Foster v. Armontrout, 83-1275
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRIGHT; BRIGHT |
| Citation | 729 F.2d 583 |
| Parties | William W. FOSTER, Appellant, v. Bill ARMONTROUT, Associate Warden and Captain Tucker, Guard Captain, Appellees. |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1275,83-1275 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1984 |
Page 583
v.
Bill ARMONTROUT, Associate Warden and Captain Tucker, Guard
Captain, Appellees.
Eighth Circuit.
Decided March 16, 1984.
Page 584
Kathleen K. Jenkins, Hillix, Brewer, Hoffhaus & Whittaker, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Kelly Mescher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellees.
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
On December 2, 1981 William Foster, an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Bill Armontrout, the Associate Warden, and Captain Tucker, the Guard Captain. In his pro se complaint, Foster alleged inter alia that in August of 1974 he was stabbed and beaten by other inmates just after defendants denied his request for protection.
The district court 1 dismissed Foster's case as untimely, applying Missouri's three-year statute of limitations governing actions against a sheriff, coroner, or other officer. Foster appeals, arguing that our decision in Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S.Ct. 2283, 73 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1982), compels application of either the five-year limitations period governing actions based upon liability created by statute or the ten-year "catch-all" period for actions not specifically enumerated in other limitations provisions. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the district court's order applying Missouri's three-year statute of limitations.
I. Discussion.
A. Statute of Limitations.
Congress did not prescribe a specific statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The controlling limitations period for such an action is, therefore, the most appropriate one provided by state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975).
In Garmon, we considered which Iowa statute of limitations was appropriate in a section 1983 action: "the statute governing an action based on the underlying conduct of the defendant, or the state's general, 'catch-all' statute of limitations." Garmon v. Foust, supra, 668 F.2d at 401. 2 There, Mark Garmon brought an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against three Des Moines police officers, alleging that as a result of an illegal search and seizure, he suffered severe emotional distress, damage to his reputation, and impaired earning capacity. The officers sought summary judgment, arguing that Iowa's two-year statute of limitations governing actions for injuries to person or reputation barred the action. We rejected the tort analogy, reasoning
Page 585
that Garmon's action could not be narrowly characterized as merely an action for injuries to his person and reputation. Such a characterization, we concluded, "unduly cramps the significance of section 1983 as a broad, statutory remedy" for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights. Id. at 406.In the case before us, Warden Armontrout and Captain Tucker are not asking us to characterize Foster's action as one sounding in tort. No such characterization is necessary. Nor need we resort to analogy to determine which statute of limitations applies. Section 516.130(1) of the Missouri Statutes provides a three-year limitations period for
[a]n action against a sheriff, coroner or other officer, upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty * * *. Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 516.130(1) (Vernon 1952).
The statute applies not only to tort actions, but to any action against a sheriff, coroner, or other officer acting in his or her official capacity. Therefore, by its terms, the three-year statute of limitation governs this action.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 3 "authorizes federal courts to disregard an otherwise applicable state rule of law only if the state law is 'inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.' " Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980). "State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the...
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