Foster v. Stanek
Docket Number | 18-2552-DDC-KGG |
Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
Parties | NYLA FOSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JANET STANEK, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Sometimes parties agree to settle a dispute and ask the court to enter a mutually-agreeable consent judgment manifesting their settlement. But, when a consent judgment remains in force for years, circumstances can change. Recognizing that possibility, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to ask for relief from a judgment-including a consent judgment-if applying the judgment “prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5).
Plaintiffs Nyla Foster, Luc Bensimon, Jessica Hicklin, C.K., and the Kansas Statewide Transgender Education Project[1] filed this lawsuit in 2018. They alleged that defendants[2] had violated their constitutional rights by categorically barring transgender Kansans from acquiring birth certificates listing their true sex, consistent with their gender identity. In 2019, defendants agreed to remedy the violation alleged by plaintiffs, and the parties jointly asked the court to enter a Consent Judgment encompassing their agreement. The court adopted the jointly proposed Consent Judgment, which required defendants to provide transgender Kansans with birth certificates these Kansans viewed as accurate.
Now defendants ask the court for relief from that Consent Judgment. They base their request on a new Kansas law-Senate Bill 180. SB 180, effective July 1, 2023, requires all Kansas birth certificates to identify a person's sex as the one assigned to the person at birth. Invoking Fed.R.Civ.P 60(b)(5), defendants have filed a motion seeking relief from the 2019 Consent Judgment because SB 180 conflicts with it. The court agrees that defendants have invoked Rule 60(b)(5) properly and, as explained below, grants their Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 36).
On October 15, 2018, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against several state officials. They challenged the state's birth certificate policy. See Doc. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that the “State of Kansas categorically bar[red] transgender people from obtaining birth certificates that reflect their true sex, consistent with their gender identity[.]” Id. at 3 (Compl. ¶ 5). At the time, they alleged that no “specific statute or regulation prohibit[ed] the correction of the gender marker on a birth certificate in order to accurately reflect the sex of a transgender person.” Id. at 14 (Compl. ¶ 63). Plaintiffs claimed that the state's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, violated its Due Process Clause by infringing on substantive rights to privacy, autonomy, and liberty, and violated the First Amendment by impermissibly compelling speech. Doc. 1 at 34-41 (Compl. ¶¶ 173-214).
On June 21, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment. Doc. 31. As an exhibit in support of their motion, the parties submitted a Proposed Consent Judgment. Doc. 32. Acting on the parties' joint request, the court adopted the parties' Proposed Consent Judgment and entered it that same day. Doc. 33. In relevant part, it provides:
Doc. 33 at 2-4. Now, four years later, defendants ask the court to revisit its Consent Judgment.
On June 23, 2023, the Attorney General of Kansas entered his appearance on defendants' behalf and filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). Doc. 36. Defendants' filings argue that circumstances have changed in unanticipated fashion since the court entered the Consent Judgment. Doc. 37 at 1. Specifically, they report that the Kansas legislature passed SB 180-and this new statute that, according to defendants, “fundamentally changes the circumstances under which the consent judgment was issued.” Id. at 2.
Id. at § 1(c) (emphasis added). Based on these provisions in SB 180, defendants argue they cannot comply with both the Consent Judgment and SB 180. Doc. 37 at 3.
Plaintiffs oppose defendants' motion. Doc. 40. Separately, Kansas Governor Laura Kelly has filed an amicus brief offering her own interpretation of SB 180. Doc. 39-1. And defendants have filed a Reply. Doc. 46. But, before the court can addresses the merits of the parties' dispute, it must address defendants' Motion to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. 45).
Defendants have asked to exceed the page limit adopted in our court's local rule, D. Kan. Rule 7.1(d)(3). For motions like the one at issue here, the rule establishes a five-page limit for reply briefs. D. Kan. Rule 7.1(d)(3). Defendants assert that they need 14 pages to respond to plaintiffs' Opposition (Doc. 40) and a 13-page Amicus Curiae Brief (Doc. 39-1), which the court, without opposition, permitted Governor Kelly to file. See Doc. 41 (granting Unopposed Motion to File). Plaintiffs haven't responded to defendants' Motion to Exceed.
While less than enthusiastic about the way defendants have chosen to present their request, the court nonetheless grants their motion.[3] Defendants' filing adequately explains their need for additional pages, and this case presents disputes of broad public interest. The court thus grants defendants' Motion to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. 45).
With that motion decided, the court now turns to the substance of the current dispute, beginning with the legal standard governing Rule 60 motions, generally, and Rule 60(b)(5) motions, specifically.
“A Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment is an extraordinary remedy and may be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2018). This rule “gives the court a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.” Compama de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 58 F.4th 429, 446 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
More specifically, defendants here invoke Rule 60(b)(5). “Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief from a judgment or order if ‘[1] the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; [2] it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or [3] applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.'” Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1192 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)). Defendants' current motion relies on the third...
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