Foster v. U.S.

Decision Date16 August 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-5260,84-5260
Citation768 F.2d 1278
PartiesRobert McK. FOSTER, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Almon O. Thompson, Deceased, and Doris E. Thompson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Daniel Donnelly, Crossfields, Garrison, N.Y., James Tribble, Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl, Todd Cowart, Diane H. Hutt, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

David Hutchinson, Trial Atty., Civ. Div., Torts Branch, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges and WRIGHT *, Senior Circuit Judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

I. FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant is the personal representative of the Estates of Almon O. Thompson and Doris E. Thompson, a Florida couple, who were killed in a plane crash in Lake Michigan. At the time of their deaths they were on a journey from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Oshkosh, Wisconsin in a plane which was partially owned by Mr. Thompson, in order to attend the Experimental Aviation Association Annual Convention. Plaintiff-appellant, as the personal representative of the estate, filed this complaint alleging that the defendant-appellee, the United States, was negligent in providing air traffic control services to the Thompsons. The district court, applying the conflicts laws of the State of Illinois, (the place of the alleged misconduct), determined that the Florida wrongful death statute should be applied in this case. It was the plaintiff's position that the Illinois wrongful death statute should be used. In Florida, unlike Illinois, the representative of the decedents' estate may recover on behalf of non-minor children only if they are "partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support." Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 768.18.

A bench trial was conducted on the issue of dependency. 1 The court determined that the plaintiff-appellant had not met the burden of establishing that Beth Ann, the decedents' sole heir, was partly or wholly dependent upon the decedents' for support or services, and ruled that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 Plaintiff-appellant perfected the instant appeal raising the following issue: Whether the district court's conclusion, using Illinois conflicts of law principles, that the Florida Wrongful Death Act instead of the comparable Illinois provision should be applied in this case, was erroneous.

II. THE LEGAL ISSUE IN CONTEXT

A. The Applicable Law

Plaintiff brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C Secs. 1346(b), 2671-80. Under this Act, the liability of the United States for an injury is to be determined "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). This includes the choice of laws doctrines of that jurisdiction. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82 S.Ct. 585, 590, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). In this case, the Thompsons' aircraft was being controlled from the ground by air traffic controllers located in the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center. Neither side disputes, therefore, that the Illinois choice of law doctrines governs this case.

1. Illinois' conflicts law

The Illinois courts apply the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, (Restatement (Second)) to determine the applicable law in choice of law decisions. This test incorporates a presumption that the local law of the state where the injury occurred should govern unless another state has a "more significant relationship" to the occurrence or to the parties. 3 Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Ill.App.3d 485, 55 Ill.Dec. 375, 380, 426 N.E.2d 350, 355 (1981); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 48, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1970). The Restatement provides a set of criteria that are to be used for the determination of the state with the "most significant relationship." This set of criteria includes a number of contacts to be taken into account in order to make the choice of law determination. These contacts are: (1) the place of the injury; (2) the place of the misconduct; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. 4 The contacts are to be evaluated and weighed according to the relative importance to the issue involved and according to the purposes sought to be achieved by the relevant rules of the interested states. Rather than merely counting contacts, Illinois uses a "sophisticated 'interest analysis' " approach to conflicts problems. Mitchell, supra, 426 N.E.2d at 355. Thus, the application of choice of law rules is not a mechanical process of cranking various factors through a formula. Critical to any conflicts analysis is the notion that a court must examine the choice of law rules not with regard to various states' interest in general, but precisely with regard to each state's interest in the specific question involved. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1981) (Using Illinois conflicts principles).

The Restatement (Second) assigns no particular weight or priority to the factors listed in Sec. 145(2). The particular weight, therefore, given to any factor will vary from issue to issue as well as among different fact situations involving the same issue. See Scoles & Hay, Conflict of Laws Sec. 17.21, p. 588 (West 1982). Furthermore, it is not the state with the greatest number of contacts but with the most significant contacts whose law will govern as to that particular issue. Leschkies v. Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 80, 82 (N.D.Ill.1979) (applying Illinois conflicts law). This case involves the application of Illinois conflicts law to determine whether Illinois' or Florida's wrongful death statute should apply.

B. The Issue to be Decided
1. The different laws

The precise issue in this case is whether the Illinois or Florida Wrongful Death Statute should be applied pursuant to the Illinois conflicts law. The question of which state's law regarding liability would apply is not before us. 5 Pursuant to the conflicts doctrine of "depecage," different substantive issues in a single case may have to be resolved under the laws of different states where the choices influencing decisions differ. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law, Sec. 3.4 p. 72 (2d ed. 1980). However, in this case there is only one issue to be decided.

In this case the district court determined that:

After careful consideration of all of the points and authorities cited and argued by counsel, the court has concluded that under the "most significant contacts" test provided by Illinois conflicts law, Florida law must govern this wrongful death action. Manos v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 295 F.Supp. 1170 (N.D.Ill.1969). The decedents were citizens of Florida, the sole heir currently resides in Florida, the decedents estate was probated in Florida, and any proceeds of this suit will be distributed here. See id. at 1173 n. 2.

The plaintiff-appellant argues that a review of the contacts previously enumerated in Sec. 145 of the Restatement (Second) indicates that the Illinois statute and not the Florida Wrongful Death Act should have been used. The argument in its simplest form is that since the negligent conduct occurred in Illinois, and that Beth Ann, the decedents' sole beneficiary lived in Illinois at the time of the accident as well as the fact that the relationship between the Thompsons and Beth Ann was centered in Illinois, the Illinois statute should have been utilized. Thus, appellant maintains that the decision of the district court to use the Florida Wrongful Death Act should be reversed.

Under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 768.16-27 (West Supp.1984), Beth Ann must be a survivor, as defined in Sec. 768.18(1) to recover. 6 See Capiello v. Goodnight, 357 So.2d 225, 227 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), appeal dismissed, 365 So.2d 712 (Fla.1978); Henderson v. Ins. Co. of North America, 347 So.2d 690 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977). As a "blood relative" she must show at least partial dependence "on the decedent for support or services," in order to be a "survivor." Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 768.18(1) (West.Supp.1984). In contrast, Illinois provides a cause of action for the next of kin even where the only beneficiary is an adult married child who is not dependent on the decedent for support. Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 3, Sec. 11 (Smith-Hurd 1983); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill.App.2d 527, 151 N.E.2d 120 (1958). 7 Although the beneficiary must show pecuniary loss in order to recover, a lineal descendant is presumed to suffer substantial pecuniary loss subject to rebuttal. Fontanne v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc., 105 Ill.App.3d 306, 61 Ill.Dec. 178, 434 N.E.2d 331 (1982).

a. the relevant policies

The issue involved here is the definition of the class of beneficiaries in whose behalf a wrongful death action can be brought. There are two competing policies at work.

First, the broad purpose behind both acts is to shift the burden of loss from the decedent's survivors to the wrongdoer. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 768.17; Elliott v. Willis, 89 Ill.App.3d 1144, 45 Ill.Dec. 287, 289, 412 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1980) ("purpose ... is to compensate a family, as plaintiffs for the injury ..."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 92 Ill.2d 530, 65 Ill.Dec. 852, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982). Shifting the burden is aimed toward compensating victims and deterring tortious conduct. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra, 426 N.E.2d at 358; Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 598 F.Supp. 377 (S.D.Fla.1984).

Second, the class of beneficiaries is limited in order to protect defendants, i.e., by insuring that defendants need compensate only those suffering a loss. Florida does so by requiring dependency...

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