Foster v. Roadtec, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No.: 1:18-CV-270-TAV-CHS,: 1:18-CV-270-TAV-CHS |
| Parties | MATT FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. ROADTEC, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
This civil case is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 19]. Defendant moves the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor on plaintiff's interference and retaliation claims under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Plaintiff has responded in opposition [Doc. 21], and defendant has replied [Doc. 22]. Defendant has also filed a notice of supplemental authority in support of its motion for summary judgment [Doc. 33]. The motion is thus fully briefed and ripe for resolution. Because plaintiff fails to provide evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's reasons for including plaintiff in the RIF were pretextual, defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 19] will be GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED.
Defendant Roadtec, Inc. is a Chattanooga-based manufacturer of roadbuilding and asphalt-paving equipment [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 3]. Defendant's production line is divided into "Cells:" the Buggy Cell, the Mill Cell, the Paver Cell, and the Stabilizer Cell [Id., ¶ 4]. In September 2016, defendant hired plaintiff Matt Foster as a full time "Metal Prep I" in its Stabilizer Cell [Id., ¶ 5; Doc. 19-4, ¶ 3], the department of defendant's production line responsible for manufacturing soil stabilizers and road reclaimers [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 4]. Plaintiff states that he was initially hired as a Metal Prep I in the Buggy Cell but, at his request, was later transferred to the Stabilizer Cell [Doc. 21-3 p. 104]. In the Cells, there are three tiers of Metal Preps [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 7]. According to defendant, a Metal Prep I, whose responsibilities include "operating the brake press and assisting with layout" [Id., ¶ 6], can advance to a Metal Prep II, and then to a Metal Prep III (the highest designation) "by expanding his skill set and completing training on other work stations within a cell" [Id., ¶ 7]. A Metal Prep III in the Stabilizer Cell can perform the tasks of a Metal Prep I in addition to operating three other stations without supervision [Id.]. However, according to plaintiff, these are, in large part, distinctions without difference: A higher designation results in a higher pay [Doc. 21-3, p. 101], but one's designation is more an indication of workplace politics than an employee's skill set or the number of machines he or she is capable of operating [Id. at 102, 109-10]. Plaintiff also contends that there is no distinction between Metal Preps from one Cell to another [Id. at 108-09].
In April 2018, following the birth of his daughter, plaintiff requested, was approved for, and took continuous FMLA leave for just under three (3) weeks [Doc. 19-4, ¶ 5]. On June 26, 2018, plaintiff's wife, Chastity Foster, was severely injured in an automobile accident [Doc. 21-1, ¶ 2]. Immediately after the accident, plaintiff took continuous FMLAleave to care for his wife and their daughter [Id., ¶ 3]. These two periods of continuous FMLA leave are not the subject of this lawsuit [Doc. 21-3, pp. 16-17].
Plaintiff returned to work on August 13, 2018 [Doc. 21-3, p. 16]. He alleges that he explained to his supervisors and defendant's human resources department that he "would have to take off occasionally to care for Chastity" as "[s]he had an additional surgery scheduled on August 29, 2018" [Doc. 21-1, ¶ 5]. According to plaintiff, because his future absences would be intermittent, as opposed to continuous, he "was instructed to make [his] supervisors aware through a calendar or log and they would record the FMLA" [Id.; see also Doc. 21-3, p. 27]. Plaintiff recalls that he was absent eight (8) to nine (9) days, including September 24, 2018, after returning to work in August 2018 [Doc. 21-1, ¶ 5]. And he claims that he "always" followed this procedure when taking this intermittent FMLA leave [Id.], specifically by providing his supervisor, Ray Mitchell, with an "FMLA calendar" that identified those eight (8) to nine (9) days after August 13, 2018, when plaintiff took intermittent FMLA leave [Doc. 23-1, pp. 18, 24].
Defendant reports, however, that its human resources department has no record of these absences [Doc. 19-4, ¶ 9]. Defendant's director of human resources, Deborah Bowman, testified that she asked Mr. Mitchell if he had plaintiff's FMLA calendar and that Mr. Mitchell "said it was never given to him" [Doc. 21-5, p. 9]. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Mitchell, who, if he was in receipt of plaintiff's FMLA calendar, was obligated to submit it to human resources [Id. at 8], must have "thr[own] it away" [Doc. 23-3, p. 28] instead of giving it to human resources. Ultimately, because his FMLA calendar was nottendered to defendant's human resources department, plaintiff's intermittent absences were not designated as FMLA leave [Doc. 21-5, p. 8]. Plaintiff did not, however, receive any warnings or discipline for unexcused absences between August 13, 2018, and October 9, 2018 [Doc 21-3, pp. 57-62]. Nor did he accrue any "points" under defendant's attendance policy [Id.], which provided that employees would be assigned points for certain unexcused absences and, after accruing a certain number of points, an employee would be terminated [Id. at 58-59; Doc. 19-4, ¶¶ 14-15].
