Foster v. Dickinson

• Decision Date: 15 October 1974
• Citation: 293 Ala. 298,302 So.2d 111
• Parties: Ronnie FOSTER v. Robert L. DICKINSON and State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama. S.C. 978.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 111

302 So.2d 111

293 Ala. 298

Ronnie FOSTER v. Robert L. DICKINSON and State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama.

S.C. 978.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 15, 1974.

Edward S. Allen, Birmingham, Gaines & Hereford, Talladega, and Michael H. Cleckler, Childersburg, for appellant.

Max Pope, Birmingham, for appellees.

FAULKNER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County enjoining the Probate Judge of such county from including the name of Ronnie Foster on the November, 1974, general election ballot as the Republican nominee for Alabama House of Representatives, District 56.

On January 26, 1974, the Alabama Republican Executive Committee adopted a resolution electing to accept and come under the primary election laws of the State of Alabama. The resolution set March 1, 1974, as the last day for persons to file declarations of candidacy in the primary. No person, including Foster, filed a declaration of candidacy in the Republican primary for the House of Representatives (House District 56) as required by § 348, Title 17, Code of Alabama, 1940, Recompiled 1958.

On September 5, 1974, the Republican Executive Committee filed Foster's name with the Secretary of State as the Republican nominee for the office of House District 56. This certification was made pursuant to the January 26, 1974, Resolution, which set the last date for filing declarations of candidacy in the primary, and also appointed a committee having certain authority and powers:

'(d) to fill vacancies in any nomination for any public or party office with regard to the primary or other election and the general election where such vacancy exists for any reason whatsoever, including but not being limited to, a vacancy existing by reason of death, resignation, disqualification, failure of any person to have filed for nomination for a particular office, failure of any person to have been nominated for a particular office or failure of any person to have been elected to a particular office.'

On September 12, 1974, Dickinson filed a complaint to enjoin the Probate Judge of St. Clair County from placing Foster's name on the ballot for the general election.

The only issue to be decided is whether the failure of any person to qualify by March 1, 1974, as a Republican primary candidate for House District 56, resulted in a vacancy in the Republican nomination for such office within the meaning of § 371, Title 17, Code of Alabama. Section 371, Title 17, provides in part as follows:

'The state executive committee . . . where a vacancy may occur in any nomination, either by death, resignation, revocation, Or otherwise . . . shall have the power and authority to fill such vacancy . . . by such . . . method as such committee may see fit to pursue.' (Emphasis added.)

Foster relies on the cause of the vacancy contained in that part of the statute which says, 'or otherwise.' The words, 'or otherwise' in law when used as a general phrase following an enumeration of particulars are commonly interpreted in a restricted sense as referring to such other matters as are kindred to the classes before mentioned, receiving ejusdem generis interpretation. Cf. Goode v. Tyler, 237 Ala. 106, 186 So. 129 (1939); State v. Tyler, 100 Fla. 1112, 130 So. 721 (1930). In Goode the court said the general words 'or otherwise' will...