Foster v. State

• Decision Date: 30 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. SC 91341.,SC 91341.
• Citation: 352 S.W.3d 357
• Parties: William Wentworth FOSTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

352 S.W.3d 357

William Wentworth FOSTER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. SC 91341.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Aug. 30, 2011.

[352 S.W.3d 358]

William Wentworth Foster, pro se.

Megan Fewell, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

William Foster filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act (MIRA), section 217.825 et seq.¹ could not be applied to require reimbursement from him for the cost of his incarceration because the criminal acts that resulted in his incarceration were committed prior to the law's enactment. The trial court dismissed Mr. Foster's petition. Because the facts alleged in Mr. Foster's petition are not developed sufficiently to give rise to a ripe controversy, he cannot maintain a declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court dismissing Mr. Foster's petition for declaratory judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1977, Mr. Foster was convicted of capital murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action. He presently is incarcerated in the department of corrections on sentences for those convictions. In 2009, department personnel informed Mr. Foster that any funds deposited by someone into his prison account to pay for college correspondence courses or an attorney would be subject to seizure by the state, pursuant to MIRA, to reimburse it for the cost of his incarceration. On receiving this information, Mr. Foster filed a pro se petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that any funds deposited into his prison account would not be subject to seizure by the state. His petition claimed that the application of MIRA to him violates provisions of the Missouri Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws or laws retrospective in operation because the act was passed after he committed the crimes that resulted in his incarceration.

Thereafter, the state filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Foster's petition for declaratory judgment. In its motion, the state first asserted that Mr. Foster's petition was premature and did not present a justiciable controversy. Additionally, the state claimed that applying MIRA to Mr. Foster would not operate as an ex post facto law because MIRA does not focus on past crimes and was not enacted as additional punishment.² After receiving Mr. Foster's response to the state's motion, the trial court entered its judgment dismissing his petition. In its judgment, the court ruled that no justiciable controversy existed because the state had not filed a MIRA action seeking reimbursement from Mr. Foster for the cost of his incarceration. Mr. Foster appeals.

On appeal, Mr. Foster raises three distinct issues. First, Mr. Foster claims that the trial court erred in finding that his petition for declaratory judgment did not present a justiciable controversy. Next, Mr. Foster asserts that applying MIRA to him violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because the act

[352 S.W.3d 359]

was passed after he committed the crimes that resulted in his incarceration. Alternatively, Mr. Foster contends that applying MIRA to him violates the state constitution's prohibition against laws that are retrospective in operation. Because Mr. Foster's appeal involves challenges to the validity of MIRA, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over his claims. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.³

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. City of Lake Saint Louis v. City of O'Fallon, 324 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Mo. banc 2010).⁴ In reviewing the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of the petition, this Court considers the grounds raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss and does not consider matters outside the pleadings. Id. In determining whether a motion to dismiss should have been granted, the appellate court reviews the petition “in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.” Id. If the motion to dismiss can be sustained on any ground alleged in the motion, the trial court's ruling will be affirmed. Farm Bureau Town and Country Ins. Co. of Missouri v. Angoff, 909 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Mo. banc 1995).

Mr. Foster's Claims are not Ripe for Review

The trial court dismissed Mr. Foster's petition on the basis that his declaratory judgment action did not present a justiciable controversy. Therefore, it is first necessary to determine whether Mr. Foster satisfies the requirements for maintaining a declaratory judgment action. To maintain a declaratory judgment action, the party seeking the declaration must demonstrate that (1) a justiciable controversy exists and (2) the party has no adequate remedy at law. Levinson v. State, 104 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2003). A justiciable controversy exists when the plaintiff: (1) “has a legally protectible interest at stake;” (2) “a substantial controversy exists between parties with genuinely adverse interests;” and (3) “that controversy is ripe for judicial determination.” Id. In the present case...