Foster v. Board of School Com'rs of Mobile County, Ala.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-7044,88-7044
• Citation: 872 F.2d 1563
• Parties: 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1397, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,057 Edwin FOSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, George L. Langham, Gabe W. Wright and Charles Buskey, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1563

872 F.2d 1563

49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1397,

50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,057

Edwin FOSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, George L. Langham, Gabe W. Wright and Charles Buskey, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-7044.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 23, 1989.

Joseph G. Pierce, Russell Jackson Drake, Drake, Knowles & Pierce, Tuscaloosa, Ala., Thomas H. Figures, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank G. Taylor, Thomas R. McAlpine, Sintz, Campbell, Duke, Taylor & Cunningham, Mobile, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before JOHNSON, HATCHETT and COX, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the denial of relief to seventy-four members of a class of black school teachers in Mobile County, Alabama, who allege they were denied promotions to principal positions in the Mobile County school district on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1982, 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e et seq. We affirm.

I. FACTS

This case originally arose in 1963. Black employees of the Mobile County public school system filed a class action challenging the hiring and promotion practices of the Mobile County School Board. In 1974, two black professionals in the school system, Foster and Buskey, intervened, arguing that the Mobile County School Board discriminated against them in promotion-to-principalship decisions. ¹ This Court's predecessor found that the School Board had engaged in a pattern of racially discriminatory promotion and assignment practices against prospective principals and principals within the school system. See Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 473-74 (5th Cir.1979), modified at 616 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.1980). The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine which members of the class had suffered injury from this discrimination and were entitled to relief.

On remand, the district court severed the principalship promotion claims from the remainder of the claims in Davis. On September 3, 1981, the district court certified as a subclass under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) black professionals in the Mobile County school district who alleged they had been denied principal positions within the school district on the basis of race between January 1972 and August 1981. ² Because plaintiffs had already proven that the school board had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, the district court entered an order establishing the framework for Stage II proceedings to determine which plaintiffs were entitled to relief. See generally Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867-68, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Under that framework, class members had to present claims with the district court indicating the period for which the member alleged injury and requested relief from the school board's discriminatory promotion practices. Upon presenting a claim, the member presumptively was entitled to relief subject to four defenses available to the defendants. Those defenses were: (1) defendants proved by clear and convincing evidence that a plaintiff would not have been promoted absent discrimination; (2) a plaintiff was offered and refused a promotion within a reasonable time period before or after the vacancy; (3) a plaintiff did not suffer economic harm from defendants' conduct; and (4) a plaintiff was barred from further relief by some other legally cognizable affirmative defense.

The district court referred the case to a United States Magistrate, Patrick H. Sims, as Special Master to conduct the Stage II proceedings and to issue a Report and Recommendation identifying those plaintiffs entitled to relief. His goal was to determine the promotion process followed by the school board, to delete racial considerations from that promotion process, and to ascertain the promotions that would have occurred absent discrimination. See generally Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1267-68, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). Discovery occurred over a three-year period. In 1984, the magistrate held hearings on the claims of each of the 104 members of the class. On June 5, 1985, the magistrate issued his Report and Recommendation. The report divided the class into two groups, those who were eligible to receive relief and those who were not. The magistrate recommended relief for twenty-eight class members. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations as to all except one plaintiff, granting relief to Booker T. Davis although the magistrate had recommended no relief.

On July 27, 1985, pursuant to a motion made by attorneys for the class members who were not entitled to relief, the district court severed the class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4)(B) into two subclasses based on the groups established by the magistrate. On December 15, 1987, the recovering class members entered into a consent agreement regarding the damages claimed by each member. On December 17, 1987, the district court entered a final order and judgment granting relief to the members of the recovering class pursuant to the consent agreement and denying relief to the seventy-four ³ members of the non-recovering class. It is from this final order that the non-recovering class members appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants argue that a six-year statute of limitations rather than the one-year limitations period applied by the district court should control their section 1983 claims. The class certified on September 3, 1981, was defined as all black professionals employed by the Mobile County school district since August 27, 1971, who sought or would seek employment as principals within the school system. Plaintiffs brought suit under section 1981, section 1983, and Title VII. The August 27, 1971, date for defining the class was selected as the first date on which violations could have occurred that were not barred by the statute of limitations. Buskey, one of the original named plaintiffs, filed a charge with the EEOC on August 27, 1973, as required by Title VII. The statute of limitations for Title VII actions was two years. See 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(g). Prior to 1985, Alabama's one-year statute of limitations applied to section 1983 claims alleging discriminatory employment practices. See, e.g., Smith v. McClammy, 740 F.2d 925, 927 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (citing Doyle v. University of Alabama, 680 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir.1982)). Thus, the applicable statutes of limitations prevented plaintiffs from asserting claims based on events occurring prior to August 27, 1971.

In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Wilson, the Court held that the state limitations period for personal injury actions would apply to all actions arising under section 1983 within a particular state. Id. at 276, 105 S.Ct. at 1947. Subsequently, this Court decided that the six-year limitations period provided in Ala.Code Sec. 6-2-34(1) applies to section 1983 actions arising in Alabama. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105, 106 S.Ct. 893, 88 L.Ed.2d 926 (1986). Appellants argue that this six-year limitations period should apply retroactively to their claims, and that therefore they should be allowed to try the merits of claims arising before 1971.

Judicial decisions presumptively apply retroactively to all pending cases. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). To determine whether to deny retroactive effect to a judicial decision, we must follow the three-factor test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). See, e.g., Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624 (11th Cir.1986) (applying Chevron to grant retroactive effect to uniform limitations period for section 1983 actions in Georgia). First, we must determine whether Jones established a new principle of law, either by overruling clear precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355. Second, we must look to the purpose and effect of Jones and determine whether retroactive application in this case would advance or inhibit that purpose and effect. Id. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355-56. Finally, we must consider the inequity that would be created by retroactive application of the new rule. Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355.

The first Chevron factor works against retroactive application of the decision in Jones. The six-year statute of limitations represented a clear break from the past. Prior to 1985, a one-year limitations period applied in Alabama to section 1983 actions based on employment discrimination. See, e.g., Dumas v. Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.1980) (one-year limitations period applies under Alabama law to action alleging racial discrimination in hiring decision). Jones established a new rule that a six-year limitations period applies to all section 1983 actions arising in Alabama. Jones thus overruled clear precedent.

The second Chevron factor does not weigh in favor of retroactive application of the six-year limitations period. The second factor focuses on the purpose and effect of the new decision. See Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355-56. The Supreme Court intended Wilson to further uniformity and certainty of limitations periods for section 1983 actions and to reduce unnecessary expenses incurred in contesting the proper limitations period. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1946. Jones established that limitations period as six years for cases arising in Alabama. Courts had already established a uniform and certain one-year limitations period, however. ...