Foster v. Com.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1968
• Citation: 163 S.E.2d 565,209 Va. 297
• Parties: Bernard Rieves FOSTER, allas, etc. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 565

163 S.E.2d 565

209 Va. 297

Bernard Rieves FOSTER, allas, etc. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Oct. 14, 1968.

John Ritchie, Jr., Richmond, for plaintiff in error.

William P. Bagwell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON, and HARRISON, JJ.

SNEAD, Justice.

Bernard Rieves Foster, alias Bernard Rease, pleaded not guilty to an indictment charging that he did on October 9, 1966 unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously break and enter a storehouse of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC), situated at 1209 East Main street in Richmond, with intent to commit larceny therein. A jury found defendant guilty of statutory burglary as charged in the indictment and fixed his punishment at confinement in the State penitentiary for a term of ten years. After overruling defendant's motion to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the law and the evidence, the trial court, on December 2, 1966, sentenced defendant in accordance with the jury verdict. We granted defendant a writ of error to that judgment.

In his assignments of error relied upon, defendant claims in substance that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to quash the indictment because he was denied a proper preliminary hearing; (2) in refusing to provide funds for necessary expert assistance in preparation of his defense; (3) in denying his motion for a change of venue; (4) in admitting and refusing certain evidence, and (5) in refusing Instruction Z.

Raymond L. Wiltshire and James W. Bowles were also charged with burglarizing the ABC store. The same attorney was appointed by the Police Court to defend the three defendants at the preliminary hearing. The defendants agreed to the appointment and a single preliminary hearing was had.

The defendants summoned twelve witnesses for the hearing. All save one, Fred M. Block, were police officers. Included among those summoned was Lieutenant F. G. Clark, but the subpoena had not been served upon him and he was not present at the hearing. As a consequence counsel for defendants moved for a continuance which was denied. An exception was taken to the court's ruling. J. E. Gibbs, a clerk of the ABC store which was entered, and Detective P. E. Hastings testified for the Commonwealth to show sufficient cause to charge the accused with statutory burglary. Code § 19.1--106. The defendants then called Fred M. Block who was in his place of business next to the ABC store on the morning of the alleged burglary. He testified, among other things, that he heard 'hammering noises' in the liquor store, 'went up the street' and 'told somebody to call the police.'

The defendants next called Detective E. R. Marrin, who was a witness to their arrests at the scene of the alleged crime. The Commonwealth's attorney objected to the examination of this witness and of the other police officers, suggesting that the sole purpose of defense counsel was to indulge in a 'fishing expedition.' Counsel for defendants argued that Marrin's evidence would be relevant to some of the motions he had made during the preliminary hearing which had been overruled, and that 'the defendants have the right to present evidence to contradict what the Commonwealth has put on and to bring out other features of their case at this time.' Counsel did not represent to the court that the evidence expected from the remaining eight police officers would either tend to show that no crime was committed or that any of the defendants was not connected with it. Over the objection and exception of counsel for defendants, the court refused to permit counsel to examine Marrin and the remaining witnesses, and after stating 'I am satisfied that there is probable cause' certified the cases to the grand jury. After the grand jury returned a true bill the trial court appointed separate counsel, who had not represented Foster at the preliminary hearing, to defend him.

We have had occasion to consider a similar situation in the recent case of Williams v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781, which was decided after the writ of error in the case at bar was granted. In that case the Commonwealth's attorney introduced three witnesses at the preliminary hearing to show sufficient cause for certifying to the grand jury the charge that Williams had killed James Sarver, and then moved the court to certify the case. Counsel for defendant objected, stating that the motion was premature because they desired to call witnesses to testify on behalf of the accused. They represented to the court that they wished to call witnesses who would testify concerning an oral statement and a written confession allegedly made by the accused. One of defendant's attorneys stated: "(W)e understand that the defendant made a statement. We feel that this is the best opportunity to bring it out. The circumstances growing out of that alleged statement." The other attorney for the defendant said: "I * * * concur * * * We should have an opportunity to submit evidence also on the confession." Counsel argued, as counsel for the defendant does in the case at bar, that Code, § 19.1--101 gave them the right to call witnesses for the accused. Section 19.1--101 provides:

'The judge or justice of the peace before whom any person is brought for an offense shall, as soon as may be, in the presence of such person, examine on oath the witnesses for and against him, and he may be assisted by counsel.'

In holding that the trial court committed no error in overruling defense counsel's motion to quash the indictment because Williams had been denied a preliminary hearing as 'required and provided by law', Mr. Justice Gordon, speaking for the court, said:

'The county judge had only one issue to decide when he presided at Williams' preliminary hearing, whether there was sufficient cause for charging Williams with murder (see Va.Code Ann. § 19.1--106 (1960 Repl. vol.)) or, in other words, whether there was reasonable ground to believe that a murder had been committed and Williams was the person who had committed the murder.

'Because a preliminary hearing is essentially a screening process, the Code of Virginia prescribed as early as 1849, and still prescribes, that the examining judge or justice 'shall examine on oath the witnesses For and against * * * (the accused)'. (Emphasis supplied.) Code of 1849, ch. 204, § 11, now Va.Code Ann. § 19.1--101 (1960 Repl. vol.) * * *. Defense counsel therefore had the right to present evidence For Williams, that is, to show there was no reasonable ground for belief that Williams had committed murder. But counsel did not represent to the county judge that they wished to offer testimony for that purpose. Instead, they represented that they wished to call witnesses who would testify respecting an incriminating statement and a confession made by Williams.

'* * * Neither Code § 19.1--101 nor any Rule of Court gave counsel for the accused the right to call witnesses at the preliminary hearing for the purpose of discovery. * * *.' 208 Va., pp. 728, 729, 160 S.E.2d p. 784.

As has been said, counsel for defendants made no suggestion to the Police Court that the testimony of any of the witnesses not permitted to testify would tend to show either that the crime had not been committed or that any of the defendants had not committed the crime. A preliminary hearing may not be used for the purpose of discovery. Moreover, there has been no showing that defendant Foster was prejudiced by the court's action in refusing to permit the witnesses to testify. We find that the trial court committed no error in overruling Foster's motion to quash the indictment because he was denied a proper preliminary hearing.

The record shows that defendant's clothes were taken from him soon after his arrest and were subjected to a chemical analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.). The results of these tests revealed paint chips on defendant's clothing identical to chips from the safe which had been tampered with inside the ABC store. At a pretrial hearing counsel for defendant moved the court 'to turn over to the defendant's counsel the said clothing for the purpose of obtaining chemical examination and that the cost thereof be paid by the Commonwealth'. The court observed that the report of the examination by the F.B.I. had been reviewed by counsel and denied the motion.

The defendant contends that by the denial of this motion he was deprived of his rights to equal protection and due process under the Federal Constitution. He argues that 'If adequate time for preparation (by defense counsel) is required, then adequate information for preparation must also be required.' Whatever may be the merit of this contention, it has no...