Foster & Glassell Co., Limited v. Knight Bros.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1922
• Docket Number: 25421
• Citation: 93 So. 913,152 La. 596
• Parties: FOSTER & GLASSELL CO., Limited, v. KNIGHT BROS. In re FOSTER & GLASSELL CO. Limited
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

93 So. 913

152 La. 596

FOSTER & GLASSELL CO., Limited, v. KNIGHT BROS. In re FOSTER & GLASSELL CO. Limited

No. 25421

Supreme Court of Louisiana

October 30, 1922

Foster, Looney & Wilkinson, and Marion K. Smith, all of Shreveport, for applicant.

Wilkinson Lewis & Wilkinson, of Shreveport, for defendants.

OPINION

DAWKINS, J.

Plaintiff alleges that it was the employer of one Pink Morris, who, at the end of certain litigation, obtained a judgment for compensation against it under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Act No 20 of 1914). After having paid the said judgment, plaintiff brought this suit for indemnification against Knight Bros., alleging that the injuries to Morris were caused through their fault and negligence. The petition alleges that the compensation which it had to pay was "from November 24, 1917," and which, presumably, was the date of the injury.

Defendant filed a plea of prescription of one year under article 2315 of the Civil Code, which was sustained by the trial court, and that ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The case is now before us for review under writ of certiorari.

Opinion.

The allegations of the petition, of course, are taken as true for the purposes of the plea, and an examination thereof discloses the following as the basis of the cause of action:

That Pink Morris "was injured by a bale of cotton thrown or dropped from a truck belonging to said Knight Bros., and in charge of employees of the said Knight Bros., and through the fault and negligence of the said aforesaid employees of said Knight Bros., and without the slightest fault or negligence of petitioner"; further, that said injuries were without fault on the part of Morris; and that the injuries sustained by him were a fracture of the left arm, fracture of three ribs, and general bruises over the body. Plaintiff further alleges as follows:

"Petitioner shows that under said judgment it has been compelled to pay $ 537.40 to the said Pink Morris, said amount being composed of the following items: Judgment, $ 396; interest, $ 41.20; physician, $ 75; court costs, $ 25.20."

Further:

"Petitioner shows that the said Pink Morris sustained injuries as a result of being struck by the bale of cotton as above set forth in the amount of $ 650."

The prayer is for judgment in the sum of $ 650, with legal interest on $ 537.40 from August 3, 1920, the date on which payment is alleged to have been made to Morris of the amount of judgment, interest, and cost, and for legal interest upon "the balance from judicial demand until paid."

It is said by defendant that the action is one ex delicto, and that plaintiff can have no greater rights than those of Pink Morris against defendant, a third person, through whose fault the injury is alleged to have occurred. This is undoubtedly true, in so far as the claim is for and on behalf of Morris; but plaintiff had two causes of action under the law, the one for and on behalf of Morris, and the other for indemnification, as upon an implied or quasi contract to be reimbursed for money which it was compelled to pay on account of the fault of defendant, for which, under the allegations of the petition, it was in no wise responsible. Appalachian Corporation, Inc., v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539. If plaintiff, without or before having paid Morris, had sued defendant for the full extent of the latter's injuries, it could have been said that the action rested solely upon the right of subrogation under Act 20 of 1914, as amended, known as the Employers' Liability Law or Workman's Compensation Act. However, in view of the contest which it made of Morris' claim for compensation, it could not have sued the defendants in this case without waiving the defenses which it made in that case, until the issues were finally settled; hence it waited until the sum which it had been condemned for had been paid, and brought this suit for indemnification or reimbursement. There is no reason which we can see why it could not combine the demand for indemnification with one under the legal subrogation, and in the absence of the plea of prescription have recovered all that was due by defendants for the injuries to Morris, the excess over what was necessary to reimburse it, under the Compensation Act, being for the benefit of the employee.

"It quite frequently happens that a new cause of action is created by a statute or a new remedy is provided by statute to enforce a common-law cause of action, and in consequence it becomes important to determine how the new cause of action shall be enforced, or whether the new remedy...