1903.
JUSTICE EJECTMENT. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the September Term, 1902, Washington County, Watson, J presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the facts.
Judgment reversed and judgment for defendant.
J P. Lamson for the defendant.
Frank Plumley and John G. Wing for the plaintiff.
Present: TYLER, MUNSON, START, STAFFORD, and HASELTON, JJ.
The defendant is in possession under a written instrument by which the premises were let to him and his wife "to hold for the term of their and each of their natural lives." The proceeding is that ordinarily spoken of as justice ejectment. We have no case of this kind where the tenancy in question was for more than a term of years. The defendant contends that the remedy is not available when the tenancy is for life.
There is nothing in the language of the statute that suggests any distinction between tenancies. The remedy is given when one in possession of demised premises under a written or parol lease remains in possession, without right, after the determination of the lease by its own limitation, or after the breach of a stipulation contained in the lease. The relation of landlord and tenant is that which subsists by virtue of a contract for the possession of lands, at will for a definite period, or for life. The contract employed in the creation of this relation is called a lease, and with reference to this the parties are designated as lessor and lessee. Tenancies for years and for life may both be created by will, and in such cases the statute would apply to neither. The distinction called for by the statute is not between tenancies for life and lesser estates, but between tenancies created by contract and those arising otherwise.
We find nothing in our decisions that suggests a different view. It is said that the proceeding is analogous to, and contains all the elements of, an action of ejectment; that it is given as a summary remedy for the recovery of demised premises, and is designed to avoid the expense and delay attendant upon the prosecution of an action of ejectment; that it is available only against one whose rightful possession was that of a technical lessee, and who remains in possession after the expiration or forfeiture of his lease. Middlebury College v. Lawton, 23 Vt. 688; Hadley v. Havens, 24 Vt. 520; Davis v. Hemenway, 27 Vt. 589; Pitkin v. Burch, 48 Vt. 521; Baldwin v. Skeels, 51 Vt. 121.
The question here is whether the lease has been forfeited. The only breach relied upon is the failure to repair the buildings. The lessees covenanted, among other things, to keep the premises in good repair, and surrender them at the end of the term in the same condition as when taken, ordinary wear and providential damage excepted. It was further provided that if the lessees should refuse for the space of three months to fulfill the covenant of the lease, the lessors might re-enter. More than three months before the bringing of the suit, the plaintiff notified the defendant to repair the buildings or quit the premises.
The plaintiff holds the reversionary interest by virtue of a quit-claim deed from Dorman W. and Wilma M. Cole, executed October 6, 1900. The lease was given by the Coles September 21, 1891. The shed was so far gone at the date of the lease that it was not worth repairing. The house and barn were then old and very much out of repair, and they have since grown...
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