Foster v. Powell
| Decision Date | 11 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 7:20-3252-TMC-MHC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Robert Lee Foster, Plaintiff, v. Larry W. Powell, Tony Fisher, J. L. Hall, Bradford James, Daniel K. Swad, Ashley C. Harris, Spartanburg County Jail, Spartanburg City Police Department, Spartanburg Sheriff's Department, Chuck Wright, Attorney General Alan Wilson, and State of South Carolina, Defendants. |
This a civil action filed by a state prisoner. In the event a limitations issue arises, Plaintiff shall have the benefit of the holding in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
However, even when considered under this less stringent standard, for the reasons set forth below, the Complaint submitted in this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ().
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Trenton Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). He challenges his criminal conviction, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights as to the conviction. Plaintiff also asserts that his max-out or release date has been calculated incorrectly. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4-8. Additionally, Plaintiff claims he is subjected to human slavery, human trafficking, and exposure to the COVID-19 virus by remaining incarcerated. Id. at 5. Plaintiff appears to be asking to be released from prison. Id. at 6.
Records from the Spartanburg County Circuit Court and the SCDC indicate that Plaintiff was convicted (on May 20, 2008) on an October 3, 2007 charge of manufacture/distribute cocaine base, 3rd offense and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, http://publicindex sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/CaDetails.aspx?CourtAgency=42001&Casenum=2008GS4202261&CaseType=C (last visited Mar. 25, 2015); http://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ [Search Inmate "Robert Foster"] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).1
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has previously unsuccessfully tried to raise many of the issues he again tries to raise here. In Foster v. Powers, No. 3:08-25-PMD (D.S.C.), Plaintiff brought claims, including for false arrest and improper search pertaining to the 2008 conviction for manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine, against some of the Defendants listed in this case (Defendants Powers,2 Fisher, Hall, Swad, and James). Summary judgment was granted to the defendants. In Foster v. Cole, No. 3:09-452-PMD, Plaintiff brought claims pertaining to his 2008 conviction for manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine against some of the Defendants listed in this case (Defendants Swad, Hall, James, and Harris), which were dismissed as frivolous and vexatious as Plaintiff had previously brought the same claims. In Foster v. Powers, No. 9:15-1611-TMC, Plaintiff again brought claims concerning his 2008 conviction against some of the Defendants listed in this case (Defendants Power, Fisher, Hall, James, and Swad) that were summarily dismissed. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring the same claims here that were previously asserted in his other lawsuits, these duplicate claims are frivolous and are subject to dismissal on that basis. See Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (); Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.1992)("[D]istrict courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party."). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, such duplicative claims should be summarily dismissed. See Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) ( ).
Even if the allegations asserted in this case are not duplicative, this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the named Defendants. Although Plaintiff lists the names of the Defendants in the caption of his Complaint, his pleadings fail to provide any specific facts to support a claim that these named Defendants violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (). Although the "liberal pleading requirements" of Rule 8(a) only require a "short and plain" statement of the claim, a plaintiff must "offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) ().
Additionally, this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not asserted a viable claim for relief. He writes:
I am requesting to be relief since the court clock stamp, and date Aug 27, 2020, which clarified that the Plaintiff has no charge "or" conviction to actual be imprison serving 20 yrs 85%.
ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff appears to request that his charges be dismissed or that he be released from prison, However, release from prison is not is a remedy that is not available in a § 1983 action.3 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973)(attacking the length of duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
Even if Plaintiff were to amend his Complaint to request monetary damages based on his arrest, the prosecution of his criminal charge, and/or his imprisonment, his claims are subject to summary dismissal based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, where the Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487.4
Plaintiff submitted a copy of a letter from the Office of the Solicitor's Pre-Trial intervention Programs and Expungements for the State of South Carolina in which it is stated that certain information on Plaintiff's South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) background record may be eligible for an expungement from the public record. Listed is a 10/04/2007 charge for trafficking ice (methamphetamine) for which it was noted it was "non conviction - NO CHARGE." ECF No. 1-1 at 3. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the 2008 conviction and sentence for manufacturing and distributing cocaine base, for which he is currently incarcerated, has been expunged. Additionally, as noted above, any challenge to a conviction and sentence cannot be brought in a § 1983 action.
Plaintiff also appears to be attempting to challenge his "max-out" or prison release date. ECF No. 1 at 5. However, this also is a request for release from prison which cannot be brought in this § 1983 action. Instead, the available federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which can be filed only after Plaintiff has exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1971); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91(1973) ().
To continue reading
Request your trial