Foster v. Fowler

• Decision Date: 04 January 1869
• Citation: 60 Pa. 27
• Parties: Foster & Co. <I>versus</I> Fowler & Co.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 27

60 Pa. 27

Foster & Co. versus Fowler & Co.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 18, 1868.

January 4, 1869.

November 18th 1868.

Before THOMPSON, C.J., READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Error to the District Court of Allegheny county: No. 83, to October and November Term 1867.

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C. B. M. Smith, for plaintiffs in error.—The operation of the Mechanics' Lien Law of June 16th 1836, Pamph. L. 696, Purd. 708 et seq., is very broad, applying to all buildings. Those cases which the decisions have held to be excepted were decided on reasons not applicable to this case: Wilson v. Huntingdon Co., 7 W. & S. 197, county public buildings; Williams v. Controllers, 6 Harris 275, public-school house. A church is subject to a mechanics' lien: Church v. Allison, 10 Barr 413. This company is not a public corporation, and its property is liable to execution: Act of June 16th 1836, § 72, Pamph. L. 774, Purd. 199, pl. 37; Turnpike Co. v. Wallace, 8 Watts 316; McIlvaine v. Hestonville and Mantua Railroad, Leg. Int. Feb. 7th 1862; Plymouth Railroad v. Colwell, 3 Wright 337.

D. W. & A. S. Bell, for J. L. Lowry.—The reason why a lien cannot be enforced against such buildings is, that a loss would be sustained by the public: Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 W. & S. 28; Steiner's Appeal, 3 Casey 315.

H. Burgwin, for Fowler & Co., defendants in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 4th 1869, by THOMPSON, C. J.

This was a case of an attachment-execution, issued by Fowler & Co. against Joseph L. Lowry, and served on the Monongahela Water Company, an alleged debtor of Lowry, as garnishee. There was an interpleader issue ordered by the court between the plaintiffs and defendants in error, and another party, to try who was entitled to the money due by the company to Lowry. Fowler & Co. claimed it by virtue of the service of an execution-attachment on the 10th of May 1866; Foster & Co., by virtue of a mechanics' lien against the company filed June 6th 1866, for materials furnished Lowry, the contractor of the company, for building a pumping-engine; and David Lowry claimed it under an alleged assignment by Joseph L. Lowry of all interest in his contract with the company, dated the 19th of December 1865. The jury found against the validity of the assignment on the facts, and also against Foster & Co., on the charge of the court that the mechanics' lien filed by them was not operative against the company, and in favor of Fowler & Co., and that the sum of $2327.72 remained due the defendant, Joseph L. Lowry, by the company, applicable to their writ. The case here, however, is exclusively between the plaintiffs and defendants in error, and turns upon the question whether a mechanic's lien is valid in law against property essential to the operations of the company. We are assuming nothing in stating the proposition thus, for undoubtedly the pumping-engine and engine-house of the company, would be absolutely necessary to raise water to the company's reservoirs, in order to supply the districts intended to be supplied with water. It was to these the lien, if any, attached — to property vital to the objects of the corporation, and which, if it might be deprived of by execution on such a lien, would stop or suspend the operation of the works altogether, to the great deterioration, and perhaps destruction of the stock, to the injury of the inhabitants relying on the works for water; and to the company, by rendering the balance of the works worthless. The question is, therefore, a grave one, whether the mechanic's lien, in a case precisely of this nature, is a remedy to secure a material-man; because if it be clearly so, we need not vex ourselves with contemplating embarrassing consequences; the law injures no one, even if such consequences follow its provisions.

In the able argument of the learned counsel of the plaintiffs in error, it was claimed that we should consider the question of lien without reference to its possible enforcement. This would be too abstract and unpractical; for the lien abstractly is nothing — its consequences or results, everything. The fruits of a lien are what the plaintiffs in error are contending for. We cannot, therefore, look at the question of lien, without reference to the legal consequences of it; and if they would necessarily contravene settled principles, it is evident that such an effect should not be given, and was not intended by the law; and if it be incapable of the practical results assigned by law to it, it is inoperative, is no lien. We must, therefore, regard the consequences of holding the claim filed to be a lien, one of which, and the principal one, is, that by virtue of it, the property bound by it would be subject to a sale on a levari facias, and then would follow the depreciation of the stock, the inconvenience to the public, and injury to the remaining property of the company, already referred to. We do not agree with the learned counsel, therefore, that in considering the question of lien we ought to ignore the possibility of its enforcement. The entry of the claim is parcel of a legal remedy, the whole of which remedy it is necessary to consider in order to determine whether it is a proper remedy, in any given case.

Most people acquainted at all with corporate action, understand that corporations, other than municipal, which are purely public, naturally divide into public and private corporations; that is, into those that are...