Foster, Glassel Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co

Decision Date22 June 1908
Docket Number17,067
Citation121 La. 1053,46 So. 1014
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesFOSTER, GLASSEL CO. v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. In re KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO

Certiorari to Court of Appeal, Parish of Caddo.

Action by the Foster, Glassel Company against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review. Reversed.

Alexander & Wilkinson, for applicant.

Hall &amp Jack, for respondent.

OPINION

BREAUX C. J.

On Rehearing.

There was no published through rate from the point of shipment and the destination of the freight. There was a published local rate between different places on the way.

The question is whether the carrier had the right to collect rates fixed by the Commission from the one point to the intermediate point and then to Shreveport, although there was no through rate.

The agent at the initial station furnished a lower rate to plaintiffs than the schedule rate.

Plaintiffs charged that the sum of the local rates was excessive.

That was the amount which was collected from the defendant and paid under protest. Plaintiffs sued for the difference in the amount between the amount furnished to them by the agent and the schedule rate, consisting of the sum of the local rates.

We are constrained to arrive at the conclusion that, although there is no through rate, it is not left to the carrier to make rates. The purpose is to avoid difference in rates and discrimination.

It was a mistake on the part of the clerk or agent who furnished to plaintiffs the information which induced them to have their property shipped as stated by them. There were local rates, and they must be taken as governing.

Under the law the railroad "had no option but to collect the charges which they did." See Report and Order of the Commission, No. 1,048.

The following is a brief statement of facts agreed upon between counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants:

"It is further admitted that the rate collected was the sum of the local fixed and published by the Interstate Commission from Stillwater to an intermediate point and from the intermediate point to Shreveport; and that there was no through rate at that time between Stillwater and Shreveport established by the Commission; and the amount sued for is the difference between the rate quoted by defendant's agent and the sum of the local rates fixed by the Commission."

It being admitted that there were published local rates approved by the Commission, it follows that the following is pertinent. One who has obtained from the carrier transportation of goods from one state to another, at a rate specified in the bill of lading less than the published schedule of rate, filed and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in force at the time, whether or not he knew that the rate obtained was less than the schedule rate, is not entitled to recover the goods or damages for detention upon the tender made of the amount of the charges named in the bill of lading. Texas & Pacific v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 245, 26 S.Ct. 630, 50 L.Ed. 1011.

All the authorities are to the same effect.

The question here (urged by plaintiffs) is specially that, as there was no through rate, the defendant could carry out the agreement of its agent, which had been made without regard to the special rates combined.

All the decisions hold that there should be no discrimination -- no favoritism. The law is imperative. Despite the imperativeness of the law, if it be as plaintiffs contend, there would be very little check on the carrier if it chose to take advantage of the fact that there is no through rate.

Judge Cooley of the Commission is quoted by plaintiffs as having said:

"Beyond question, the carrier must judge for itself what are substantially different conditions and circumstances which preclude a special rate, rebate or drawback which is made unlawful. * * * The carrier judges on peril of consequences, but the special rate, rebate, or drawback which it grants is not illegal when it turns out that the circumstances and conditions were not such as to forbid it."

The foregoing, quoted by plaintiff in argument, is embodied in the case of Interstate Commission v....

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