Foster v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-cv-00008-TES |
| Parties | ROBIN FOSTER and JONATHAN FOSTER, Plaintiffs, v. FRANKLIN COLLECTION SERVICE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the Court is Defendant Franklin Collection Service, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "FBCS") Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 32] on Plaintiffs' action for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Georgia Fair Business Practices Act and for FBCS's alleged negligence. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In December 2014, Plaintiff Robin Foster received medical treatment at RedMed Urgent & Family Clinic ("RedMed") in Pontotoc, Mississippi. [Doc. 34-7, ¶ 2; Doc. 33-5, p. 6]. On her intake form, Mrs. Foster indicated that she had insurance and listed her husband, Plaintiff Jonathan Foster, as the insured. [Doc. 33-5, p. 6].
Several months later, FBCS received an email from RedMed's billing service for the collection of an unpaid balance of $317.00. [Doc. 33-8, pp. 6, 25]. The email listed the patient as Mrs. Foster and the guarantor as Mr. Foster. [Id. at p. 25].
Pursuant to FBCS's contract with RedMed, dated July 14, 2015, RedMed has "a continuing obligation to provide FBCS any new or additional Account Information with respect to the Delinquent Accounts as soon as such information becomes known" to it. [Doc. 37-3, p. 4]. Furthermore, RedMed agreed to report payments to FBCS by email on a weekly basis. [Id. at p. 2]. Elsewhere the contract states that RedMed "will notify FBCS within twenty[-]four (24) hours of direct receipt of payment or assigned accounts." [Id. at p. 4].
After receiving RedMed's email regarding the Fosters' balance, Defendant sent two letters to the Fosters regarding the unpaid debt. [Doc. 34-7, ¶ 9]. Defendant addressed the first one, dated July 30, 2015, to Jonathan Foster but named "Mr./Mrs. Jonathan Foster" in the salutation and informed Plaintiffs of their ability to call FBCS to discuss payment options. [Doc. 33-8, pp. 15-16]. On the second page of the letter, FBCS wrote:
[Id. at p. 16].
On August 7, 2015, Mrs. Foster called RedMed and had a conversation with a billing department employee. [Doc. 34-2]. Mrs. Foster explained that her insurance provider made a mistake and would reprocess her claim regarding her December 2014 medical services. [Id. at p. 2:10-20]. The RedMed employee "reversed the collections balances" and told Mrs. Foster to "keep on top of your insurance company" and to call back in one and a half to two weeks "to see if we've received that payment yet." [Id. at p. 4:7-16].
On February 10, 2016, FBCS sent another letter to Jonathan Foster. [Doc. 33-8, pp. 17-18]. This letter contained no salutation and stated, [Id. at p. 17]. Plaintiffs contend that at the time FBCS sent the February 10 letter their balance with RedMed was paid in full. [Doc. 34, p. 4].
Plaintiffs now bring the instant action, claiming that FBCS violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA") and the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq. ("GFBPA"). Plaintiffs also claim that FBCS negligently breached its duty to "treat [Plaintiffs] fairly and in a manner that was not abusive." [Doc. 24, ¶¶ 85, 86].
DISCUSSION
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As to issues for which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the "movant must affirmatively show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and support its motion with credible evidence demonstrating that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party on all of the essential elements of its case." Landolfi v. City of Melbourne, 515 F. App'x 832, 834 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993)). As to issues for which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant may (1) simply point out an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case or (2) provide "affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. in Greene & Tuscaloosa Ctys., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Once the movant satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must "go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citingFitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17). "A factual dispute is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Battle v. Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006). However, "[a] court need not permit a case to go to a jury. . . when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relies, are implausible." Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs' first claim arises under the FDCPA, which Congress enacted in 1977 to curtail "the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); see also Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014). By enacting the FDCPA, Congress created a civil cause of action for consumers confronted by debt collectors who use "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; see also Edwards v. Niagara Credit Sols., Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, to have a viable claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must "show that a debt collector attempted to collect a consumer debt through an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA." Brown v. Collection Servs. of Athens, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-156 (MTT), 2014 WL7359560, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2014).
The question in this case is whether FBCS committed some act or omission in violation of the Act. To answer this question, the Court must not assess "whether the particular plaintiff-consumer was deceived or misled," but must instead determine "whether the 'least sophisticated consumer' would have been deceived by the debt collector's conduct." Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1258 (citing Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1177 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985)). The least sophisticated consumer is "presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care," and the standard does not allow for "bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices." LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Eleventh Circuit courts generally construe the FDCPA as a strict liability statute since it "typically subjects debt collectors to liability even when violations are not knowing or intentional." Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). However, the statute contains an exception to liability in Section 1692k, which states:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). To be entitled to this "bona fide error" defense, the debt collector must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) its FDCPA violation wasunintentional; (2) its FDCPA violation was the result of a bona fide error; and (3) the error "occurred despite the maintenance of procedures 'reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.'" Owen, 629 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Edwards, 584 F.3d at 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiffs claim that FBCS "violated various provisions of [Sections] 1692e and 1692f by attempting to collect a debt Plaintiffs did not owe." [Doc. 34, p. 8]. Section 1692e prohibits, among other things, "[t]he false representation of—the character, amount, or legal status of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). It also prohibits "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
FBCS moves for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that its mistaken attempt to collect on Mrs. Foster's medical bill is excused by its reasonable reliance on information supplied by the...
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