Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp.
Citation | 76 A.D.3d 210,905 N.Y.S.2d 226 |
Parties | Paula FOSTER, plaintiff-respondent, v. HERBERT SLEPOY CORP., et al., defendants-respondents, Kerry Clancy, appellant. |
Decision Date | 22 June 2010 |
Court | New York Supreme Court Appellate Division |
76 A.D.3d 210
Paula FOSTER, plaintiff-respondent,
v.
HERBERT SLEPOY CORP., et al., defendants-respondents,
Kerry Clancy, appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
June 22, 2010.
Gorton & Gorton LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Thomas P. Gorton of counsel), for appellant.
Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo P.C., New York, N.Y. (Stephen C. Glasser of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
Fumuso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart & Farrell, LLP, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Scott G. Christesen of counsel), for defendants-respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., STEVEN W. FISHER, ARIEL E. BELEN, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.
MASTRO, J.P.
The instant appeal presents us with an opportunity to discuss and clarify what a snow-removal contractor must show to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when she slipped and fell on snow and ice in the driveway/parking lot area of the cooperative complex where she resides. The complex
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, alleging, inter alia, that Clancy was negligent in his performance of snow removal services. The owners cross-claimed against Clancy for contribution, contractual indemnification, and common-law indemnification based in part on his alleged unspecified "affirmative negligence." In a subsequent bill of particulars, the plaintiff generally alleged that Clancy had created the condition on which she fell or permitted it to exist by failing to properly remove it and by failing to apply salt or sand to the area. She claimed that Clancy "actively created and/or caused said dangerous condition to exist by not properly removing all of the snow and ice in the parking lot/driveway."
Following the completion of discovery, Clancy moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against him, contending that he merely had a limited agreement to perform snow clearing services at the premises, which did not give rise to a duty of care running from him to the plaintiff and, thus, precluded recovery by the plaintiff against him under a negligence theory. He further maintained that no cross claim for contribution or indemnification could lie against him under the circumstances of the case.
In opposing the motion, the owners acknowledged that Clancy's snow plowing contract was not with the plaintiff and that the performance of such services ordinarily would not give rise to tort liability to a third party such as the plaintiff. However, they argued that Clancy nevertheless failed to sustain his prima facie burden because he had not made an additional showing eliminating any potential issues of fact as to whether he launched a force or instrument of harm by performing his snow plowing activities, or whether the oral agreement constituted a comprehensive property maintenance contract by which he assumed the owners' duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition. In any event, they contended that they had succeeded in raising triable issues of fact with respect to these matters.
The plaintiff also opposed Clancy's motion, similarly contending that Clancy failed to negate all factual issues as to whether
In reply, Clancy insisted that his mere failure to remove all of the snow and ice by plowing did not create or exacerbate a dangerous condition, that the snow plowing agreement did not constitute a comprehensive maintenance contract because the owners' personnel still performed some snow clearing activities in the driveway/parking lot area, and that the plaintiff could not have detrimentally relied on his contractual services because the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she was not even aware of Clancy or the agreement.
In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied Clancy's motion in its entirety, finding that an issue of fact existed with regard to whether Clancy was required to apply salt or sand to the driveway/parking lot area as part of his contractual duties. We now modify by granting Clancy's motion for summary judgment to the extent of dismissing the complaint and the cross claims for contribution and contractual indemnification insofar as asserted against him.
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