Foster v. Maynard

• Decision Date: 11 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 48683,48683
• Citation: 565 P.2d 285,222 Kan. 506
• Parties: Jimmie Frank FOSTER, Franklin R. Yurk, William L. Breier, Delbert E. Highman, Appellants, v. Raymond D. MAYNARD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 285

565 P.2d 285

222 Kan. 506

Jimmie Frank FOSTER, Franklin R. Yurk, William L. Breier Delbert E. Highman, Appellants, v. Raymond D. MAYNARD et al., Appellees.

No. 48683.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

June 11, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prison officials are vested with wide discretion in the discharge of their duties. Their decisions concerning matters of internal management and operation of a state penitentiary will not be disturbed unless clearly arbitrary or shocking to the conscience.

2. The classification of prisoners in regard to housing and job assignments is necessary to the proper administration of a state prison and rests within the sound discretion of the prison administrator.

3. Habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for presenting a prisoner's claim seeking monetary relief.

4. The provisions of K.S.A.1975 Supp. 75-5211 give the Secretary of Corrections discretion to provide employment opportunities "for all inmates capable of benefiting therefrom" and accord with the legislative intent to leave the internal management and operation of the state correctional system to the sound discretion of the Secretary.

5. In a civil appeal brought pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501, the record is examined, and, as more fully set forth in the opinion, it is held that the district court did not err: (1) in finding the confinement of the appellants did not amount to a violation of due process or equal protection of the law; (2) in ruling that a habeas corpus action is not a proper proceeding to raise the issue of crediting the appellants' accounts with forced savings; and (3) in not ordering employment opportunities be provided the appellants in accordance with K.S.A.1975 Supp. 75-5211.

Daniel J. Carroll of Murray & Tillotson, Chartered, Leavenworth, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellants.

Roger M. Theis, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., and Kenneth D. Doyle, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief, for appellees.

FATZER, Chief Justice:

This is an appeal from the denial of relief sought under a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501. Petitioners-appellants are inmates at Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing. On February 23, 1976, the appellants filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501, in the district court of Leavenworth County, alleging the deprivation of various constitutional and statutory rights and privileges while being confined in protective custody status in the Adjustment and Treatment (A and T) Building. Both sides presented evidence at a hearing held in the district court on March 11, 1976. On March 25, 1976, the district court rendered a memorandum opinion denying the appellants' prayers for relief and dissolving the writ of habeas corpus. Notice of appeal from that decision was timely filed, and this appeal followed.

The appellants are on protective custody status at their own request. Protective custody inmates are segregated from the general prison population. They are housed in the A and T Building which is designed to protect the occupants. The building has three wings. The north wing is occupied entirely by inmates on protective custody status. The south wing is occupied by inmates on administrative segregation status awaiting hearings for institutional violations. The east wing is occupied by inmates on disciplinary segregation status who are serving "jail time" as a result of convictions of institutional rule violations. Some inmates on protective custody status, including the appellants, are also on the east wing.

The crux of the appellants' position is that they are not receiving the same treatment as other protective custody inmates who are housed on the north wing. In their petition below, the appellants alleged they are denied many privileges which protective custody inmates on the north wing are allowed: the right to attend church, the privilege of listening to the radio, the privilege of earning money through institutional employment, adequate light to read by, the use of typewriters, and the privilege of having the same amount of exercise each day. The appellants further alleged they are allowed to spend less money per month in the canteen than are protective custody inmates on the north wing.

The evidence showed there are approximately forty protective custody inmates. There are twenty-one one-man cells and six four-man cells on the north wing. Because of past assault problems, only one man is housed in the larger cells. North wing inmates work in the prison laundry which is run entirely by protective custody inmates in the A and T Building. It is the only available job for protective custody inmates. There are from twenty-three to twenty-eight job positions in the laundry. It is an important prison function, and selection of workers is done with care. Two of the appellants had previously worked in the laundry and had proved to be unsatisfactory workers because of their belligerent attitudes. The decision to place inmates on the east wing is based in part on past behavior. Satisfactory workers are kept on the north wing. Protective custody inmates are not placed on the east wing for disciplinary reasons. Inmates from the north and east wings are not allowed to mix. Commingling has resulted in past problems. They have different exercise periods and do not attend church together, but protective custody inmates on the east wing do have an exercise period and they may have religious leaders visit them. The evidence further showed there was no difference in lighting or in the amount of money protective custody inmates could spend in the canteen.

The district court concluded the evidence failed to establish the imprisonment of the appellants in the east wing of the A and T Building was illegal and a violation of due process or that it amounted to a violation of their right to equal protection of the law.

The appellants' first point on appeal is that their confinement in the east wing of the A and T Building is illegal. They contend they have suffered a loss of institutional privileges without being accorded a prior hearing in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.

The appellants' due process contention appears to be predicated on the view that retraction of their privileges occurred as a disciplinary measure imposed upon them by prison officials. However, the evidence showed that the decision to house prisoners on the east wing was merely an administrative classification decision made in the day-to-day operation and management of the penitentiary. The decision concerning the appellants' housing was made by their unit team. The unit team determined the appellants' aggressive attitude toward institutional staff and other inmates and their unsatisfactory history of institutional employment necessitated their being housed on the east wing. This administrative classification decision allowed the most efficient inmate workers to work in the laundry and removed a potentially disruptive influence upon the remaining protective custody population. The decision was not imposed for disciplinary purposes and did not result in a reduction of privileges. The district court found that there was no significant difference in institutional privileges for inmates in protective custody status on the east and north wings.

In Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265, this court recognized that prison officials are vested with wide discretion in the discharge of their duties and that their decisions concerning matters of internal management and operation of a state penitentiary will not be disturbed unless clearly arbitrary or shocking to the conscience. See Breier v. Raines,221 Kan. 439, 559 P.2d 813; Morris v. Raines, 220 Kan. 86, 551 P.2d 838.

These decisions are reinforced by the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451. There a state prisoner brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 contending his transfer from one state prison to another with conditions of confinement considerably more severe without a prior hearing violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stated:

". . . We reject at the outset the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. . . . (T)he determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.

"Similarly, we cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause by its own force forbids the State from convicting any person of crime and depriving him of his liberty without complying fully with the requirements of the Clause. But given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution." 427 U.S. at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2538.

"A prisoner's behavior may precipitate a transfer; and absent such behavior, perhaps transfer would not take place at all. But, as we have said, Massachusetts prison officials have the discretion to transfer prisoners for any number of reasons.

"Holding that arrangements like this are within reach of the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would place the Clause astride the day-to-day functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges." 427 U.S. at 228-29, 96 S.Ct. at 2540.

The broad discretion of prison administrators concerning the housing of inmates in...