Foster v. Jesson
| Decision Date | 22 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. A14–1119.,A14–1119. |
| Citation | 857 N.W.2d 545 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Bradley Wayne FOSTER, Appellant, v. Lucinda JESSON, Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent. |
Todd E. Deal, Virginia, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Adam Hoiland Welle, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by RODENBERG, Presiding Judge; JOHNSON, Judge; and REYES, Judge.
Appellant Bradley Wayne Foster challenges the denial of his petition for transfer or discharge from civil commitment, arguing that the judicial appeal panel erred in granting the commissioner's motion to dismiss his petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b). We affirm.
Appellant was committed as a sexual psychopathic personality and sexually dangerous person on March 14, 2007.1 In January 2013, appellant petitioned the special review board for discharge or transfer to a nonsecure Minnesota Department of Human Services facility, otherwise known as community preparation services (CPS).2 The special review board held a hearing on the petition on February 12, 2013, at which the board heard the testimony of appellant and Minnesota sex offender program (MSOP) employees, and considered the results of several risk assessment tests as applied to appellant. The special review board recommended that appellant be denied a transfer or discharge.
Appellant requested rehearing and reconsideration by the judicial appeal panel under Minn.Stat. § 253D.28 (Supp.2013). The judicial appeal panel held a first-phase hearing on January 31, 2014. Dr. Paul Reitman, one of the psychologists who had testified at appellant's initial commitment hearing, testified on behalf of appellant and also prepared a written report, which was received in evidence.3 On direct examination by appellant's counsel, Dr. Reitman initially indicated that he supported appellant's transfer to CPS, based on a clinical interview, appellant's psychological testing, and the availability of intensive supervised release. However, he did not support discharge:
On cross-examination, Dr. Reitman was asked whether appellant had completed a full-disclosure polygraph and whether appellant had missed 16 group sessions. Dr. Reitman testified that he was under the impression that appellant had taken a full-disclosure polygraph, and opined that “[i]f [appellant] has not yet done that, consistent with other cases I've had I would say that has to happen first” before he could recommend appellant's transfer to CPS. It is undisputed that appellant had not completed a full-disclosure polygraph before the hearing. With that corrected understanding, Dr. Reitman amended his recommendation and testified that appellant would need to complete and pass the full-disclosure polygraph before transfer would be appropriate. Based on the absence of such a polygraph, Dr. Reitman testified that he could support neither discharge nor transfer.
The commissioner moved for dismissal of the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) after Dr. Reitman's testimony and without presenting evidence. The judicial appeal panel granted the motion, first concluding that appellant failed to “make even a minimal showing that he is no longer in need of treatment or that he is no longer a danger to the public,” as required for discharge. The judicial appeal panel then evaluated the statutory transfer factors of Minn.Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b) (Supp.2013), and concluded that appellant had failed to establish grounds for a transfer by a preponderance of the evidence, due to his missed group meetings and based on Dr. Reitman's testimony that appellant, having not yet completed a full-disclosure polygraph, is not an appropriate candidate for transfer. This appeal followed.
I. Did the judicial appeal panel err in concluding that appellant's petition for transfer was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence?
II. Did the judicial appeal panel err in concluding that appellant failed to meet his burden of production to establish that he is entitled to discharge?
Appellant challenges the judicial appeal panel's dismissal of his petition for transfer from MSOP. He argues that the testimony of Dr. Reitman, the only testimony presented by appellant in his case-in-chief, was sufficient to defeat the motion for dismissal at the close of his case.
The commissioner's motion to dismiss the petition was made pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) (2012), which provides:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence, the defendant ... may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by the court without a jury, the court as trier of the fact may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52.01.
This rule operates differently depending on whether the judicial appeal panel is considering a petition for transfer or for discharge.
Typically, when a rule 41.02(b) motion is made at a bench trial, the district court is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and is allowed to judge the credibility of witnesses when making its findings of fact. Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 489–90 (Minn.2013) (citing State ex rel. Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 109, 63 N.W.2d 278, 283 (1954) ). But the supreme court has held that rule 41.02(b) motions to dismiss discharge petitions cannot be considered by the judicial appeal panel under this standard. Id. at 490. “Allowing the fact-finder to weigh the evidence” and make credibility assessments “effectively elevates the burden imposed on the committed person” beyond the required burden of production, and this “conflict” between rule 41.02(b) and the commitment statutes “renders the rule inapplicable.” Id. (quotation omitted). The judicial appeal panel therefore is required to “view the evidence ... in a light most favorable to the committed person” when a rule 41.02(b) motion is made to dismiss a petition for discharge. Id. at 491. This procedure is analogous to a directed verdict motion, and we, therefore, recently held that appellate review of a dismissal of a petition for discharge or provisional discharge under rule 41.02(b) is de novo. See Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Minn.App.2014).
But, unlike a discharge petition, a petition for transfer imposes the burdens of production and persuasion on the petitioner at the hearing before the judicial appeal panel. See Minn.Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(e) ().4 Because the petition for transfer imposed the burden of persuasion on appellant, there is no “conflict” between the commitment statute and rule 41.02(b) ; thus, the reasoning of Coker v. Jesson is inapplicable to his transfer petition. Therefore, because the judicial appeal panel sat as trier of fact and rendered judgment against appellant in written findings, as would a district court in a rule 41.02(b) determination during a court trial, the findings of the judicial appeal panel concerning a petition for transfer are properly reviewed for clear error. See Bollenbach, 241 Minn. at 109, 63 N.W.2d at 283 ; see also Rydberg v. Goodno, 689 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Minn.App.2004) ().
In evaluating whether a petitioner has demonstrated the appropriateness of transfer by a preponderance of the evidence, “[t]he panel must address the statutory factors.” Piotter v. Steffen, 490 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1992). Those factors are:
Minn.Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(1)-(5).
Here, the state of the record evidence at the close of appellant's case-in-chief would be insufficient even if appellant had only the burden of production. Dr. Reitman's testimony, considered in its entirety, supported neither discharge nor transfer. Dr. Reitman opined that, until appellant successfully completes the full-disclosure polygraph, appellant is not an appropriate candidate for transfer. But appellant also had the burden of persuasion. And appellant's counsel, while suggesting in response to the rule 41.02(b) motion that the case could be continued to secure the polygraph, never formally requested a continuance. The judicial appeal panel then considered the statutory factors and found appellant unsuitable for transfer. In light of Dr. Reitman's testimony, “the record as a whole sustains [the panel's] findings.” See Rydberg, 689 N.W.2d at 313. The record supports no other conclusion. The judicial appeal panel did not err in dismissing appellant's petition for transfer under rule 41.02(b).
Appellant also argues that he met his burden of production on the issue of discharge at the first-phase hearing through the testimony and report of Dr. Reitman. Appellant's argument on this issue is truncated. And the record contains no evidence at all supporting the ...
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...committed person. [Appellate courts] therefore review the [CAP's] dismissal of the petition for discharge de novo.Foster v. Jesson, 857 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014) (citation and quotations omitted). Also, this court has rejected the idea that, "by themselves, conclusory assertions by ......
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