Foster v. State, S00A2054.

Citation544 S.E.2d 153,273 Ga. 555
Decision Date19 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. S00A2054.,S00A2054.
PartiesFOSTER v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Almand & Wiggins, Bond H. Almand, Samuel G. Alderman, III, Macon, for appellant.

Alan R. Tawse, Jr., Solicitor, Arthur J. Creque, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.

CARLEY, Justice.

In April of 1999, the Houston County Animal Control Office (Office) issued a written warning to Charles K. Foster, informing him that he was in violation of a provision of the Houston County Animal Control Ordinance (Ordinance). The notice specified that, within 30 days, he should "[l]imit the number of dogs and/or cats at this residence to four or apply for a special permit to maintain more than four animals." He timely completed and submitted to the Office an official application for a permit, explaining that all of the 11 dogs on the premises were pets, and that he did not keep any of the dogs for any business purposes. When the Office denied the application for the special permit, Foster refused to comply with the Ordinance. Eventually, he was cited for violating § 10-20 of the Ordinance, which then provided, in relevant part, that

[i]t shall be unlawful for there to be more than four dogs and/or cats on any residential lot that is less than five acres in size, subject to the following exceptions: (1) Animal owners who have an approved permit issued by the animal control board shall be excepted from this section.

At trial, Foster stipulated that he was in violation of § 10-20, and he defended on the ground that the provision was unconstitutional. After upholding the constitutionality of the enactment, the trial court imposed a 12 month suspended sentence and a $130 fine. Foster appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence.

1. "`The power to regulate the keeping of dogs and to enforce such regulations by forfeitures, fines and penalties, is recognized as within the police power[.]'" Griggs v. Mayor and Council of Macon, 103 Ga. 602, 603, 30 S.E. 561 (1898). However, the exercise of that power through the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws is not without limitations. Criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State, they must be read according to the natural and obvious import of their language, and their operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 371(1), 499 S.E.2d 56 (1998).

Foster asserts that, when thus construed, § 10-20 of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. "`With regard to a vagueness challenge, there is a "greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." (Cit.)' [Cits.]" Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81, 82, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000). The unambiguous provisions of § 10-20 provided Foster with notice that he was forbidden to have more than four dogs on his residential property unless and until he obtained a permit authorizing him to keep a larger number. However, nothing in the Ordinance establishes a standard by which the application for such a permit will be judged.

Due process requires that any licensing scheme enacted pursuant to the police power "provide sufficient objective criteria to control the discretion of the governing authority and adequate notice to applicants of the criteria for issuance of a license." [Cit.]

Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 693(6), 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997). "Constitutional standards of due process do require that a governing body issuing licenses establish `ascertainable standards ... by which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify ... [.]' [Cit.]" Levendis v. Cobb County, 242 Ga. 592, 594(1), 250 S.E.2d 460 (1978). Thus, to overcome a vagueness challenge, the Ordinance must be "`drawn with sufficient specificity to apprise an applicant of common intelligence of the standards which he should anticipate the governing body will consider.' [Ci...

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12 cases
  • State v. Marlowe
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 17, 2003
    ...language, and its operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555-556(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001). Today, a majority of this Court violates this principle by giving a strained construction to the unambiguous terms o......
  • Wolfe v. State, S00A1620.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • March 19, 2001
  • Raber v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • March 23, 2009
    ...language, and its operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555, 556(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001). Applying that rule of statutory construction to avoid an absurd and unintended result, I would recognize that "issu......
  • State v. Fielden, S06A0282.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • April 25, 2006
    ...clarity.1 However, reading the statute according to the natural and obvious import of its language, see generally Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555(1), 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001), we conclude that OCGA § 16-11-34 provides a sufficiently definite warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of the pro......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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