Foster v. State, 71--370
Decision Date | 20 June 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71--370,71--370 |
Citation | 266 So.2d 97 |
Parties | Roger FOSTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carr & Emory, Miami, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Arnold R. Ginsberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C.J., and PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ.
On April 11, 1963, a United States Coast Guard vessel received a message from the motor vessel 'Dream Girl' that 'I have killed two people'. Upon further communication over the marine radio, the person in communication with the Coast Guard from the motor vessel 'Dream Girl' upon inquiry, announced that he had thrown the bodies overboard. The Coast Guard vessel proceeded to the 'Dream Girl'. Upon approaching, it found the appellant aboard; no other persons aboard; the 'Dream Girl' the scene of a violent struggle; one of the awnings torn; and blood splattered all over inside the cockpit. Whereupon the Coast Guard officials took the appellant aboard their vessel, took the 'Dream Girl' in tow, and proceeded to Key West, Florida, arriving there about 10:30 A.M., April 13, 1963, at which time they were met by Sheriff Brown of Monroe County and Deputy Sheriff L'Heureux, and the appellant was delivered to their custody. Before taking any statement from the appellant, he was advised by Sheriff Brown as follows:
'* * * I wish to question you in regards to the murders of Douglas Trevor and his son, Edward Trevor, but first, I want to advise you and caution you that you do not have to make any statements whatsoever, if by doing so, you will tend to incriminate yourself; however, if you are willing to make a statement concerning these offenses for which you are being held, you may request the presence of counsel on your behalf at this time, if you wish to do so, before I proceed further in this matter.
'A No, sir, I wish to continue.
'Q I also wish to warn you that if you do make any statements or admissions in connection with the matter we are investigating, such statements or admissions may be used against you at any time. I wish to emphasize that only statements you make must be made freely and voluntarily by you and that you may refuse to make any such statements or answer any questions which may incriminate or tend to incriminate you in connection with the offenses concerning which I desire to question you, nor need you make any statements or admissions in relation to any matter whatsoever that may tend to incriminate you. Do you fully understand everything that I have just stated to you and do you wish to continue at this time?
'A Yes, sir.'
Thereafter, in the presence of the Deputy Sheriff, the appellant reiterated to the Sheriff that he had killed two people aboard the vessel 'Dream Girl' and thrown the bodies overboard. He subsequently reenacted the crime aboard the 'Dream Girl' and pictures were taken depicting the reenactment.
After being indicted for first degree murder, the appellant entered a plea of insanity and, upon examination, was so adjudicated in the fall of 1963. Subsequently, in 1971, he was found competent and brought on for trial, which resulted in a conviction for second degree murder, and this appeal ensued. As points for reversal, the appellant urges that the trial court erred in permitting his oral confession to be admitted into evidence because of a failure to give the Miranda warnings (see: Jimenez v. State, Fla.App.1968, 208 So.2d 124; Woods v. State, Fla.App.1968, 211 So.2d 248; Craig v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So.2d 19; Abram v. State, Fla.App.1968, 216 So.2d 498; James v. State, Fla.App.1969, 223 So.2d 52); that the court erred in permitting pictures of the reenactment of the crime to be admitted in evidence because the appellant had not been adequately advised of his rights under Miranda; that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of his sanity to the jury when the evidence, as a matter of law, showed that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged; and, lastly, that the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial because of an emotional plea made by the wife of the deceased in the presence of the jury at the time of the trial.
As to the first point, we recognize that although the confession was made prior to the rendition of the Miranda decision, the trial having occurred after such decision, in measuring whether the oral statements and reenactment of the crime should have been permitted into evidence such introduction would be subject to the principles enunciated in Miranda. Glover v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So.2d 676; Ard v. State, Fla.App.1970, 233 So.2d 439; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. However, in this cause, it is aparent that the appellant voluntarily announced over the international marine radio that he had killed two people; he voluntarily announced over the same media of communication how he had disposed of the bodies. The initial statements made by the appellant were not made as a result of any custodial situation and we find, under the circumstances, that the Miranda requirements were not available to the appellant in the instant case because of the voluntary admissions made prior to his being taken into custody. 1
As to the issue of insanity, there were a number of experts produced who indicated that in their judgment the appellant was insance at the time of the commission of the crime. There was also lay testimony by officers and crew members aboard the Coast Guard vessel, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff that he appeared to be normal to them. This observation occurred shortly after the crime was committed. Of necessity, neither the experts nor the lay witnesses were present at the time of the commission of the act, and we do not find that the trial court committed any error by failing to rule, as a matter of law, upon the motion for directed verdict that the appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Acree v. State, 153 Fla. 561, 15 So.2d 262; Brock v. State, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 344; Norman v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 186; Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 24; Byrd v. State, Fla.App.196...
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