Foster v. State, S00A2054.
Citation | 544 S.E.2d 153,273 Ga. 555 |
Decision Date | 19 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. S00A2054.,S00A2054. |
Parties | FOSTER v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Almand & Wiggins, Bond H. Almand, Samuel G. Alderman, III, Macon, for appellant.
Alan R. Tawse, Jr., Solicitor, Arthur J. Creque, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
At trial, Foster stipulated that he was in violation of § 10-20, and he defended on the ground that the provision was unconstitutional. After upholding the constitutionality of the enactment, the trial court imposed a 12 month suspended sentence and a $130 fine. Foster appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence.
1. "`The power to regulate the keeping of dogs and to enforce such regulations by forfeitures, fines and penalties, is recognized as within the police power[.]'" Griggs v. Mayor and Council of Macon, 103 Ga. 602, 603, 30 S.E. 561 (1898). However, the exercise of that power through the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws is not without limitations. Criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State, they must be read according to the natural and obvious import of their language, and their operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 371(1), 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998).
Foster asserts that, when thus construed, § 10-20 of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. " Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81, 82, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000). The unambiguous provisions of § 10-20 provided Foster with notice that he was forbidden to have more than four dogs on his residential property unless and until he obtained a permit authorizing him to keep a larger number. However, nothing in the Ordinance establishes a standard by which the application for such a permit will be judged.
Due process requires that any licensing scheme enacted pursuant to the police power "provide sufficient objective criteria to control the discretion of the governing authority and adequate notice to applicants of the criteria for issuance of a license." [Cit.]
Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 693(6), 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997). Levendis v. Cobb County, 242 Ga. 592, 594(1), 250 S.E.2d 460 (1978). Thus, to overcome a vagueness challenge, the Ordinance must be ...
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...language, and its operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555-556(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001). Today, a majority of this Court violates this principle by giving a strained construction to the unambiguous terms o......
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...language, and its operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555, 556(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001). Applying that rule of statutory construction to avoid an absurd and unintended result, I would recognize that "issu......
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State v. Fielden, S06A0282.
...clarity.1 However, reading the statute according to the natural and obvious import of its language, see generally Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001), we conclude that OCGA § 16-11-34 provides a sufficiently definite warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of the pro......