Foster v. Quigley
| Decision Date | 04 April 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 10338,10338 |
| Citation | 179 A.2d 494,94 R.I. 217 |
| Parties | Frederick W. FOSTER v. Katherine R. QUIGLEY. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Pontarelli & Berberian, Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for plaintiff.
Raymond J. McMahon, Jr., Providence, for defendant.
This is an action of trespass on the case which was tried before a justice of the superior court without a jury who rendered a decision for the plaintiff but refused to add to the damages interest from the date of the writ. The case is here on the plaintiff's bill of exceptions to the decision solely because of such refusal.
The plaintiff commenced his action on May 1, 1951 in the district court of the sixth judicial district and received a favorable decision. After such decision defendant appealed to the superior court where on June 13, 1952 a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Thereafter defendant moved for a new trial which was granted. However, it was not held until October 3, 1961. In the meantime on September 1, 1958, P.L.1958, chap. 126, now G.L.1956, § 9-21-10, became effective and provides:
'In causes of action and actions of trespass and trespass on the case for damages to the person or to real and personal estate in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the court to the amount of damages, interest thereon from the date of the writ which shall be included in the judgment entered therein.'
The plaintiff contends that the statute is intended to apply to any judgment entered upon a decision made or a verdict rendered after its enactment regardless of the date of the commencement of the action. The defendant argues that it is intended to operate only on actions that have been commenced since its enactment. To construe it otherwise, she claims, is to give it a retrospective operation contrary to the general rule that a statute is presumed to operate only prospectively unless a contrary intent is expressed or necessarily implied therein. The plaintiff concedes that such is the rule but contends that his construction of the statute does not violate it.
We have recognized and applied that rule in appropriate cases. See State v. Hillman, 84 R.I. 396, 125 A.2d 94; Capobianco v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 78 R.I. 309, 82 A.2d 170. But the primary question for us to determine here is whether the instant case is an appropriate one for its application. Admittedly it would be if defendant's construction of the statute is correct. However, we are of the opinion that it is not. We think the language of the statute clearly indicates that the legislature was concerned solely with the time when the damages were ascertained by decision or verdict and not at all with reference to the commencement of the action.
Interest on a judgment in an action of trespass or trespass on the case for damages to person or property is not of the substance of the right of action but exclusively an incident attached thereto by legislative fiat after such right has been adjudicated. The period for computation of such interest is the same catogory. It is in essence analogous to costs concerning which it is said that 'a statute establishing costs and fixing court fees applies to pending cases equally with those arising after its enactment,...
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Gott v. Norberg
...trial court's conclusions concerning what occurred at the agency level. Until today interest was a statutory creature. Foster v. Quigley, 94 R.I. 217, 179 A.2d 494 (1962); St. Germain v. Lapp, 72 R.I. 42, 48 A.2d 181 (1946). Today, the majority in a masterful display of judicial inventivene......
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Busik v. Levine
...the usual rule that statutes operate prospectively. Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230 (Sup.Ct. 1959); Foster v. Quigley, 94 R.I. 217, 179 A.2d 494 (Sup.Ct. 1962); Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I. 366, 187 A.2d 262 (Sup.Ct. 1963); Ballog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich.......
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Fleming v. Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma, 54711
...application of the interest rate. 6 Benson adopted the rationale expressed in the leading postjudgment interest case, Foster v. Quigley, 179 A.2d 494-95 (R.I.1962), 7 that interest on a judgment in an action for damages to person or property is not of the substance of the right of action bu......
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Holmes v. Bateson, Civ. A. No. 5116.
...earlier versions of Rhode Island's prejudgment interest statute are in my opinion dispositive of that issue. In Foster v. Quigley, 94 R.I. 217, 179 A.2d 494 (1962) the Supreme Court directed that interest be calculated from the date of the commencement of said action pursuant to a statutory......