Foster v. Peterson
Decision Date | 17 September 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 21842,21842 |
Citation | 600 P.2d 490,42 Or.App. 249 |
Parties | William A. FOSTER, Jr., dba Century 21, Mr. Real Estate, Appellant, v. Dwayne E. PETERSON, Respondent. ; CA 12449. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Vernon W. Robinson, Bend, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Paul R. Unger, Redmond, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Bryant, Erickson, Jaqua & Bischof, Redmond.
Before SCHWAB, C. J., TANZER, RICHARDSON and ROBERTS, JJ., and PETERSON, J. Pro Tem.
Plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker, brought this action to recover a broker's fee allegedly owing under an exclusive listing agreement covering the period July 23, 1976, through January 24, 1977. The listing price was $89,950, and defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 10% Of the selling price as a commission for his services. The agreement contained this clause:
Plaintiff established a file, advertised the property, listed the property with a multiple listing service, and presented a prospective purchaser whose offer was too low to interest defendant. During November, 1976, defendant sold the property on his own to a third party for the sum of $81,000. Plaintiff's complaint demanded payment of $8,995 as a commission.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that defendant had breached the employment contract by selling the tavern during the period of exclusive listing. However, the trial court refused to enforce the provision for payment of a full commission on sale by defendant because the court viewed it as a penalty rather than a valid liquidated damages provision, citing Wright v. Schutt Construction, 262 Or. 619, 500 P.2d 1045 (1972). The trial court awarded plaintiff judgment against defendant in the sum of $338, apparently as compensation for the amounts plaintiff actually expended in attempting to sell the property, and costs and disbursements.
Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred in holding the stipulated sum to be a penalty rather than a valid liquidated damages provision. Plaintiff relies primarily on Dean Vincent v. Chef Joe's, 273 Or. 814, 541 P.2d 469 (1975).
In Wright v. Schutt Construction, supra, plaintiff broker had an exclusive listing agreement to sell the property in question at a price which would net defendant owner $200,000. Plaintiff was to receive a 10% Commission. The agreement provided that if the owner withdrew the authority to sell during the term of the contract the owner would pay plaintiff the same commission plaintiff was to receive if he sold the property. Defendant terminated the agreement prior to its expiration date. Plaintiff's complaint requested payment of $20,000 as a commission. The trial court held that plaintiff could not recover the stipulated commission because plaintiff did not prove that he would have been able to sell the property for the asking price so as to earn his commission, and, therefore, use of the prospective commission as a measure of damages was speculative. The trial court awarded nominal damages because of the breach of the agreement.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the provision for payment of a full commission constituted a penalty. The Supreme Court cited 1 Restatement 552, Contracts § 339(1) as the rule which must be met before a contract provision will amount to a valid and enforceable provision for liquidated damages. That section states:
Applying these rules to the facts of the case before it, the court concluded that the trial judge did not err in finding that the payment of a commission of 10% Of a purchase price of $200,000 net to defendant was not a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused by the breach because there was evidence (1) that the property was priced too high for the market and that no prospective purchaser had come forward offering anything near the asking price, and (2) that in all probability plaintiff would have suffered no damages in any amount from the wrongful termination of the listing agreement since he could never have made the required sale. Id. at 631, 632, 500 P.2d 1045.
Wright v. Schutt Construction, supra, must be read in light of a later decision, Dean Vincent v. Chef Joe's, supra. In Chef Joe's defendant had entered into a 90-day exclusive listing agreement with plaintiff on May 15 which contained similar provisions to these in the case at bar. Defendant set $110,000 as the minimum acceptable price and promised plaintiff a commission of $10,000. Plaintiff advertised and made other attempts to make a sale. On June 21 defendant entered into an earnest money agreement with a buyer procured by another broker in which defendant agreed to sell for $125,000. After the 90-day period had expired, defendant entered into a contract of sale with the other party pursuant to the earnest money agreement. Defendant paid the second broker a commission of $12,500. Plaintiff sued for its commission and prevailed in the trial court. Defendant appealed, contending that the clause requiring defendant to pay plaintiff its commission if the property sold during the exclusive period constituted a penalty under Wright v. Schutt Construction, supra.
The Supreme Court rejected defendant's reading of Wright, noting that it had expressly held there that such provisions for commissions were not necessarily under all circumstances unenforceable as penalties. 273 Or. at 819, 541 P.2d 469. The court interpreted Wright to mean that the provision there was unenforceable because the chances were nonexistent that plaintiff would have sold the property for a net of $200,000 for the owner, that such a price was unreasonable. (Id. at 820, 541 P.2d 469), and that the provision for payment of a commission based upon a net sales price of $200,000 was not a genuine pre-estimate of the injury or a sum that was fixed as the equivalent of the injury which would probably be caused by the breach of contract. Id.
The court concluded that the evidence supported the conclusion that the provision for the payment of the commission was not a penalty. 273 Or. at 820, 541 P.2d 469.
The facts of this case more closely resemble those present in Dean Vincent v. Chef Joe's, supra, than Wright v. Schutt Construction, supra. The event precipitating the action was a sale of the property, not a mere withdrawal of authority to sell. The sale occurred during the listing period. The agreement set the commission at 10% Of a sale price of $89,950. Defendant found a purchaser at $81,000. Since defendant was able to find a buyer at a price substantially equivalent to the list price in the agreement, the record shows that the property was not overpriced and prospective buyers were available. Plaintiff's chances of finding a satisfactory buyer cannot be described as speculative or remote.
In light of Wright v. Schutt Construction, 262 Or. 619, 500 P.2d 1045 (1972); Dean Vincent v. Chef Joe's, supra; Dean Vincent v. McDonough, 281 Or. 239, 574 P.2d 1096 (1978); and Layton Manufacturing v. Dulien Steel, 277 Or. 343, 560 P.2d 1058 (1977), this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A brief analysis of these four cases is appropriate.
Wright v. Schutt.
This case was tried to the court, without a jury. The trial court "held that the provision for payment of a full commission on withdrawal of authority to sell was a penalty and refused to enforce it * * *." 262 Or. at 621, 500 P.2d at 1046. In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court held "that under the facts of this case this contract provision was a penalty." 262 Or. at 633, 500 P.2d at 1051.
Dean Vincent v. Chef Joe's.
In this case, the trial court was also the trier of fact. In affirming the ruling of the lower court, which enforced the liquidated damage clause, the Supreme Court opined (273 Or. at 820, 541 P.2d at 472):
(Emphasis added.)
Layton Manufacturing v. Dulien Steel.
In this case, the plaintiff sought liquidated damages. The defendant affirmatively alleged that the liquidated damage provision was unenforceable as a penalty.
The Supreme Court held (277 Or. at 346, 560 P.2d at 1060):
" * * * Whether a contract provision is essentially designed to operate as a penalty Is a question of law to be decided by the...
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