Foster v. Town of Waterford
| Decision Date | 13 April 1982 |
| Citation | 443 A.2d 490,186 Conn. 692 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jane E. FOSTER v. TOWN OF WATERFORD. |
Sidney Axelrod, Groton, for appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas F. McGarry, New London, for appellee (defendant).
Before PETERS, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO, SHEA and COVELLO, JJ.
This appeal challenges the propriety of the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's losing control of the motor vehicle that she was operating was the sole proximate cause of her resulting personal injuries and damages.
On December 9, 1977, at approximately 5:30 in the morning, the plaintiff was operating her 1974 Chevrolet Blazer in a southerly direction on Oil Mill Road in the town of Waterford. It was a cold, dark and drizzly morning while she drove to work as a waitress in East Lyme. While traveling along the narrow, two-lane country road the plaintiff's motor vehicle hit a patch of ice. The motor vehicle then crossed the northbound lane and mounted an embankment on the northbound side of the road. The top of the embankment consisted of a three-foot high stone wall. A boulder, approximately eighteen inches in diameter, lodged between a front wheel and the frame of her motor vehicle and prevented the plaintiff's control of steering. The source of the boulder is disputed. The plaintiff's motor vehicle traveled along the embankment for approximately eighty-five feet and then turned over onto the road. At some point while the motor vehicle traveled on its top forty-nine feet farther, the plaintiff was ejected from the motor vehicle onto the road. The plaintiff's injuries included permanent nerve, muscle, and spinal damage.
In her action against the defendant for maintaining a defective highway, 1 the plaintiff alleged that the boulder was near the traveled portion of the highway and obstructed her use of the highway, causing her to lose control of the steering after the skid, and thereby proximately causing her injuries. 2 As a special defense, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was "more than slight" when compared with any negligence of the defendant. 3 After a trial to the court, it found that the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was her failure to operate her motor vehicle under proper control. The trial court expressly made this finding regardless of whether the motor vehicle initially skidded on ice. Because this finding was dispositive of liability, the trial court did not consider the other issues presented. In the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment rendered against her, the plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding proximate cause without any basis in the facts. 4
In her action pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-149, the plaintiff had the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the defective highway was "the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed, which means that the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence." Lukas v. New Haven, --- Conn. ---, p. ---, 439 A.2d 949 (1981). We have had recent occasion to discuss the nature of proximate cause as an element of negligence. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 383-84, 441 A.2d 620 (1982). In that case, we explained that this court will not disturb a trial court's factual finding of proximate cause unless it is clearly erroneous. Id., 386, 441 A.2d 620. If the record reasonably and logically supports the conclusion that the plaintiff lost control of her motor vehicle as a result of her negligence and that her failure to maintain control was the sole substantial factor in causing her personal injuries and damages, then the plaintiff has not sustained her burden and the judgment of the trial court must stand. See, e.g., id., 383, 441 A.2d 620, and cases cited therein.
On direct examination, the plaintiff testified that she was coasting at a speed of less than twenty miles per hour, with her foot off the accelerator pedal, at the time her motor vehicle skidded on a patch of ice. She further...
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State v. Mitchell
...seek an articulation of the facial basis for the court's conclusions as provided in Practice Book § 4051. See Foster v. Waterford, 186 Conn. 692, 694 n. 4, 443 A.2d 490 (1982); see also Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 739 n. 2, 453 A.2d 1151 (1982); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 186 Conn. 387, 3......
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Williamson v. Commissioner of Transp.
... ... prove that the defective highway was the sole proximate cause of their injuries. See Foster v. Waterford, 186 Conn. 692, 695, 443 A.2d 490 (1982); Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 207, 439 ... ...
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Lamb v. Burns, 12730
... ... In analogous cases involving defective town roads, this court recognized that "[n]otice to a policeman ordinarily is not notice to the ... See Kolich v. Shugrue, 198 Conn. 322, 326, 502 A.2d 918 (1986); Foster v. Waterford, 186 Conn. 692, 695, 443 A.2d 490 (1982); Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 207, ... ...
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Janow v. Town of Ansonia, 4506
...from contributory negligence, the defendant cites Lukas v. New Haven, supra, 184 Conn. at 207, 439 A.2d 949, and Foster v. Waterford, 186 Conn. 692, 694, 443 A.2d 490 (1982). These cases are inappropriate to the facts before us. In Lukas, the defendant simply denied the plaintiff's allegati......