In September 2018, in light of, among other factors, an accumulation of an "excessive amount of unsold inventory" [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 9], defendant's management determined that a reduction in force ("RIF") would be necessary [Id., ¶ 8]. To determine the necessary extent of the RIF, defendant's management prepared a 12 to 18 month sales forecast [Id., ¶ 10]. Based on this forecast, and considering defendant's unsold inventory, defendant's Vice President of Operations, Timothy Lewis, estimated how many new products would need to be manufactured in each Cell to meet the forecasted demand [Id.]. Mr. Lewis then determined how many hours, broken down by job title and Cell, would be necessary to complete the production schedule [Id., ¶¶ 11, 13].
Defendant's human resources department compiled a list of names, job titles, and years of service of those employees that were to be considered for the RIF (i.e., all "Manufacturers Road shop employees") and submitted it to Mr. Lewis [Doc. 19-4, ¶ 17; Doc. 21-5, p. 17]. Mr. Lewis states that he selected employees from this list for inclusion in the RIF based on the following criteria: (1) job title, (2) skill set, and (3) seniority[Doc. 19-1, ¶ 12]. Specifically, having deduced how many employees with a particular job title in a particular Cell were needed to complete the scheduled production, Mr. Lewis designated specific employees for inclusion in the RIF by ranking the employees by skill set and seniority, giving preference to employees with the most comprehensive skill sets and the most seniority (e.g., "a Fitter/Welder III with eleven years of experience would be given preference over a Fitter/Welder I with only two years of experience") [Id., ¶ 13]. Based on this criteria, Mr. Lewis designated specific employees, including plaintiff, for inclusion in the RIF [Id., ¶ 18].
Notably, the criteria used to select employees for inclusion in the RIF departed in respects from the RIF policy in defendant's employee manual [Doc. 19-7]. The manual provides:
[Id. at 4 (emphasis added)]. Specifically, length of service or seniority was the core criteria in Mr. Lewis's determination [see id.; Doc. 19-1, ¶ 13]. Additionally, according to Mr. Lewis and Ms. Bowman, attendance was not considered in designating employees for the RIF [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 16; Doc. 19-4, ¶¶ 21-22].
The list of the employees designated for inclusion in the RIF by Mr. Lewis was tendered to Ms. Bowman for her review "with an eye toward any HR-related issues of concern" as well as legal counsel [Doc. 19-4, ¶ 18; see also Doc. 19-1, ¶ 14]. On October 4, 2018, Ms. Bowman emailed Mr. Lewis stating that plaintiff's inclusion in the RIF gave her "heartburn" due to his FMLA leave [Doc. 19-6, p. 2]. But ultimately, she concluded that his inclusion in the RIF "follows the same logic as the others (newest in job title by cell)" and did not recommend that plaintiff be removed from the RIF [Id.].
Mr. Lewis attests that, along with attendance generally, he did not consider FMLA leave in designating employees for the RIF [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 16]. Indeed, he states that when he compiled the list of employees to be included in the RIF, he did not have any knowledge or information regarding any employee's FMLA leave [Id., ¶ 18] and he did not know that plaintiff in particular had taken FMLA leave until Ms. Bowman informed him in her October 4, 2018 email [Doc. 19-6].
On October 9, 2018, defendant announced the RIF [Doc. 19-1, ¶ 15; Doc. 21-1, ¶ 7]. Thirty-eight (38) employees were included in the RIF, twenty-nine (29) of whom worked in the production Cells [Id.]. Out of the twenty-five (25) employees working in the Stabilizer Cell, seven (7)—twenty-eight percent (28%)—were included in the RIF [Doc. 19-1, ¶¶ 15, 20]. Four (4) of those seven (7) were Metal Prep Is. Indeed, only two(2) Metal Preps in the Stabilizer Cell were not included in the RIF, both of whom were Metal Prep IIIs [Doc. 19-4, ¶¶ 25-26].1
According to plaintiff, Mr. Lewis reported to those included in the RIF that "the criteria was 'needs based'...
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